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With increasing frequency commentators have been urging greater
reliance on the market mechanism to allocate resources in a variety of
fields.1 There has been relatively little examination, however, of the
extent to which decentralized mechanisms can be used to handle the
controversial social problem of conflicts among neighboring land-
owners.2 Land development in urban areas is one of the most regulated
human activities in the United States. In recent decades, public regula-
tion of urban land has increased sharply in incidence 3 and severity,4
but dissatisfaction with the physical appearance and living arrangements
in American cities continues to grow. Despite the evident shortcomings
of present public regulatory schemes, even those commentators who pro-
pose reliance on the market mechanism in other areas tend to concur
with the prevailing view that increased public planning is the most
promising guide for the growth of cities.5 This article advances a
different thesis: that conflicts among neighboring landowners are gen-
erally better resolved by systems less centralized than master planning
and zoning.6
I The trend is international. See Lindblom, The Rediscovery of the Market, PUBLIC
INTEREST, Summer, 1966, at 89. Perhaps surprisingly, Ralph Nader is in principle sym-
pathetic: "Hence, our general industrial policy should encourage competition in our
economy by minimizing regulation, except when clearly necessary." Green & Nader, Eco-
nomic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 883
(1973).
2 The leading articles advocating market-oriented solutions to land use problems in-
dude: Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
Coase, Social Cost]; Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAw & ECON. 71 (1970) [herein-
after cited as Siegan, Non-Zoning]; Baxter &- Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, 15
J. LAw & ECON. 1 (1972); Note, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of
Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 335 (1972); Note, An Economic
Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1969). Siegan has recently expanded
his landmark article into a book: B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972). There are
a number of leading articles by the economist Otto A. Davis, often with joint authors:
Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAw & CONTEMr. PROB. 105
(1961); Davis, Economic Elements in Municipal Zoning Decisions, 39 LAND ECON. 375
(1963); Davis & Whinston, Economics of Complex Systems: The Case of Municipal Zon-
ing, 17 KYKLos 419 (1964); Davis & Whinston, On Externalities, Information and the Gov-
ernment-Assisted Invisible Hand, 33 ECONOMICA 303 (1966); Crecine, Davis & Jackson,
Urban Property Markets: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for Municipal
Zoning, 10 J. Lw & EcoN. 79 (1967).
3 For statistics on the proliferation of zoning ordinances, see text at notes 34--38 infra.
4 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY 205-06
(1969) [hereinafter cited as BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY].
5 See, e.g., MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (rent. Drafts No. 2, 1970 and No. 3, 1971);
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4; R. FELLMETH, POLITICS OF LAND 401-05 (1978);
Reps, The Future of American Planning: Requiem or Renaissance?, LAND USE CONTROLS,
No. 2, 1967, at 1.
6 Others, of course, have raised doubts about the wisdom of greater governmental in-
tervention in land markets. See generally sources cited note 2 supra. Among the
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First, the article offers goals for a land use control system. Three
major means of control are then evaluated in terms of these goals:
(1) mandatory public regulations (zoning),7 (2) consensual private agree-
ments (covenants)," and (3) the redefinition of property rights and their
private enforcement (nuisance law).9 Finally, the article explores how
these methods, and others, might be interrelated to produce a more
efficient and equitable system for guiding urban growth.10 The analyti-
cal approach, and the substance of the conclusions, have been heavily
influenced by Professor Guido Calabresi's groundbreaking work in
analyzing accident law. 1
I. EXTERNALITIES AND SYSTEMS FOR THEIR INTERNALIZATION
Economists assert that if the market remains free of imperfections,
market transactions will optimally allocate scarce resources. They do
not maintain that the distribution of these optimally-allocated resources
among specific individuals will necessarily be just. If injustices in
distribution arise, most economists urge that they be corrected by
direct cash transfer payments, rather than through more indirect at-
tempts at redistribution. According to this economic model, optimally
efficient patterns of city development would evolve naturally if urban
land development markets were to operate free of imperfections; city
planning or public land use controls would only make matters worse
from an efficiency standpoint. Since market forces would generate the
most efficient land use, the basic decision for policy makers would be
the distribution of urban pleasures among residents, with adjustments
preferably made through cash transfer payments.
most distinguished and persistent of these skeptics are Professors Allison Dunham, e.g.,
Property, City Planning, and Liberty, in LAW AND LAND 28 (C. Haar ed. 1964) and Fried-
rich Hayek, e.g., THE CONsTITUTION oF LIBERTY 340-57 (1960).
7 See text at notes 31-117 infra.
8 See text at notes 118-42 infra.
9 See text at notes 143-268 infra.
10 See text at notes 269-318 infra.
11 The most complete exposition of Professor Calabresi's analytical scheme is THE
CosT OF ACCIDENTS (Student ed., 1970) [hereinafter cited as G. CALABRESI, COST OF Acci-
DENTS]. That work incorporated much of his earlier articles on accident law: Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ. 499 (1961); The De-
cisions for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv. L. RIv. 713
(1965); Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J. 216
(1965); Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.
LAw & ECON. 67 (1968). For an artful commentary on the Calabresi approach, see Michel-
man, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J. 647 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Michelman, Book Re-
view]. The latest from the master are Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAHv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) and
Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055
(1972).
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review
Land development markets, however, are not perfect and in reality
city development is far from optimal. Economists regularly use land
markets to illustrate that where transactions or activities entail "exter-
nalities" or "spillovers"-that is, impacts on nonconsenting outsiders
-suboptimal resource allocation will often result. Although beneficial
externalities can also impair efficient allocation, this article deals pri-
marily with externalities harmful to nonconsenting outsiders .' Welfare
economists have urged that harmful externalities be "internalized"
to eliminate excessive amounts of nuisance activity. Internalization is
said to be accomplished through devices that force a nuisance-maker to
bear the true costs of his activity.'3 Internalization of harmful spillovers
in land development often requires some departure from what this
article calls a laissez faire distribution of property rights, an imaginary
legal world where each landowner can choose to pursue any activity
within the boundaries of his parcel without fear of liability to his
neighbors or governmental sanction. These departures range from those
that are compatible with the continuance of private markets to those
that seek to supplant the market mechanism altogether; thus, systems
for internalizing harmful spillovers range from relatively decentralized
ones that emphasize private ordering to others that are highly rollec-
tivized and rely on mandatory decrees.14
This article will examine a spectrum of internalization systems as
they might apply to a specific land use problem, the location of grocery
stores in the Santa Monica Mountains. These mountains, actually a
low range of hills never exceeding 2,000 feet in height, divide the City
of Los Angeles into roughly two halves, the San Fernando Valley on
the north and the Los Angeles Basin on the south. The attractive
physical features of the mountains and the views they offer have made
them a popular residential area for the wealthy, as indicated by the
communities in their foothills (Beverly Hills, Belair, and Pacific Pali-
12 This narrowing of focus should not be construed as a downgrading of the impor-
tance of dealing with activities having beneficial spillovers. Devices for increasing the
optimality of resource allocation by providing compensation for beneficial spillovers-
bounties, modifications of the lai, of unjust enrichment, bonus zoning, and the like-
deserve far more attention from scholars and policy makers than they have yet received.
13 The following text is a brief introduction to a spectrum of internalization devices.
For a discussion of the extremely difficult issues of identifying and measuring harmful
externalities, see text at notes 143-268 infra.
14 This system of categorization follows Michelman's suggestion that regulatory sys-
tems be judged by their degree of collectivization of decision making. Michelman ques-
tioned Calabresi's dichotomy of "general" and "specific" deterrence systems, corresponding
roughly to market systems and public regulatory systems, since that bisection tends to
obscure the actual range of gradations of collective action. See Michelman, Book Review,
supra note 11, at 661-66.
[40:681
Alternatives to Zoning
sades). Virtually all of the buildings in the mountains today are single-
family detached houses. Most of the people living near the top must
drive as long as ten minutes down the mountains to reach the nearest
grocery store. Children who live in the mountains obviously cannot
walk or bicycle to a store to buy a soft drink, baseball cards, or crayons.
In light of the rather high density of houses at the top of the mountains
and the severe isolation from other commercial facilities, there is
probably sufficient market demand to support a small mom-and-pop
or convenience-type grocery store at one of the key intersections of the
road that runs along the crest. If such a store were built, however, both
the resulting traffic and noise and the unattractiveness of the store
might cause some diminution in the value of nearby residences, an
apparent example of a harmful externality from a land use activity.
This harmful spillover is not internalized to the grocer under existing
law since the drop in neighboring property values is borne by the home-
owners if the grocery is normally operated.";
One option for handling externalities from unneighborly land uses
is to adopt a laissez faire distribution of property rights, and rely
entirely upon informal social forces rather than governmental action
to control land use decisions. This policy has more to commend it than
first appears; legal sanctions are among the least civilized ways of
handling conflicts between neighbors. Socially harmful behavior gener-
ally has been most effectively controlled by socialization of the young,
not the coercive force of law. If manners cannot deter certain antisocial
behavior, like littering or poor maintenance of front yards, that behavior
may not be efficiently controllable at all. 16
The best-mannered societies tend to be small, long-lived, and stable
in population. The historic beauty of Italian villages, or cities in the
Netherlands and Switzerland, is undoubtedly attributable in large part
to the smallness, antiquity, and stability of the societies that contain
them. These characteristics foster more uniform acceptance of moral
and aesthetic codes and allow stronger social sanctions against violations.
The United States, a young, large country with a highly diverse and
15 Taverns and drive-in restaurants have been held to be public or private nuisances
and consequently enjoined from further operation. See, e.g., State v. Rapauno, 153 So. 2d
353 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); Annot., 5 A.L.R.Sd 989 (1966); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 572 (1963).
There are no reported American cases, however, holding that normally operated small
groceries are nuisances. Cf. Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1407 (1943).
16 "Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great measure, the
laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then. Manners are
what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize or refine us, by a con-
stant, steady uniform insensible operation, like that of the air we breathe in." E. BURKE,
LETERS ON A R.EGICIDE PEACE, I (1797).
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mobile population is less able to produce good neighbors through social
sanctions, and American cities suffer for it. 1-7 In the Santa Monica
Mountains case, it is unlikely that the good manners of Southern
California entrepreneurs will optimally constrain the location and design
of groceries; that degree of socialization may never occur in a society
as mobile as that of Southern California.
If manners are not enough, it may suffice for government to aid the
laissez faire system by providing enforcement mechanisms for contracts
negotiated between a grocer and nearby homeowners bothered by his
operation' s This approach remains highly decentralized, since the
grocer and his neighbors negotiate the price and terms of a transfer
of control over land use from the grocer to the homeowners. A further
modification occurs when government alters the laissez faire distribu-
tion of property rights by granting homeowners the right to reimburse-
ment for certain types of harm caused by the land uses of grocers. When
the parties then determine land use allocation through bargaining and
litigation, the homeowners are able to force the grocer to bear more
of the costs of his actions than he bears under the pure laissez faire
system. In the Anglo-American legal system, this modified system is
encompassed by the law of nuisance.
If greater intervention is necessary, the policy maker still has a range
of options. Regulatory taxation is a mild form of public intervention.
In the Santa Monica Mountains case, this system would involve a
publicly assessed and collected tax on the grocery for its harmful
qualities. A properly calculated tax would force the grocery to take into
account the full social costs of its activities.' A variation of regulatory
taxation is a system of fines assessed without careful regard to the actual
external costs of the penalized activity.
Regulatory taxation and fines are more centralized approaches than
nuisance law and private agreements. The amounts of monetary trans-
fers are established by unilateral public assessment rather than private
negotiation, and enforcement is the responsibility of government offi-
17 The beautiful small towns of Vermont, with their historic color combinations of
red barns and white houses with green trim, are evidence that manners can be an effec-
tive land use control under the right conditions even in the United States. These towns
were not produced and maintained by legislative controls; they are the result of infor-
mal social pressures on anyone who would violate prevailing aesthetic norms. For a
thoughtful analysis of the role of good manners and the conditions likely to foster them,
see R. M UNDELL, MAN AND ECONOMICS 188 (1968).
18 These mechanisms would include rules on defenses, computation of damages, and
the like, in addition to procedures and institutions for enforcement.
19 A concept of fairness may suggest that the injured homeowners should be the
beneficiaries of the tax revenues. Cf. text and note at note 301 infra.
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cials, not aggrieved private parties. These more centralized mechanisms
retain some of the advantages of the market since the grocer, although
forced to bear at least some of the external damage to his neighbors
through the tax or fine, is free to choose whether or not to operate the
grocery.
That free choice disappears as the internalization systems become
more centralized. Mandatory minimum standards of conduct for per-
mitted activities are the next device on the continuum. Such standards
might be contained in ordinances that control the hours a grocery may
be open, prohibit selected types of signs or roofing materials, or place
a minimum on the amount of available parking space. Mandatory mini-
mum standards prevent the grocer from undertaking a prohibited
activity, even if he is willing to pay for its external costs. Standards are
generally limited to undesirable subactivities incidental to a larger
permitted activity, but the imposition of standards differs only in
degree, not in kind, from mandatory prohibitions on activities. Prohibi-
tions are more centralized than standards merely because the collective
judgment being rendered is on a more momentous scale.20
The most centralized, nonmarket devices are collective directives to
landowners, ordering them to carry out affirmative activities they would
not otherwise undertake. An example of a directive is a mandatory
order to a grocer to paint his store. A directive of this sort might issue
under a housing code enforcement program or be contained in a court
decree in a nuisance case. The line between standards and prohibitions
on the one hand and directives on the other is not, however, a sharp one.
As more activities and subactivities are prohibited through other de-
vices, landowners are in effect directed into a specific course of action
in developing their property.
A cataloguing of methods of internalizing harmful externalities gives
but an outline of possible systems. All of the devices on the continuum
of interventions, from informal sanctions to public directives, can be
combined with infinite variety.
II. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING LAND USE CONTROL SYSTEMS
How are intelligent choices to be made from this array of alternative
actions? Problems of resource allocation have been attacked with the
20 Prohibitions and standards may be selective or blanket in scope. There are no
grocery stores on the crest of the Santa Monica Mountains because the City of Los An-
geles prohibits them in that location. This prohibition is selective, however, as the loca-
tion of grocery stores elsewhere in Los Angeles is permitted. In mid-1971, the few
commercially zoned tracts in the mountains within the city were either isolated from
the largest residential areas or located far down from the crest in some of the larger
canyons. For shopping, most residents must drive to stores at the foot of the mountains.
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greatest conceptual rigor by economists. They generally judge the im-
pact of social policies by two basic standards: efficiency and equity.21
A measure is inefficient if it is likely to waste resources, that is, allocate
scarce goods and services in a suboptimal manner. Equity, however,
is a function of the distribution of resources, or who ends up with what
share of the wealth. For example, uninternalized harmful spillovers
from land use activities may not only result in inefficiencies, but may
also cause redistributions of wealth that are perceived as unjust. Follow-
ing other legal scholars who have applied welfare economics to problems
of external cost, this article employs efficiency and equity as the two
basic criteria for evaluating land use control systems.22
The notion of efficiency requires some dissection. When a conflict
among neighboring land uses arises, three reasonably distinct types of
resource diminutions may occur, singly or in combination. First, harm-
ful externalities decrease the utility and thus the value of neighboring
property. To keep the terminology as simple as possible, this factor
will be called nuisance costs. Under a laissez faire distribution of prop-
erty rights, these costs would probably be very high. A second possible
source of resource diminutions will be termed prevention costs. This
category includes nonadministrative expenditures made, or opportunit
costs incurred, by either a nuisance maker or his injured neighbor to
reduce the level of nuisance costs. Prevention costs will tend to be
higher when either or both of the parties are compelled to undertake
specific steps than when they are permitted to select voluntarily among
21 The production and distribution of wealth, however, are not the sole societal con-
cerns. Land use control policies, particularly highly centralized ones, can severely threaten
individual liberty, a value not sufficiently recognized in economic theory. This analysis
devotes little space to liberty issues, not because of unimportance, but because the de-
privations of liberty caused by land use regulations, or uninternalized nuisances, are
rarely perceived as severe. See also text at notes 208-11 and 231-38 infra. For observations
on liberty issues that arise from efforts to control land development, see Dunham, supra
note 6, at 38-43; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Formulation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Ray. 1165, 1201-02 n.77 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Michelman, Property]. See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11,
at 1093, 1101-05.
22 In his examination of accident law, Calabresi states his goals as the "reduction of
accident costs" within the constraint of "justice." G. CAABRFeSI, COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra
note 11, at 24-33. Except for the ambiguities in his scheme discussed in note 29 infra,
these goals seem functionally comparable to efficiency and equity. Michelman's heroic
investigation of the issue of when government must compensate for losses occasioned by
public action revolves primarily around the goals of "utility" and "fairness." Michelman,
Property, supra note 21. Those goals correspond to the same economic notions. See id.
at 1181-83. The terms efficiency and equity are used here because they have greater cur-
rency outside legal literature. For more on the Calabresi and Michelman classification
systems, see notes 25 and 29 infra.
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available preventive measures. 23 Finally, administrative costs may also
diminish resources. This term will be used to encompass both public
and private costs of getting information, negotiating, writing agree-
ments and laws, policing agreements and rules, and arranging for the
execution of preventive measures.
If administrative costs are zero, optimal resource allocation is achieved
when the sum of nuisance costs and prevention costs is minimized.24
It will rarely be efficient to eliminate all nuisance costs, since that
action will ordinarily require unacceptable levels of prevention costs.
A major city could easily extinguish all nuisance costs from gas stations
by banning them within city limits. Such a measure, however, would
involve high prevention costs as all motorists would have to take long,
annoying trips to the suburbs to service their cars. Prevention costs in
this instance would probably far exceed the eliminated nuisance costs,
and overall efficiency would not be enhanced. 25
23 When a preventive step has utility to its sponsor other than its reduction of nui-
sance costs, the value of that utility is not a part of the prevention cost. For example,
if a homeowner buys an air conditioner to combat air pollution, the prevention cost is
the sales price of the air conditioner less the price the purchaser would have agreed to
pay for the appliance if there were no air pollution.
Given the possibility of minimizing prevention costs by maximizing the independent
utility of preventive action, the parties will seek the device or action that, in their par-
ticular situation, provides the maximum independent utility. Permitting the parties to
select voluntarily among available preventive measures is dearly more conducive to op-
timal resource allocation than the imposition of a uniform preventive measure in all
situations.
24 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 3-8; cf. G. CAL.Aass, Cosr oF ACCIDENTS, supra
note 11, at 26-31. For a fuller treatment of the Coase analysis, see text at notes 159-63
infra.
25 Some components of nuisance costs and prevention costs may be quite subtle. As-
sume that a major manufacturing facility is closed down, either because an incompatible
neighboring use makes its continued operation unprofitable, or because it has been abated
as a nuisance or a nonconforming use under a zoning law. The shutdown may cause
widespread unemployment in the short run and have other disruptive effects on the
economy. The land use policy that caused the demise of such a conspicuous employer
may demoralize firms and workers, causing reduced output, and generally discourage
entrepreneurs and investors because of the uncertainties created. Calabresi and Michel-
man have both enriched, and complicated, their analyses by separately classifying such
costs. As they certainly recognize, however, these costs are different only in subtlety, not
in kind, from the other classifications of costs they use. Thus, Michelman could have
simplified his approach by regarding "demoralization costs" as a subcategory, to be con-
sidered negatively in computing a measure's "efficiency gains." Michelman, Property, su-
pra note 21, at 1214-15. The subtle efficiency losses Calabresi denominates "secondary
costs," see note 29 infra, are perhaps less immediate than what he calls the "primary
costs" of accidents, but they could easily have been included under that heading. The
Michelman and Calabresi classifications of costs may be appropriate to the "taking" and
"accident" contexts for which they were developed, but they seem unnecessarily complex
for application to land use problems. "Nuisance costs" and "prevention costs," as used
here, include all subtle, indirect, long-term losses from either harmful externalities or
prevention systems.
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The weighing of nuisance costs and prevention costs is further com-
plicated by the fact that in reality administrative costs are not zero. All
land use control systems involve some form of administrative costs.
These costs may be collectivized through government, as in the case of
salaries for zoning officials, or borne directly by private persons, as in
the case of the costs of inculcating good manners, arranging for the in-
stallation of preventive devices, litigating nuisance suits, or deciphering
zoning codes. The overall goal from an efficiency standpoint is the
minimization of the sum of nuisance costs, prevention costs, and ad-
ministrative costs.
The goal of equity, however, complicates matters considerably; an
efficient policy may be an unfair one, particularly when the gains of
the policy are not distributed to those injured by its imposition.2 6
Because they have found no theoretically sound basis for making inter-
personal comparisons of utility, many economists believe that they can
at best only describe the wealth transfer effects of a policy, but that
they cannot assess the fairness of those transfers. Thus, they either
ignore the issue of equity27 or defer to courts and legislatures. 28 The
legal profession can certainly provide guidance to those institutions,
and most legal scholars writing on welfare economics have been careful
to consider equity criteria in their analysis. 29 The degree of unfairness
26 If a policy is efficient, its total gains by definition exceed the harm it imposes.
27 Coase deliberately avoids consideration of equitable issues in his landmark article:
"The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximize the value of
production." Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15; "When an economist is comparing
alternative social arrangements, the proper procedure is to compare the total social
product yielded by these different arrangements." Id. at 34.
28 See, e.g., Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 AME.R. ECON. REV.
90-91 n.3 (1967). An impressive exception is Thurow, Toward a Definition of Economic
Justice, PUB. INTEREST, Spring, 1973, at 56.
29 See note 22 supra. Calabresi treats undesirable changes in income distribution not
primarily as issues of "justice," but as "secondary costs," which his formulas require to be
added to what are here termed administrative costs, prevention costs, and accident costs.
G. CALABRSi, Cosr oF ACCIDENTS, supra note 11, at 24 n.1, 27 n.4, 28 n.6. He is aware
that economists would be troubled by this classification, since they assert no such summa-
tion is possible. Although Calabresi at times suggests the contrary, see id. at 24 n.1, pre-
sumably the "justice" constraint would also take into account harsh fluctuations in
wealth brought about by an accident law system. His "secondary costs" also apparently in-
clude subtle efficiency losses; at least Michelman thinks that was Calabresi's intention.
See Michelman, Book Review, supra note 11, at 650, 682. Michelman himself is perhaps
not consistent in his interpretation of "secondary costs." Compare id. at 650 n.10, with
id. at 682. From a standpoint of sound economic theory and to avoid the resulting con-
fusion, Calabresi perhaps should have considered all distributional issues under the
"justice" goal, not the "accident cost reduction" goal. Cf. Posner, Book Review, 37 U.
CHI. L. Rv. 636, 644 n.17 (1970).
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of a system obviously cannot be quantified and persuasive arguments
about fairness issues are hard to construct; nevertheless legal scholars
must confront an issue so central to the law.30
III. AN EVALUATION OF ZONING
The analytical framework constructed above will first be applied to
zoning.3 1 Zoning relies primarily on selective prohibitions and the
imposition of mandatory standards on permitted activities, and thus
lies toward the collective end of the spectrum of alternatives. General-
izing about a local governmental practice like zoning, however, is
dangerous business. There is no consistent practice as to what will be
included in a zoning ordinance; further, many local governmental pro-
hibitions, mandatory standards, and directives affecting land use may
be contained in regulations falling under other labels-subdivision
regulations, building codes, housing codes, fire codes, health codes, and
the like. From an economic standpoint, however, local zoning regula-
tions are the most significant land use controls; in most areas they have
a far greater effect on land values than other kinds of regulatory ordi-
nances. Thus zoning constitutes an ideal model for highlighting the
economic consequences of all types of mandatory regulations.
The regulatory framework of zoning ordinances in the United States
is surprisingly uniform. The typical structure is based on the landmark
New York City zoning law of 191632 and the Standard State Zoning
30 Professor Michelman has proposed as a standard of fairness that requiring a person
to bear a loss is not unfair if he should be able to perecive that refusing compensation
to people in his situation is likely to promote the welfare of people like him in the
long run. Michelman, Property, supra note 21, at 1223. This article invokes Michelman's
standard of fairness, despite its operational difficulties, more often than any other one. His
fairness test is obviously linked to efficiency considerations. See text and note at note 69
infra. Michelman's standard for fairness is analogous in many respects to John Rawls's sec-
ond basic principle of a just society: "social and economic inequalities, for example, inequal-
ities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society." J. RAwrs, A
THEoRY OF JusncE 14-15 (1971). Both the Michelman and Rawls approaches show a kin-
ship in many respects to the classical economic notion of Pareto optimality.
31 Zoning literature has mushroomed in the last decade. Some of the better general
sources on the subject include: MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1970); J. DELAFLONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); D. MANDELEER,
THE ZONING DILEMMA (1971); BUILDING THE AmEIucaN CITY, supra note 4, at 199-253; L.
SAGALYN & G. STERNLIB, ZONING AND HOUSING Cosrs (1973). For an economic analysis of
zoning, see sources cited note 2 supra and ALONso, LocAniON AND LAND USE 117-25
(1964).
32 The evolution of this ordinance is detailed in two recent historical treatments of
zoning. S. MAELsma, THE POLrrMcS OF ZONING: THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE (1966); S. ToLL,
ZONED AMERICAN (1969). See also Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City,
82 YALE L.J. 338, 339-44 (1972).
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Enabling Act issued by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in
1922. 33 Although a few major cities had earlier made modest attempts
to control land uses, the precedent of the New York City ordinance
triggered the rapid spread of zoning, apparently because of its political
appeal as a device to protect the value of single-family homes. By 1925,
368 municipalities had zoning ordinances; in 1926 the United States
Supreme Court upheld zoning against constitutional challenge,34 and by
1930 the number exceeded 1,000.35 By 1967, over 9,000 governments
exercised zoning powers, nearly 50 percent of the municipalities first
adopting their ordinances after 1950.36 Today, zoning is virtually uni-
versal in the metropolitan areas of the United States, where more than
97 percent of cities having a population over 5,000 employ it3 Of cities
with over 250,000 population only Houston, Texas, has not enacted a
zoning ordinance.38
Zoning typically involves at least two types of controls. First, the
authorities define classes of activities, termed uses, that are permitted
in each geographic area. The specificity of use zones is increasing; while
the original New York ordinance had only three types of use districts, 39
the current ordinance contains sixty-six. 40 In addition, the zoning
officials set structural restrictions. The early controls of this type were
primarily concerned with building and lot dimensions, but recent
ordinances impose broader regulations dealing with matters like mini-
mum parking space and the use of signs. Both types of restrictions are
mandatory in application; violators receive orders of compliance, not
fines or regulatory taxes. Further, zoning is primarily prospective in
nature due to the harshness of retroactive application. Nonconforming
uses and, to a greater degree, nonconforming structures that preexist
zoning restrictions are generally allowed to continue.
Zoning regulations are enforced in large part through review by
local building officials of plans for proposed developments. Permits for
new construction, or the rehabilitation of existing structures, are
granted only if the proposals conform to zoning restrictions. Most
municipalities have a board of zoning appeals to review the decisions
33 Reprinted in MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 210-21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
34 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
35 BUILDING THE AMERICAN Crry, supra note 4, at 200.
36 A. MANVEL, LOCAL LAND AND BUILDING REGULATIONS 23, 31 (National Commission on
Urban Problems Research Report No. 6, 1968).
37 Id. at 24.
38 Id. at 17.
39 The city was divided only into "residence," "business," and "unrestricted" zones.
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 316, 128 N.E. 209, 210 (1920).
40 Mandel, Zoning Laws: The Case for Repeal, 135 ARCHITECTURAL FoRuM 58 (1971).
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of local officials on permit applications and to grant variances from the
ordinances to relieve "unnecessary-hardship." The modern trend, how-
ever, is to have prohibitions on use relieved not by the zoning appeals
board but by "special exception" or a map amendment approved by
the local legislature. Actions of both the board of zoning appeals
and the local governing body are subject to judicial review to assure
compliance with applicable procedural and substantive law.
A. Zoning and Efficiency
Despite the difficulty of discussing the uncoordinated practices of
over 9,000 local governments, the basic structure of zoning and present
knowledge about its effectiveness will support some general observations
about its likely efficiency as a land use control system.
1. Reduction in Nuisance Costs. Since zoning inevitably results in
considerable prevention and administrative costs, large reductions in
nuisance costs would have to be forthcoming for zoning to be deemed
efficient. At present, zoning administrators either ban or greatly re-
strict the location of highly undesirable uses. Where a noxious use is
permitted, planning officials generally try to place it adjacent to activities
not particularly vulnerable to the type of harm caused by that use. For
example, most zoning ordinances cluster industrial uses, often placing
the cluster adjacent to railroad tracks. Similarly, apartment zones are
commonly placed next to highways, perhaps on the assumption that
if apartment dwellers must tolerate the noise coming through the party
walls of their building, they should not be especially sensitive to the
hum of nearby automobiles. Most ordinances also set aside large areas
exclusively for single-family homes, a land use perceived as particularly
vulnerable to external harm.
These locational decisions unquestionably reduce the nuisance costs
that would occur if land uses were randomly distributed. Nonzoning
allocations, however, may also be better than random. Urban land
markets automatically reduce nuisance costs far below the level that
would be found with random land use distribution. Industrial plants
are not attracted to prime residential areas; instead they naturally
congregate along railroad tracks, just where zoning is likely to put them.
By such clustering, they are likely to achieve the benefits of convenient
access to major shipping lines and supporting service industries, less
vandalism, and lower risk of injury to neighborhood children. Similarly,
Bernard Siegan found that automobile dealerships in Houston tended
to locate benignly.41 All twenty-four of the "Big Three" dealerships he
41 Siegan, Non-Zoning, supra note 2, at 104-05.
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examined were located on major thoroughfares, and in twenty-one cases
he could find no loss in the value of neighboring properties. It is difficult
to disagree with Siegan's conclusion that a nonzoning system seems to
have allocated these uses as efficiently as any zoning scheme could have.
Thus, even if a zoning system is more efficient than random land use, it
does not necessarily follow that it reduces nuisance costs more than the
market mechanism.
In addition, zoning does not guarantee either elimination or intern-
alization of nuisance costs. Assume that a small parcel on the crest
road of the Santa Monica Mountains is rezoned for commercial uses,
and subsequently a convenience grocery store is built. If the zoning
change is legally sound, the neighboring homeowners who suffer losses
in property values are without a remedy, and the store is allowed to
operate without bearing its full social costs. The frequency with which
zoning changes occur 42 prompts fear that such failures are not uncom-
mon. Between 1964 and 1967, 30 percent of cities in the United States
with populations over 50,000 either enacted or comprehensively revised
their zoning ordinances.43 Nationally, about three-quarters of all re-
zoning applications are approved by governing bodies, and a slightly
greater fraction of variance requests are approved by the boards of
zoning appeals.4 A landowner where zoning is in flux could potentially
receive more certain protection from both covenants and nuisance law
than he receives from zoning.45
2. Prevention Costs. The great danger, however, is not that the
drafters of zoning ordinances will fail to eliminate nuisance costs, but
that they will try to eliminate them all. The pertinent goal is minimiza-
tion of the sum of nuisance, prevention, and administrative costs. If
zoning is directed solely toward eliminating nuisance costs, planners
will impose land use controls so restrictive as to create inefficiently
high prevention costs. For example, the zoning authorities in Los
Angeles have focused on the slight damage that might be inflicted on a
few homeowners if a small grocery store were built in the Santa Monica
42 Amendments tend to be less easy to secure, however, in expensive residential areas
like the Santa Monica Mountains.
43 A. MANVEL, supra note 36, at 31.
44 Id. at 32-33. Manvel's national data corroborate the findings of local surveys on the
variance process. See, e.g., C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 296-97 (1959). The percentage
of applications granted may overstate the ease of obtaining a desired modification, since
hopeless requests for changes may never be brought or be discouraged before the formal
application stage.
45 The effectiveness of covenants and nuisance law in protecting property values, of
course, depends on the substantive rules governing those systems. See text and notes at
notes 118-268 infra.
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Mountains and banned such land uses. 40 As a result, many mountain
residents incur the prevention cost of a twenty-minute round trip to buy
groceries, a total burden to them far more costly than the nuisance cost
of a neighboring grocery to a few homeowners. Elsewhere in Los
Angeles about one-half the land surrounding the UCLA campus is
presently zoned for single-family housing. Since over 50,000 people
work or study at UCLA every day, the demand for apartment accom-
modations in this area is tremendous. By seeking to protect a few
hundred homeowners from the harms caused by apartments, 47 the
Los Angeles planners have imposed substantially higher commuting
costs on a large segment of the population, and aggravated their city's
traffic, noise, and air pollution problems. Another example is found
in the common prohibition against the use of single-family homes as
business offices; this policy prevents professionals and small businessmen
from economizing on rental expenditures and travel costs, and deprives
residential areas of conveniently located professional and business
services.48 Even where a prohibition is desirable, the abatement of a
preexisting nonconforming use often inflicts losses that appear large in
comparison to the reduction in nuisance costs achieved.49
Structural restrictions may also be a major source of prevention costs.
For example, fixing minimum lot sizes larger than consumers demand
increases the amount of urban land that must be consumed in order to
accommodate a given population increase; thus metropolitan areas tend
to spread farther than they would under a free market,0 increasing
transportation and utility costs throughout the urban network. Imposi-
tion of maximum building sizes may also involve prevention costs. In
Manhattan, architects designing highrise apartments have frequently
been instructed by developers to make maximum use of the zoning
envelope allowed. Prior to the early 1960's, this policy produced struc-
tures in the form of wedding cakes and more recently sheer towers
with tiny, useless plazas in front of them.5' Without doubt, building
46 See note 20 supra.
47 These homeowners might be better off from a financial standpoint if the area were
rezoned for apartments. Such a change would greatly increase the value of their land
and, after selling out, they could move into a nicer home in nearly as convenient a
neighborhood.
48 See, e.g., Skrysak v. Village of Mount Prospect, 13 Ill. 2d 329, 148 N.E.2d 721 (1958)
(upholding a prohibition against opening a dental office in a single-family home).
49 This can occur even where constitutionally mandated amortization periods are ap-
plied. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954) (affirming
termination of wholesale and retail plumbing supply business within five years).
50 In cases where the demand for land is highly elastic, however, lot size minima could
actually reduce the consumption of urban land.
51 See Mandel, supra note 40, at 59.
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bulk controls caused major inefficiencies in the interior layouts of
these buildings and adversely affected architectural variety in the city,
in return for at best insignificant improvements in the protection of
the city's light and air.52 Side yard requirements in residential areas
are perhaps a more common example of controls with high prevention
costs. If the width of each side yard must be 10 percent of the width
of the lot,53 the inventory of buildable urban land is thereby reduced by
one-fifth. This is a high price for the elimination of all risk that a
building will block a neighbor's light and air. If neighbors negotiated
the uses of the respective sides of their parcels, it is unlikely that many
would make agreements that so depleted their supply of buildable land.
Other prevention costs resulting from zoning are more subtle.
In most communities, for example, zoning ordinances are designed to
promote the interests of single-family homeowners, often a majority
of the voting population. This constituency generally prefers strict
zoning controls, a policy that eventually causes a buildup of market
demand for some development not permitted by existing zoning regu-
lations. When this demand becomes large enough, the prodevelopment
forces are usually able to finance a winning campaign for a relaxation
of control, and an outbreak of new land development follows. This
pattern of long pauses in development, followed by bursts of activity,
can create substantial inefficiency in the land development industry.
For example, a prospective tightening of zoning restrictions on highrise
apartment buildings in New York City caused construction of an artifi-
cially high number of apartments in the early 1960's. This overbuild-
ing was a major cause of the 75 percent drop in private apartment
construction in Manhattan from the first half of the 1960's to the
second.54 The economic effects of this artificial boom-and-bust cycle
were probably great enough to impede the efficient functioning of
local construction firms and cause suboptimal employment of labor
in the building trades. Similarly, the pendulum cycle of zoning may
require architects and civil engineers to incur the expense of revising
52 Some architecture critics have asserted that the proliferation of plazas in New York
City since the 1961 zoning amendments has created, notably on Sixth Avenue, an unde-
sirable "broken teeth effect" of random open space. See Space Rates, NEW YoRK, Feb.
19, 1973, at 9.
53 A common requirement in the City of Los Angeles ordinance.
54 During 1961, the last year the old ordinance was in effect, developers filed plans for
150,000 multiple dwelling units in all of New York City. Under the new ordinance, ap-
plications for permits fell to 6,700 units in 1962 and 42,000 in 1963. Completion of units
lags behind the granting of permits by several years. See Kristof, Housing: Economic Facets
of New York City's Problems, in AGENDA FOR A CITY: ISSUES CONFRONnNG NEW YORK 328
(L. Fitch & A. Walsh eds. 1970).
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plans already on their drawing boards in order to accommodate the
latest shift in political winds.
Delay is another subtle but major prevention cost inflicted by legis-
lated land use regulations.55 Particularly when elections are approach-
ing, uncertainties about the timing and substance of public decisions
force developers to gamble on when to mobilize men and equipment.
Conservative developers thus extend lead times in construction sched-
ules, sometimes by years, to minimize the risks of having their resources
idled by political developments.
3. Administrative Costs. The most conspicuous administrative cost
of zoning is the direct cost of operating a public planning agency. Local
governments, however, are tightfisted in budgeting for their planning
staffs, and direct public costs are actually quite low. The Manvel survey
found that, in 1967, total spending by municipalities for planning,
zoning, and subdivision regulation was $70 million, only 61¢ per capita
for the cities involved. 6 That amount is less than half of the spending
on building code administration. 57
Planning and zoning operations also impose more indirect expenses
on local governments. For example, Manvel did not include the stipends
paid, or the good will exhausted, through the use of voluntary labor
to staff zoning appeals boards and planning commissions. Since
land use regulation is one of the major activities of local government,
a significant fraction of general governmental costs should be attributed
to it.58 Conflicts over land use regulation that are judicially resolved
may impose another sort of public cost. Local governments seek to
shift many of these public costs to private parties by imposing fees for
efforts to change existing regulations, or for securing permits to proceed
under them.
The private administrative costs necessitated by zoning systems far
exceed the public costs. Developers of urban land, and traders of urban
property, must investigate any public land use restrictions governing
development. The existence of zoning means that builders, land specu-
lators, civil engineers, architects, financial institutions, lawyers, and
55 There have been relatively few attempts to quantify the costs of delay. One multiple
regression analysis of variables affecting the sales prices of new single-family houses in
New Jersey indicates that each month of administrative delay in subdivision approval
adds an additional ninety-one dollars to the selling price in urbanized subdivisions. L
SAGALYN & G. STERNLmEB, supra note 31, at 62. See also id. at 59.
r6 A. MANvEL, supra note 36, at 29.
57 Some of the code administrative cost should be included as a zoning cost, however,
since building officials help enforce zoning ordinances through the permit system.
58 E.g., salaries of local officials, fees paid legal counsel, and overhead items like clerical
services and building maintenance.
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others involved in land development must maintain libraries of local
land use regulations and spend time studying them. These information
costs are greatly increased by the rapid changes in the regulations. 9
Substantial costs are also incurred when a landowner attempts to
amend the regulations related to his property through one of the many
avenues provided by the zoning system. In the case of major zoning
changes, large developers often wine and dine local officials, hire ex-
pensive consultants to make presentations at public hearings, initiate
large public relatiofis campaigns, 60 and make judicious campaign con-
tributions to key local officials. Another form of private cost is incurred
if neighboring homeowners organize to lobby in opposition to the
developer. In-major metropolitan areas zoning generates enough legal
conflicts to support several law firms specializing in zoning law. By
crude measurement zoning now produces almost four times as many
appellate opinions as nuisance and covenant law disputes combined.61
In many cities the total legal fees paid to zoning attorneys probably
significantly greater than the direct costs of running the public zoning
agency.
There are yet more subtle administrative costs that deserve mention.
The structure of local government in the United States is largely
shaped by the primary power that these governments have over land
use regulation. Many municipal boundary changes may in reality be
enacted mainly to manipulate regulations governing land use. For
example, landowners in Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C., have
frequently attempted to annex their properties to incorporated cities,
like Bowie or Gaithersburg, to avoid the stricter county zoning ordi-
nances. The nationally publicized incorporation of Black Jack, Mis-
souri, was inspired solely by a desire to exercise zoning power. 62 Many
cities in Southern California contract with their counties for virtually
all local services, retaining land use regulations as their sole active con-
59 See text at notes 42-44 supra.
60 In a zoning battle over its proposed new corporate headquarters in Greenwich,
Connecticut, the Xerox Corporation commissioned a $250,000 study by an eminent plan-
ning firm and delivered copies of the study to most of the town's residents. NEwswEEK.
June 5, 1972, at 80, 82.
61 This estimate is based on the number of pages of case headnotes found under the
"Nuisance," "Covenants," and "Zoning" headings in Volumes 12-15 of WEST's GENEAL
DIGEsT (4th Series), covering all appellate cases reported by the West system in the year
1970. Those four volumes include seventy-six pages on zoning, but only ten pages each
on nuisance and covenants. The reliability of this system of measurement is diminished
to the extent that the number and length of the headnotes generated by typical cases in
each category are substantially different.
62 For background on the Black Jack controversy, see National Observer, Feb. 8,
1971, at 1, 14.
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cern.63 One doubts whether these cities would even exist but for the
opportunity to exercise zoning power.
The total public and private administrative costs of zoning are far
from insubstantial. These costs, when added to the high prevention
costs zoning is likely to involve, may be so great that an entire zoning
ordinance is inefficient; that is, the reduction in nuisance costs is less
than the concomitant prevention and administrative costs. This occur-
rence is probably extremely common in the United States. Thus, other
internalization devices are likely to be better equipped to deal with
many problems now handled by zoning. Nevertheless, the efficiency of
zoning as an internalization device varies with the specific type of
externality at issue. This article will suggest later 64 that mandatory
regulations may indeed be the most efficient device for dealing with a
few pervasive land use problems.
B. Zoning and Equity
Zoning can promote equity by prohibiting unneighborly acts, thereby
protecting some landowners from privately inflicted losses. As it is
usually operated, however, zoning is an inequitable system; the Achilles'
heel of zoning is that it does not correct the changes in wealth distribu-
tion it causes. When a zoning decision increases the value of a parcel,
the owner is generally not obligated to disgorge the increased value.
Conversely, when a zoning action reduces property values, an owner is
not compensated for any losses unless he can obtain a judicial decision
that the ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional "taking."0 5
The effect of these policies is significant since zoning often affects
land values by multiples, not fractions. If a well-located parcel in
the Santa Monica Mountains were rezoned to permit grocery stores, the
value of the property would probably increase several times. In some
cases suburban land values have been multiplied by fifty following
rezoning that allowed construction of gas stations. 0 Risks of loss can
be equally dramatic, as illustrated by the famous case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 67 In Euclid, zoning restrictions reduced
03 Bradbury, Hidden Hills, and Rolling Hills in Los Angeles County are examples.
64 See text at notes 313-18 infra.
05 The fifth amendment cautions the federal government: "nor shall property be
taken without just compensation." The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
has been interpreted similarly to constrain the states. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Most state constitutions have comparable provisions; many
also prohibit the "damaging" of private property without compensation. NIcHoLs, EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 6.1 [3] (3d ed. 1970).
60 BMIING T E AmaRICAN Crry, supra note 4, at 226, citing a study by Grace Milgrim
in Philadelphia.
67 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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the value of part of the plaintiff's property by 75 percent. The plaintiff
introduced evidence, accepted as uncontroverted by the United States
Supreme Court, demonstrating that the zoning enactment had reduced
its property values by over $300,000, or more than one-third.", The
Supreme Court held that the village's zoning ordinance was constitu-
tional, and the realty company was not compensated for any part of
the loss. Of course, the loss may achieve higher proportions. Suburban
building companies commonly fear that land bought for subdivisions
will be rezoned into agricultural estates, a use restriction that could
wipe out most of their investment.
How can one judge whether changes in individual levels of wealth
caused by zoning are fair? The legal issue is usually stated to be whether
a "taking" of property has occurred for which just compensation must
be paid. Michelman asserts in his "fairness" test that it is not unfair
for an individual to bear a loss caused by a government regulation if
he should be able to see that, in the long run, failure to compensate
people in his position will be in the best interest of people in his
situation.69 Under this test the paradigm case for noncompensability
is where: (1) the efficiency of the government program that caused the
68 The plaintiff's tract in Euclid consisted of 68 acres with an 1,800-foot front on
Euclid Avenue, its southern boundary. 297 F. 507, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1924). In deciding the
case, the Supreme Court accepted the Realty Company's allegation that the strip abut-
ting Euclid Avenue, roughly eight acres about 1,800 feet long and 200 feet wide, had
been diminished in value from $150 per front foot to $50 per front foot. 272 U.S. at 384.
The next area back from Euclid Avenue, about twenty acres extending as much
as 1,800 feet in length and 550 feet in depth, was alleged to have diminished in value by
the restriction to residential-use from $10,000 an acre to $2,500 an acre. Id. The northern
part of the parcel, constituting the remaining forty acres, was zoned for industrial pur-
poses, the highest and best use. The height and bulk restrictions on that area will be
ignored and its value considered undiminished. The total loss suffered by the Realty
Company can then be charted as follows:
Prezoning Postzoning
Value Value Diminution
Euclid Ave.
Frontage $270,000 $ 90,000 $180,000
Next 550 feet 200,000 50,000 150,000
Remaining
acreage 400,000 400,000 -0--
$870,000 $540,000 S830,000
69 See text and note at note 80 supra. This standard is not a "pure" fairness test since it
turns on the claimant's calculation of the efficiency of compensation policies and his likeli-
hood of sharing in the gains of an efficient policy. Since all distributional policies, other than
random policies, affect the efficiency of resource allocation, determinations of fairness
are inevitably influenced by efficiency considerations.
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loss is transparently obvious, (2) the administrative costs of compensa-
tion are high, and (3) the losses suffered are small and widespread. In
such a situation, the injured individual will want the public program
to continue and can see that his interests as a taxpayer may be best
served in the long run if the government does not spend large sums in
arranging to make trivial payments.
Losses from zoning have only one characteristic in common with the
paradigm case; the administrative costs of making compensatory pay-
ments would be high indeed. The earlier efficiency analysis indicated,
however, that zoning normally will not be so obviously efficient that
the injured party would be disturbed by compensation rules that made
continuation of the zoning program difficult. More significantly, the
sorts of losses inflicted by zoning are often too great in magnitude, too
haphazard in incidence, and too infrequent over an individual's life
span to lead him to believe that in the long run the losses from the
program, even if random, would be fairly spread among landowners.
The situation is aggravated, from a fairness standpoint, by the
aggrieved landowner's knowledge that zoning decisions are not random.
Zoning is not a perfectly balanced roulette wheel, randomly bestowing
its wins and losses. In most communities the wheel is warped; friends
of the house come out winners while others are losers. Given the huge
amounts at stake, it is not surprising that special influence problems
have plagued zoning from its inception. The Fifth Avenue Association,
a strong force behind the passage of New York City's 1916 zoning law,
shaped that ordinance to serve its narrow interests, 70 and "practically
drafted its own use district"71 when the New York ordinance was
revamped in 1960. Special influence can be used by businessmen to
remove restrictions on their own land, and also to maintain or tighten
restrictions on competitors' property in order to bar competing enter-
prises.72 Reliable statistics on graft in the zoning process are lacking,
but a national commission that recently investigated zoning found that
"outright corruption is far from rare" and pointed to the "increasingly
frequent newspaper exposes of corruption." 73
70 S. ToLL, supra note 32, at 173-80.
71 S. MAKIELuU, supra note 32, at 102.
72 See, e.g., Forte v. Borough of Tenafly, 106 N.J. Super. 346, 255 A.2d 804 (1969),
where a would-be supermarket developer, who suffered a rezoning that barred his project,
alleged that the rezoning was for the "sole benefit of the merchants in the central busi-
ness core." Id. at 351, 255 A.2d at 806.
73 B UIHING THE AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 226. As evidence of this phenomenon,
consider the following casual compilation of recent newspaper stories. In New York City,
a builder was indicted for perjury for denying attempting to bribe a city planning com-
missioner to vote against the granting of a special permit to a competitor. N.Y. Times,
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The pervasiveness of special influence is inherent in the zoning
system. Judicial insistence on uniform standards for decision, a basic
way of preventing favoritism in government, is not possible in the case
of zoning; the name itself suggests a system of nonuniform regulation.
Since the courts cannot easily distinguish good planning from bad,
judicial checks on unfair variations in land use restrictions have been
minimal. Studies have documented the lawlessness of zoning variance
decisions in most communities. 7 4 Many courts have stopped trying to
police local zoning and consistently sustain the local government's
action under the "presumption of validity" given to zoning provisions.75
Local governing bodies have also manipulated zoning to benefit their
treasuries at the expense of arbitrarily designated landowners. One
practice, rarely withstanding judicial scrutiny when detected, is to
zone restrictively a parcel destined to be condemned for a public project,
thus reducing its fair market value and the amount of compensation
the government will owe the landowner.76 A more common, and legal,
technique is to restrict most of the undeveloped land within the munici-
pality, and then require developers to buy development rights through
some form of public contribution. The most common currency for
repurchase of development rights is dedication of part of the developer's
land for school sites, parks, roads, or utilities. Increased levels of exac-
Jan. 1, 1970, at 14. A former commissioner of Prince George's County, Maryland (a
suburb of Washington, D.C.), was convicted of taking a bribe from a land developer in
return for favorable consideration of rezoning applications. Washington Post, Oct. 28,
1971, at A-I, A-14. Two Chicago Aldermen were indicted for extorting bribes for zoning
changes. Washington Post, Mar. 29, 1973, at A-4. A surge of zoning bribery convictions
has recently swept southern California. These involved several officials of the City of Carson,
L.A. Times, Jan. 8, 1972, at Part II, 8; a Los Angeles City Councilman, L.A. Times, Sept.
9, 1972, at Part II, 1; and an influence peddler in Santa Barbara County, L.A. Times,
Mar. 24, 1973, at Part I, 1. For more California dirt, see R. FELLMNEr, supra note 5, at
482-86. The abuses discovered by investigators are assuredly only the tip of the iceberg.
74 C. HAAR, supra note 44, at 296-97; Babcock, The Unhappy State of Zoning Admin-
istration in Illinois, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 509 (1959); Dukeminier &. Stapleton, The Zoning
Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in Misrule, 50 KENT L.J. 273 (1962); Shapiro, The
Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv.
2 (1969); Yokley, The Place of the Planning Commission, and Board of Zoning Appeals in
Community Life, 8 VAND. L. REv. 794 (1955); Comment, Zoning: Variance Administration
in Alameda County, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 101 (1962); Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions:
The Philadelphia Experience, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 516 (1955).
75 Although local governments win a vast majority of the cases, some courts are willing
to invoke the prohibition against "spot zoning" and similar doctrines to overturn rezon-
ings that appear suspiciously arbitrary. Some courts have also struck down flexibility de-
vices in zoning that fail to contain standards adequately limiting the discretion of the
governing body. See, e.g., Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7
(1960).
76 See, e.g., Kissinger v. Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958); Annot.,
36 A.L.R.3d 751 (1971).
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tions ultimately work a redistribution of wealth to existing residents
from owners of undeveloped land in the jurisdiction when the exaction
policy is announced. In most situations a local government cannot
justly single out that group as a target for taxation while exempting
owners of developed land from the tax. Under Michelman's standard77
this practice would be inequitable since the administrative burden of
compensating the developer would be slight.
Zoning as a system of local government finance has recently taken
an imaginative leap in that pioneer of land use regulation, New York
City. The city has begun to lease the free space over city-owned struc-
tures to owners of adjacent lots who use that space to increase the
zoning envelope applicable to their lots.7 8 In short, the city is selling
development rights it had earlier zoned away. If administered uni-
formly, the sale of extraordinary development rights could approxi-
mate a system of fines, an attractively flexible system of land use
regulation.7 9 In New York, however, it has appeared to be a series of
ad hoc deals,80 a pattern certain to involve serious inequities and
corruption.8 ' "Bonus zoning," a recently developed technique now in
effect in San Francisco, New York City, and elsewhere, promises more
uniform results in the government-developer bargaining process. In
bonus zoning a developer is automatically relieved from certain zoning
restrictions if he includes in his development specific features desired
by the locality.8 2 To the extent that the terms of the bargain are
identified in the ordinance, the threat of corruption and unequal treat-
ment of prospective developers is diminished.
The inequities of zoning are not limited to its effect on landowners.
Recent legal commentary about zoning has emphasized its potential
as a vehicle for segregation of racial minorities and low income groups.8 3
77 See note 30 supra.
78 The initial application of this system involved the leasing of unused development
rights over the city-owned Appellate Division Court House at Madison Avenue and 25th
Street to an adjacent landowner for seventy-five years at an annual rent of $35,000 to
$50,000. The lessee was thus able to increase the size of his planned office building by
100,000 sq. ft., or nearly one-fourth. See New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. I, ch. 2,
§ 12-10 (1971); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HAyv. L. R . 574, 586-87 n.44 (1972).
79 See text at notes 297-312 infra.
80 See Note, supra note 32, at 358-61.
81 The largest New York City apartment developer, Samuel Lefrak, has asserted,
"There is no zoning anymore. It's all deals." N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, § 8, at 1.
82 For a fuller exposition of this technique, see Comment, "Bonus or Incentive Zon-
ing"---Legal Implications, 21 SYRAcusE L. REv. 895 (1970) and a number of the readings
in THE Nuw ZONING (N. Marcus & M. Groves eds. 1970).
83 See, e.g., L. SAGALYN & G. STRNLIEB, supra note 31; Lefcoe, The Public Housing Ref-
erendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. Rav. 1384 (1971); Sager, Tight
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In highly balkanized metropolitan areas, exclusionary policies, if wide-
spread enough, may cause substantial inefficiencies by widely separating
housing for working-class families from industrial job opportunities
and may be unfair to the excluded groups. Not surprisingly, small
governments do seek to keep social and fiscal undesirables out of their
communities entirely."4 Employing land use regulations to segregate
racial groups predates the pioneering New York ordinance. Some of
the earliest reported cases involving controls having the effect of zoning
dealt with devices designed to set apart the Chinese in California 5 and
Blacks elsewhere;8 6 these overt racial classifications have not survived
constitutional scrutiny.87
The separation of families by income, however, is still abetted by
many zoning ordinances, primarily through minimum lot size, lot
frontage, and floor area requirements for residences, and the total
exclusion of apartments and mobile homes.88 Needless to say, income
discriminations often have racial ramifications. Lawsuits attacking
these practices have primarily alleged violation of equal protection and
use of the police power for invalid purposes,89 with relatively little
success except in Pennsylvania ° and New Jersey.91 Legislative action
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767
(1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. Rrv. 1645 (1971);
Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969); Note, The Constitutionality of Local
Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary
Zoning after Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971).
84 Two recent Presidential commissions have sharply attacked this exclusionary use of
zoning. BUILDING THE AEmRICAN CITY., supra note 4, at 7, 19-20, 211-17; PREsmENr's Co?,I-
mrTrEE ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 4, 25, 140, 142-44 (1968).
85 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885);
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890).
86 See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 88 A.
546 (1913); Harden v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. 248, 93 S.E. 401 (1917).
87 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Buchanan held that a Louisville, Ky., ordi-
nance barring property sales to Blacks on blocks where a majority of existing residents
were White, deprived potential White transferors of due process. Today, the same result
would probably be grounded on the equal protection clause.
88 For a review of the cases on these generally lawful techniques, see sources cited in
note 83 supra. A. MANvxr., supra note 36, is the best source on the incidence of these
practices. His data disclose, for example, that 45 percent of all zoning governments im-
pose some sort of minimum floor area requirements and 13 percent wholly bar apart-
ments. Id. at 10-11.
89 For a provocative attempt to develop a different attack, see Comment, Right to
Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CI. L.
REv. 612 (1972).
90 The leading Pennsylvania cases hold that exclusionary objectives are not permissi-
ble under the police power. Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970)
(two- and three-acre minimum lot sizes invalid); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d
395 (1970) (total exclusion of apartments invalid); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (four acre minimum lot size invalid).
91 The New Jersey cases, however, are not grounded on the misuse of the police
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to deal with exclusionary zoning has been taken only in Massachusetts z
and California.93
In the United States zoning generally works to the detriment of the
poor and near-poor, racial minorities, and renters;9 4 it operates for
the benefit of the well-to-do, particularly homeowners, by artificially
increasing the supply of sites on the market usable only for expensive
homes and thus reducing their cost.95 The City of Los Angeles in
effect prohibits its citizens of average income or less, and all would-be
apartment dwellers, from living in the Santa Monica Mountains by
restricting land use there to single-family homes on large lots. Market
forces might have caused the Mountains to be inhabited primarily by
the well-to-do, but not as exclusively so.
C. Reforming Zoning
The problems just illustrated have not won zoning many friends
other than the 9,000 governments that employ it. Most critics of zoning
focus their attack on specific flaws. Jane Jacobs primarily attacked
power. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 NJ. Super. 11, 283
A.2d 353 (1971) (exclusionary zoning pattern invalid under state enabling act for failing
to promote a balanced community in accordance with the general welfare); Molino v.
Mayor and Council, 116 N.J. Super. 193, 281 A.2d 401 (1971) (garden apartment ordi-
nance designed in part to exclude school children violates larger families' rights to equal
protection).
92 The Zoning Appeals Act authorizes developers who are denied local approval to
build subsidized housing to appeal that decision to a state agency. The deision is then
reviewed under three statutory criteria: (I) regional housing needs, (2) traditional local
planning standards for residential development, and (3) whether the locality has already
accepted its annual, or total, quota of subsidized housing. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 408,
§§ 20-23 (Supp. 1971). The Act survived constitutional challenge in Board of Appeals v.
Housing Appeals Comm'n., 294 N.E.2d 393 (Mass. 1973).
93 The California statute prohibits consideration of ethnic or religious factors, or the
presence of housing subsidies, in zoning decisions. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65008 (West Supp.
1972).
94 Siegan concluded that tenants are better off in Houston than they would be in
zoned communities. Siegan, Non-Zoning, supra note 2, at 121. Zoning can also be used to
harass persons with unpopular political ideas or living styles. See, e.g., J. DmION,
SLOUCHING TowARDs BETHLEHEM 42-60 (1968) (describing Joan Baez's problems in open-
ing an Institute for the Study of Nonviolence in Monterey County California); Note,
Excluding the Commune from Suburbia: The Use of Zoning for Social Control, 23
HASTNGS L.J. 1459 (1972).
95 See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON URBAN HOUSING, supra note 84, at 143: "In some in-
stances so-called snob zoning may in fact so increase the supply of such high-quality
sites that land prices for rich house-buyers are reduced." One econometric study of land
markets in the Boston area, generally finding that zoning had little impact on market
allocation of residential occupancy, found its most systematic effect was the advantages
it brought high income households. L. Orr, Municipal Government Policy and the Lo-
cation of Population and Industry in a Metropolitan Area: An Econometric Study, 112-
16 (1967) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis on file in M.I.T. library). Orr's use of the "smallest
permitted residential lot-size" as the indicator to measure the exclusivity of a town's zon-
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zoning's lack of flexibility while ignoring, for example, the compensa-
tion problem.96 Civil rights groups are disturbed by the exclusionary
use of zoning, but rarely condemn the resulting efficiency losses. With-
out an overall framework for evaluating land use control systems, critics
may propose reforms that sensibly ameliorate their particular concerns,
but exacerbate other problems. For example, a suggestion to upgrade
the staff and procedures of the land planning structure97 is sound only
if the benefit from these changes will exceed the required increase in
administrative costs. Similarly, more frequent compensation for losses
inflicted by zoning decisions98 will solve equity problems and tend to
make planners more concerned about efficiency, but again at the expense
of increased administrative costs. Shifting land use planning power to
state or regional units99 would reduce the present evils of parochialism
and balkanization, but larger units are less responsive and less locally
knowledgeable than smaller ones and may draft cruder ordinances. A
tiered system, with the state handling statewide issues and localities
handling local issues, is possible,100 but increased costs of defining and
policing jurisdictional limits would result. Whether any of these narrow
reforms is sound depends ultimately on the relative size of the efficiency
gains and losses and the effect of the reform on the-fairness of the system.
Most of the zoning reforms that have been proposed do not address
the three fundamental weaknesses of the institution: (1) exclusive re-
liance on mandatory public standards, (2) concentration on prospective
development with little attention to existing land use problems, and (3)
sharp and frequent variability of regulations among zones.
1. The Inefficiency of Mandatory Public Standards. Compliance with
zoning laws is mandatory. Potential violators are denied permits; exist-
ing violators, unless specially protected, may be forced to comply with
zoning standards through mandatory injunctions. Zoning is thus an
ing seems crude, however, and may cast doubt on his findings. See also Branfman, Cohen
& Trubeck, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and the Residential Pat-
terns of the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 483 (1973).
96 J. JACOBS, DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (Vintage ed. 1961); cf. Mixon,
Jane Jacobs and the Law-Zoning for Diversity Examined, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 314 (1967).
97 See, e.g., Wexler, "A Zoning Ordinance is No Better than Its Administration"--A
Platitude Proved, 1 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF PRACTICE AND PROC. 74 (1967).
98 R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 169-70 (1966); Dunham, supra note 6, at 36-37; cf.
Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (upholding the legality of such com-
pensation plans).
99 The National Commission on Urban Problems has recommended that the states
transfer to counties the zoning power of cities under 25,000 in population. BUILDING THE
AMERICAN CITY, supra note 4, at 236.
100 A system of this type is proposed in articles 7 and 8 of the MODEL LAND DEVELOP-
MENT CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
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example of what Calabresi terms a system of specific deterrence.1°1
Specific deterrence systems impair the efficiency of resource allocation
to the extent that they require compliance with a standard even when
the prevention costs involved in compliance exceed the resulting re-
duction in nuisance costs. The inadequacies of the information 0 2 and
staff'0°  available to existing governmental planning agencies create
doubts about their ability to evaluate and weigh prevention and nui-
sance costs correctly. This element of inefficiency would be lessened if
the sanction for a zoning violation were limited to a fine or an award
of damages keyed to the amount of nuisance costs resulting from lack of
compliance. An enterprise could then choose to violate an inefficient
standard, pay the monetary penalty, and escape a higher level of pre-
vention costs. Enforcement through carefully calculated monetary pen-
alties is more like what Calabresi calls a system of general deterrence,
where all activities are permitted if they pay for their external costs.10 4
101 G. CALABREsI, COST OF AccIDrrs, supra note 11, at 95-106. Another example of
specific deterrence is injunctive relief in a nuisance action.
102 The urban critic's suburban nightmare of boxlike houses in the middle of iden-
tical cookie-cutter lots is not only a product of unimaginative builders, but also of regu-
lations drafted by persons unable to predict the effects of their acts and with classifications
so crude that they deprived landowners of most of their flexibility. The inherent threat
of zoning to diversity has been powerfully portrayed by Jane Jacobs. J. JAcoBs, supra note
96 at 222-38; cf. Mixon, supra note 96. The difficulty of obtaining adequate information
for sophisticated collective planning has become painfully apparent in the last few de-
cades. In the past, professional city planners believed that efficient land development
could be promoted through a long-term comprehensive plan. The master planners soon
found, however, that they could not learn enough at reasonable cost to prepare, and
keep up-to-date, long-term plans of any detail. Thus, long-range comprehensive plan-
ning is currently in disrepute with large segments of the planning profession. This
skepticism has given birth to an important school of planning thought that asserts that
government can at best "muddle through" its problems, defusing crises as they arise, but
doing little else. For a short review of the literature debating the merits of long-term
and short-term planning efforts, see MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 87-94 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1970).
103 Public land regulation is difficult enough when attempted by the most expert. In
the United States, land planning is largely in the hands of low-level professionals and
rank amateurs. Planning commissions and Boards of Zoning Appeals are usually manned
with untrained political appointees; the performance of these bodies is heavily criticized
in the literature. BUILDING THE AMERICAN CrrY, supra note 4, at 238-39; Shapiro, supra
note 74, at 18; Note, Administrative Discretion in Zoning, 82 HAv. L. REv. 668, 674-75
(1969).
Pay scales for employees who administer public land use regulations are low relative
to the power they exercise. At the end of 1967, every metropolitan municipal govern-
ment with a population under 10,000 paid its top professional planner no more than
$15,000 annually, and 60 percent of these municipalities had no full-time planning em-
ployees. A. MANVEL, supra note 36, at 26. The average annual salary for full-time pro-
fessional and technical employees of planning and zoning agencies of municipalities over
5,000 population was about $9,000 in 1967. Id. at 30.
104 G. CALABREsI, COST OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 11, at 68-77.
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Many land use problems now governed by specific deterrence systems
probably would be better handled with general deterrence systems. In
Euclid,115 the village's decision to plan its community cost the Ambler
Realty Company over $300,000. Undoubtedly, that amount is far more
than that required to install the finest landscaping along Euclid Avenue
or compensate nearby property owners for the losses caused by an
industrial use. Allowing Ambler Realty to landscape or compensate
would probably have been a more efficient solution to the external cost
problem, but that course was precluded by Euclid's mandatory stan-
dards.
Reliance on mandatory standards instead of more decentralized sys-
tems tends to magnify the costs arising from the inherent crudeness of
government. Local legislatures often enact inefficient ordinances, mainly
because of the failure of electoral systems to weigh the intensity of
voter preference,' °6 the prohibition of voting by nonresidents affected
by a jurisdiction's legislation, and differences in organization costs
faced by interest groups that might lobby on legislative issues. 07
Greater reliance on general deterrence systems is one means of dealing
with these difficulties since mistakes in penalty systems are apt to be
less costly than mistakes in mandatory systems. 0 8 The inefficiencies of
mandatory controls would be considerably reduced if zoning prohibi-
tions could be lifted by damage payments. The economic and political
pressures unleashed by inefficient regulations have already caused some
movement in that direction. Flexibility devices prominent in the zoning
field in the last decade, like conditional use permits, contract zoning,
and planned unit development (PUD), are actually vehicles by which
local governments agree to waive inefficient standards when offered
a sufficiently attractive package of donations and preventive measuresY19
PUD, now employed by a majority of zoning municipalities, 110 is the
most important of these flexibility devices. Since local governments us-
ing PUD retain the right of ultimate approval of a subdivider's com-
prehensive development map, they are able to consider individual cases
105 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
106 For discussion of the logrolling behavior of legislatures that introduces elements of
intensity of preference in majority rule voting systems, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK,
THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 125-26, 131-45 (1962).
107 Judicial decrees may be even more unreliable. See note 215 infra.
108 See text at notes 297-312 and note 306 infra.
109 For a sampling of techniques used to loosen Euclidean zoning, see G. LEFCOE,
LAND DEVELOPMENT 1292-1345 (1966). Cf. Note, supra note 103.
110 45 percent of the zoning governments responding to the Manvel survey claimed
their ordinances permitted PUD developments. A. MANVEL, supra note 36, at 10. The
percentage has undoubtedly increased since that survey was taken in 1967.
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and, where appropriate, to lift rigid restrictions. This welcome loosen-
ing of the strait jacket of zoning, however, is not without drawbacks.
Case-by-case decision making substantially increases administrative costs
by requiring ad hoc public hearings to consider the proposed develop-
ment. In addition, the case law of zoning indicates that most courts will
decline to police PUD administration carefully, apparently because
they have decided their judicial energies are better spent elsewhere. 1 '
As a result, the use of flexibility devices inevitably enhances the prob-
ability of arbitrariness and special dealing.
The possibility of arbitrariness could be reduced by shifting the
power to waive mandatory land use standards from local government to
the neighbors who would be damaged by the prohibited use. To the
credit of the institution, many zoning decisions today are largely
shaped by private bargaining between a potential developer and his
neighbors. A landowner seeking a variance, conditional use permit, or
zoning amendment is more likely to be successful if the affected neigh-
bors are not opposed. Although it may appear corrupt on the surface,
an excellent way to handle conflicts is to encourage the landowner to
distribute monetary payments to his neighbors to enlist their support
for his project. Such payments internalize the landowner's future
externalities.
Formalized neighborhood voting on zoning changes has been at-
tempted;'12 in Detroit, a recent ordinance subjects the location of
gasoline stations to such a vote."13 Under this ordinance, no station can
be built within 400 feet of any residentially zoned property without
the written consent of 60 percent of the residential property owners
within 500 feet of the proposed station. If the would-be station owner
bought the votes of affected neighbors with cash payments, the system
could alleviate the equity problems raised by traditional zoning; fur-
ther, the sum of nuisance and prevention costs would tend to be
minimized since entrepreneurs would design their stations to reduce
111 But see note 75 supra.
112 Neighborhood voting has long played a role in the zoning process. Section 5 of the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act provided that if 20 percent of the landowners in a
defined "neighborhood" near a proposed zoning change protested the amendment, a
three-fourths majority was needed to can-y the amendment in the local governing body.
Reprinted at MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 210-21 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1968). See,
e.g., Appeal of Perrin, 305 Pa. 42, 156 A. 305 (1931), where a neighborhood voting scheme
affected the location of gasoline stations. The legality of the delegation of governmental
power to informal groups has been muddied by some United States Supreme Court de-
cisions early in this century. See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT IN URBAN
ARRAs 111-55 (1970).
113 Detroit, Mich., Ordinance 572-G, Feb. 23, 1971, and Ordinance 599-6, June 29,
1971.
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review
the losses suffered by neighbors. The effectiveness of the Detroit ordi-
nance is limited to the extent that the oil company may avoid full
internalization by obtaining the requisite 60 percent from the property
owners living farthest from the station because their harm is least and
their vote is therefore cheapest.
Perhaps because of this shortcoming, most voting systems do not
fully delegate the power to waive preexisting land use standards to
neighboring landowners. In Detroit, for example, construction of a gas
station also requires permissive zoning. If the voting system were modi-
fied, however, so that its dynamics would necessarily internalize the
external costs to the most seriously affected neighbors, the requirement
of legislative approval would be superfluous.1 4 If it is possible to define
the class of people primarily concerned with whether the gas station is
built, efficiency can be achieved without government interference with
the neighborhood decision.
Whether neighborhood voting schemes improve the zoning process
ultimately depends primarily upon the administrative costs of holding
special elections. Again, the primary advantages of such systems are re-
duced likelihood of favoritism and probable compensation for harm
through the purchase of votes. Despite these attractive features, voting
systems may involve prohibitively high administrative costs for all but
the most local externality problems;"15 the costs of private bargaining
and election supervision increase greatly as the electorate grows in size.
In general, major zoning liberalizations are probably more efficiently, if
not more fairly, sold by established governmental units.
Like neighborhood sales, governmental sales of waivers of land use
regulations involve high administrative costs if every case is dealt with
on an ad hoc basis. These costs could be diminished, however, by set-
ting uniform sales prices for waivers, preferably equal to the average
damage resulting from violation of the standards to be waived. When
irrevocable offers are made at these sales prices, the mandatory regula-
tions approach evolves into a general deterrence system; standards
are enforced only through payments having the effect of fines. Fines,
mandatory standards, and other systems for handling pervasive external
cost problems will be further analyzed later." 6
114 Otto Davis, who has proposed increased use of voting systems in zoning, would
solve this problem by requiring unanimous consent of adjoining property owners. Davis,
supra note 2, at 386.
115 In these localized situations, nuisance law is apt to be a better remedy than a
voting system since it eliminates problems caused by holdouts and hypersensitive neigh-
bors. Cf. text at notes 269-96 infra.
116 See text at notes 297-318 infra.
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2. The Problem of Scant Retrospective Application. Since the appli-
cation of zoning regulations to preenactment land uses is politically
unpopular, the first zoning map drawn in a jurisdiction will closely
mirror existing land uses. The main thrust of the regulations thus
focuses on the prospective development of vacant land.117 Zoning is
forced into a "hands off" attitude toward most existing nuisances be-
cause it is mandatory and extinction is usually both politically un-
desirable and an inefficient remedy. Zoning's incapacity to deal with
existing land use problems severely limits its effectiveness.
3. The Inequity of Multiple Zones. The variability of restrictions on
topographically identical parcels of land is the third fundamental weak-
ness of zoning systems. The growing number of zones in most cities
reflects an attempt to refine an increasingly precise hierarchy of land
uses ranked according to their levels of nuisance costs. The efficiency
of this additional complexity is a close question, but largely irrelevant.
The main point is that nonuniform regulation by local government is
almost inevitably unfair regulation. The amounts of money at stake in
switching parcels of land from one zone to another assure that zoning
will continue to be an arbitrary and largely corrupt system. In addition,
as long as multiple residential zones are tolerated, zoning will tend to be
used to segregate the residences of different income classes and thus re-
strict equality of opportunity.
With the inherent shortcomings of zoning as a backdrop, this analysis
now turns to the fundamental issues that underlie land use conflicts-
the proper distribution of rights among landowners and optimal sys-
tems for their enforcement. That investigation will lead to the con-
struction of an alternative model to zoning that alleviates the impact of
the three problems just discussed without causing greater ones.
IV. COVENANTS, MERGER, AND OTHER CONSENSUAL
SYSTEMS OF LAND USE REGULATION
The construction of a more privatized land use control system begins
with an examination of the implications of a laissez faire distribution of
property rights. In that imaginary legal world, landowners would be
free to use their land in any manner without fear of legal consequence.
The government in such a society would provide a collective system
for enforcement of privately negotiated agreements, but would itself
117 This limitation is not total; certain localities do make an effort to phase out non-
conforming uses. Nonconforming lots or bulks, however, are rarely touched. The con-
struction of the Cairo Hotel in Washington, D.C., prompted the passage of height limits,
yet the building still stands after over sixty years of violating them.
1973]
The University of Ghicago Law Review
impose no standards on land use. How would a landowner be expected
to act under these conditions? If good manners were not a characteristic
of this society, the landowner would realize that externalities were pre-
venting him from maximizing his welfare. He would notice that his
neighbors rarely generated external benefits through activities like fine
architecture or landscaping. Further, he would observe that some of his
neighbors were often causing him substantial harm that could be sharply
reduced by relatively minor modifications, a shade on a neighbor's
bright light, a filter on his smokestack, or a fence around his junkyard.
Following the realization that some internalization device would tend
to enhance their welfare, landowners can be expected to try two types
of voluntary transactions, merger and the partial exchange of rights. A
merger is effected when a landowner is prompted to buy his neighbor's
land in fee simple absolute. If there are no financing problems, this
outcome is likely where the administrative costs of acquisition and
unilateral rule making are less than the costs of bargaining for and
enforcing a more limited exchange of rights. Merger is often the device
used by a landowner to internalize his own beneficial externalities,118
perhaps because the present legal system fails to provide any reliable
alternative method of internalizing such spillovers 119 Good examples of
internalization through merger are the "new town" developments re-
cently undertaken by private land developers. 120 The entrepreneur
places improvements such as golf courses, lakes, and community centers
near the center of his holding; ownership of the surrounding land
allows the developer to internalize the increases in adjacent land values
that result from the improvements. 21
118 Merger also internalizes harmful externalities. See, e.g., Crocker, Externalities, Prop-
erty Rights, and Transactions Costs: An Empirical Study, 14 J. LAw & EcoN. 451 (1971).
Crocker relates that phosphate mines in Florida bought neighboring lands to avoid
threats by the state to impose emission controls.
119 Freeloading is likely when numerous parties would be benefited by another's unso-
licited activity, and it arises because of restrictions on recovery for unjust enrichment. The
voluntary formation of merchants' associations to provide parking facilities for a shopping
area or decorations during holiday seasons indicates that freeloader problems may occa-
sionally be overcome.
120 In practice, large land assembly efforts are unlikely to be completely successful. Even
where the land assembler has disguised his efforts through the use of nominees, most "new
towns" contain some parcels owned by persons who refused to convey. For a description
of the methods used by a commercial developer in Houston in a largely successful at-
tempt to buy out hundreds of nearby homeowners, see B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrTnoUr
ZONiNG 127-28 (1972). Merger of fractionated land holdings through granting a nar-
rowly limited power to large developers to condemn out-parcels at a substantial bonus
over fair market value might be desirable in light of possible efficiency gains. This policy
would lower the administrative costs of land assembly, but might also violate the public
use restriction on the eminent domain power as now interpreted in many jurisdictions.
121 The Disney organization became aware of the benefits of merger through painful
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The neighboring owners may decide not to merge but rather negoti-
ate a lesser exchange of rights, enforcing the exchange through mech-
anisms provided by the government. For some consideration, a
landowner might submit to restrictions on the use of his land or agree
to be bound by affirmative obligations to carry out specific activities like
mowing grass or maintaining a fence.122 Existing property law provides
for enforcement of many agreements of this type, including covenants,
leases, easements, and defeasible fees. Covenants serve as a representa-
tive example of these consensual transactions between landowners; this
category encompasses affirmative and negative obligations and is per-
haps the most prevalent type of private agreement between neighbors.
Covenants negotiated between landowners will tend to optimize re-
source allocation among them.123 In other words, the reduction in fu-
ture nuisance costs to each party will exceed the sum of the prevention
and administrative costs each agrees to bear, with all costs discounted to
present value. For example, when a developer drafts covenants that will
bind people who move into his subdivision, market forces prompt him
to draft efficient ones. Covenants will enhance the developer's profit
only if they increase his land values by more than the cost of
imposing them. His land values will rise only if his home buyers per-
ceive that the covenants will reduce the future nuisance costs they might
suffer by an amount greater than the sum of their loss of flexibility in
use and future administrative costs. The developer will suggest, there-
fore, only those covenants that provide each purchaser with a reduction
of nuisance costs greater than the purchaser's loss in flexibility plus his
experience. The original Disneyland in Anaheim, California, was constructed on a rela-
tively small land holding and was immediately surrounded by commercial uses that
took advantage of the trade Disneyland created. In 1968, the businesses surrounding
Disneyland had gross sales five times the sales of Disneyland. For the Walt Disney World
in Florida, the corporation thus assembled a land holding more than 100 times the size
of the California park; the benefits of this Florida tourist attraction were then system-
atically internalized. Walt Disney Productions, Annual Report for Fiscal Year Ending
September 28, 1968, at 6.
122 The great bulk of covenants, however, are negative, promising restraint from
specified behavior. This pattern indicates that landowners feel that affirmative obliga-
tions are likely to be inefficient, perhaps because these agreements are expensive to en-
force or because landowners fear a substantial drop in the value of their property from
such encumbrances. In addition, property law has been hostile to the running of affirma-
tive duties to succeeding owners. Finally, where affirmative covenants are enforceable,
they are often not enforced in practice. The largest merchant homebuilder in the United
States, Levitt & Sons, Inc., requires homeowners to covenant to mow and weed their
lawns weekly during the summer months. The author's field experience as a Levitt em-
ployee indicates that these covenants are not enforced by Levitt or its homebuyers.
123 This analysis assumes that landowners are capable of rational economic decisions.
For a critique of this assumption, see Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargain-
ing and Rules, 86 HARv. L. REv. 797, 805-13 (1973).
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enforcement cost plus a pro rata share of the developer's administrative
costs. Not all confficts between neighbors can be solved by covenants,
but covenants generated by market forces will tend to promote efficiency.
In addition to promoting efficiency, covenants will not usually cause
unfair wealth transfers among landowners. Absent fraud, duress, and
the like, a party will not agree to a contract that he perceives as unfair.
Thus, assuming equal bargaining power and information, consensual
covenants will not involve inequitable gains or losses to any party.
Covenants cause problems, however, when they impose external costs
on third parties, creating suboptimal resource allocation and unfairness.
The classic American example of this nature was the widespread use
of covenants to prevent the sale of residential property to Blacks. Re-
strictive racial covenants, particularly when widespread, impose oppor-
tunity costs on Black home buyers by restricting their market. More
difficult to measure, but unquestionably present, are the costs of segre-
gation to society in general. Anti-Black covenants are unfair because
they single out a small population group for permanent exclusion; the
inequity is compounded because Blacks have suffered from other arti-
ficially imposed disadvantages. The courts understandably struck down
such agreements on constitutional or public policy grounds.124
Today, restrictive covenants are widely used as a device to exclude
lower income groups.12 5 For example, most subdivisions use private
covenants to provide assurance of style, tone, and nonentry of the less
fortunate. Even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, noted for its hostility
to all forms of exclusionary zoning, has tolerated a wide range of non-
racial exclusionary covenants.126
Two factors indicate that such covenants deserve greater judicial tol-
erance than racial covenants or mandatory regulations that promote
124 See Hurd v. Hodge, 834 U.S. 24 (1948); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Whether
narrowly drawn covenants to protect ethnic neighborhoods should also be illegal is a
more difficult question.
125 This is generally accomplished indirectly through lot size requirements, house size
requirements, and similar provisions.
126 What basically appears to bother intervenors is that a small number of lovely old
homes will have to start keeping company with a growing number of smaller, less
expensive, more densely located houses. It is clear, however, that the general welfare
is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and ex-
clusionary. But this does not mean that individual action is foreclosed. "An owner of
land may constitutionally make his property as large and as private or secluded or
exclusive as he desires and his purse can afford. He may, for example, singly or with
his neighbors, purchase sufficient neighboring land to protect and preserve by re-
strictions in deeds or by covenants inter se, the privacy, a minimum acreage, the
quiet, peaceful atmosphere and the tone and character of the community which ex-
isted when he or they moved there."
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 533, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965), quoting in
part Bilbar Const. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 94, 141 A.2d
851, 867 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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segregation by income class. First, racial covenants define the excluded
class in a way that permits no escape. By contrast, to the extent that any
member of an excluded economic class can potentially increase his
income, an economic exclusion is not permanent. 127 In addition, a
cost-benefit evaluation of noncollective efforts to exclude by income
class is likely to be more favorable than a similar evaluation of legisla-
tively mandated income exclusion. The external costs most economic
covenants impose on lower income groups are minor because the
covenants tie up only a small amount of land for a few decades. If those
who are excluded recognize both the low cost of such exclusion and the
possibility of a change in their own status, they may then perceive that
the efficiencies made possible by allowing income-restrictive covenants
are so great that upholding such covenants is in their long-term self-
interest.
Economic restrictions become less fair as interference with imme-
diate residential opportunities becomes substantial. If land developers
imposing economic covenants have considerable monopoly power in
their regional markets, a decision to exclude low income families will
impose serious opportunity costs on those families. In such cases, in-
come-restrictive covenants should be denied enforcement on the
grounds of the inequity of inflicting these losses on low income families
and the inefficiency of the high prevention costs created. In this country,
however, such monopoly power is probably quite rare given the wide
distribution of urban land ownership. For example, if a proposed uni-
form set of restrictions to single-family use were circulated for signature
among landowners in the Santa Monica Mountains, many would refuse
to sign, opting instead for freedom to devote their holdings to more
dense residential development in the future. Zoning is clearly more
effective than restrictive covenants in achieving class exclusions.
Whatever their purpose, the use of covenants as an internalization
device in land markets has been limited by unfathomable judicial
restrictions rooted in the Middle Ages.1 28 The process of urban
development in California will illustrate the effect of this judicial hos-
tility. Early California decisions consistently expressed reluctance to
enforce covenants against succeeding owners, even when the party
127 But see text at notes 238-40 infra.
128 For much fuller treatment of covenant law, see C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS
RUNNING wrrH LAND (2d ed. 1947); Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the
Use of Land, 55 MINN. L. REV. 167 (1970); Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of Land,
8 J. LAw & ECON. 133 (1965). For a multinational perspective, see McCarthy, The Enforce-
ment of Restrictive Covenants in France and Belgium: Judicial Discretion and Urban
Planning, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1978).
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acquiring the burdened parcel had record notice of the restrictions.129
Subsequently, California statutes governing validity of covenants were
narrowly construed to restrict the running of burdens; 130 California
courts have also readily terminated covenants on the grounds of changes
in neighborhood conditions.' 3' Judicial hostility toward covenants in the
early part of this century undoubtedly aggravated problems of external
costs in urban land markets, thus providing fuel for .proponents of
zoning. By seeking to protect landowners from entangling covenants,
the courts unintentionally encouraged the development of public
regulations imposing inuch greater restraints on the free use of land.
The present judicial attitude fortunately seems to favor elimination of
these unnecessary barriers to bargaining among neighbors. 32
One less artificial limitation on the greater use of covenants is high
administrative costs. Standard forms 1 33 could reduce drafting costs to
parties and information costs to participants in land markets, who now
must decipher private land use restrictions. 34 Information costs could
also be reduced by simplifying, through modernization of the indexing
of land records, the process of finding the covenants applicable to a
specific parcel. More definite exposition of termination doctrines might
also reduce administrative costs. When a common covenant scheme
governs many parcels, high administrative costs may prevent landowners
from organizing to terminate the scheme even though the prevention
costs of the scheme exceed its reduction in nuisance costs. Courts have
attempted to solve this problem by terminating these covenants where
129 Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919); Berryman v. Hotel Savoy Co., 160
Cal. 559, 117 P. 677 (1911); Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36, 68 P.
308 (1902).
130 See, e.g., Marra v. Aetna Const. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 375, 101 P.2d 490 (1940) (construing
CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1461-70). Section 1468 was substantially amended by CAL. STATS. 1968,
ch. 680 § 1, and CAL. STATS. 1969, ch. 245, § 1 to liberalize the running of burdens. CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 1468 (Supp. 1973). See Comment, Covenants: California's New Legislative
Approach to Covenants Running with the Land, 9 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 285 (1969).
131 See, e.g., Key v. McCabe, 54 Cal. 2d 736, 8 Cal. Rptr. 425, 356 P.2d 169 (1960); Wolff
v. Fallon, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955); Downs v. Kroeger 200 Cal. 743, 254 P. 1101
(1927).
132 See, e.g., Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832
(1959). Academicians have generally urged greater judicial tolerance of covenants through
relaxation of the privity of estate requirement. See Berger, supra note 128, at 194-95;
Dunham, supra note 128, at 163-64.
133 Considerable standardization already exists. The Federal Housing Administration
has a standard set of covenants that subdividers proceeding under the FHA single-family
programs must use or replace with an acceptable alternative. The Veterans Administration,
lenders, publishers of legal formbooks, and such nonprofit organizations as the Urban
Land Institute have also contributed to the standardization of covenants.
134 The administrative advantages of standard forms must be weighed against their
inflexibility.
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neighborhood conditions have changed. Liberal application of this
doctrine results, however, in excessive litigation.135 State legislatures
could help solve the problem by establishing standard termination
procedures and maximum life spans for covenants; legislative rules
would also permit courts to depart from perverse requirements such
as "privity of estate" and "touch and concern" for the running of
covenants. These judicially created rules are designed to prevent the
accumulation of legal cobwebs on land parcels; the invocation of these
rules, however, often ignores the intent of the parties. Procedures to
remove stale covenants systematically after several decades would inter-
fere less seriously with freedom of contract and tend to reduce ad-
ministrative costs.
Present methods of enforcing private covenants can also be improved.
If one landowner in a common covenant scheme commits a violation,
each of his neighbors will be reluctant to assume enforcement costs
since nothing prevents the other neighbors from freeloading on that
effort. In Houston, this problem is alleviated by municipal enforce-
ment of private covenants. 136 To prevent the transfer of enforcement
costs to government, a preferable solution in large subdivisions might be
compulsory membership in a homeowners' association that polices the
covenants and is financed by assessments on its members. 137
Systems of covenants are an ideal system of land use regulation in
major developments undertaken by single owners. The administrative
costs involved are minimal since the developer drafts the covenants
unilaterally and buyers must accept them. In such cases, public inter-
vention is necessary only at the margins of the parcel since most
nuisance problems are internalized. 38 The usefulness of private order-
135 There are more reported cases on this aspect of covenant law than any other.
Despite its doctrinal complications, however, the current number of cases on covenant law
appears to be less than 15 percent of the cases on zoning. See note 61 supra.
136 The city can seek injunctive relief against breach of a covenant and can deny permits
for commercial construction projects that would violate covenant provisions. The two
programs are authorized by TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., Art. 974 a-I and a-2 (Supp. 1970),
respectively. Houston has used these powers, over a three year period, to abate 2,300
violations and file 38 lawsuits. Siegan, Non-Zoning, supra note 2, at 77. See generally
B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrrHOUJT ZONING 80-33 (1972); Comment, Houston's Invention of
Necessity-An Unconstitutional Substitute for Zoning?, 21 BAYLOR L. Rzv. 307 (1969);
Comment, The Municipal Enforcement of Deed Restrictions: An Alternative to Zoning, 9
HousTon L. REv. 816 (1972); Comment, Municipal Enforcement of Private Restrictive
Covenants: An Innovation in Land-Use Control, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 741 (1966).
137 Although many such associations are active in Houston, they apparently police only
a small minority of that city's covenant schemes. Compare B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHotrr
ZONING 33 (1972), with id. at 35.
138 When all problems are internalized by merger, government should also not interfere
with the distribution of rights among those who use the single owner's land. A common
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ing in these situations is recognized, to some extent, by PUD zoning
provisions. Since the land development industry is becoming increas-
ingly dominated by larger firms,139 covenants should play a more
important role in the future.
Even if covenant law were sensibly modernized, however, covenants
could play only a limited role in older, established neighborhoods where
land ownership is highly fractionated.1 40 Except for the simplest prob-
lems involving a few neighbors, land owners rarely meet as a group
to draft agreements governing land use. Aside from privity of estate
requirements that currently discourage such neighborhood mobiliza-
tion,1.41 the costs of organizing many people are apparently too high, and
the risk of freeloaders too great, for private bargaining to take place.142
Thus, although covenants are an attractive device, they are not
feasible in many neighborhoods. To deal with harmful externalities in
these areas, the original assumption of a laissez faire distribution of
landlord, for example, is in the best position, and has the incentive, to resolve any conflicts
arising between his tenants. Yet, courts have at times applied the principles of nuisance
law to establish tenants' rights inter se, apparently without considering their express or
implied rights under their leases. A good example is the famous case of Sturges v. Bridg-
man, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879), where a doctor sought to enjoin a neighboring confectioner
from using noisy mortars that prevented him from examining patients in his consulting
room. Both parties were lessees of the Duke of Portland; nevertheless, the court applied
nuisance doctrine without regard to substance of the leases. The court in Sturges may
not have enforced the rights of the tenants in the way the Duke had distributed them.
If the leases did not define rights in cases of intertenant annoyance, the invocation of
nuisance principles might be proper. In that case, however, it is doubtful that the
doctor should recover his entire damages since his activity appears to be hypersensitive
to injury, and, in addition, he came to the nuisance. See text at notes 241-68 infra. Another
intertenant nuisance case ignoring lease provisions is Associated Metals and Mining Corp.
v. Dixon Chem. & Res., 82 NJ. Super. 281, 197 A.2d 569 (1963).
139 PREsIDENT'S CommrrraTm ON URBAN HOUsING, supra note 84, at 151-52. Periodic
surveys by Professional Builder magazine also confirm the trend toward greater con-
centration in housing production. Although solid statistics are lacking, land development,
the manufacture of improved lots, is probably more concentrated than building construc-
tion. Large land developers commonly sell off improved lots to smaller companies for
house construction. Both the land developer and the builder could draft covenants in
such situations, but the land developer is likely to be the principal author.
140 For a more optimistic view of the potential usefulness of covenants in existing
neighborhoods, see Note, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning
and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 335, 359-60 (1972).
141 The harshness of these requirements has been somewhat reduced by the evolution
of the concept of equitable servitudes.
142 Spontaneous neighborhood mobilization is not unknown. In Houston, homeowners
in subdivisions have renewed covenants that had expired through passage of time. Siegan,
Non-Zoning, supra note 2, at 90-91. See also Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N.Y. 227, 29 N.E. 81
(1891), where residents of a fashionable neighborhood combined to buy the land of a
builder who threatened to construct a seven-story tenement. The Houston experience
suggests that unanimous neighborhood action becomes less probable as the number of
landowners involved increases. See B. SIEGAN, LAN USE WrrHouT ZONING 239-45 (1972).
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property rights must be reconsidered. Even if the initial placement of
rights is altered to a different distribution, landowners can still gain by
trading rights. Consensual systems like covenants are valuable tools
for private adjustment of any initial rights distribution.
V. ASSIGNING RIGHTS AMONG LANDOWNERS:
A REFORMULATION OF NuIsANCE LAW
More efficient and more equitable resource allocation will some-
times be achieved by altering the laissez faire distribution of property
rights so as to place the risk of loss from external harms on the landowner
carrying out the damaging activity. This possibility of redefining
property rights is often overlooked 143 because liability of landowners
for external harms is thought to be inconsistent with fee simple land
tenure. Common law doctrines, however, have long assigned property
rights to deter unneighborly acts. At common law, landowners were
held to an absolute duty to provide lateral support for their neighbors'
land.144 Invasions by persons, animals, or solid matter capable of inflict-
ing injury through the force of physical impact are actionable under
trespass doctrines. The famous case of Rylands v. Fletcher 45 imposed
absolute liability for damage caused by the overflow of unnaturally
gathered substances onto neighboring land. Less tangible interferences
such as noise, fumes, aesthetic blight, or vibration may be handled under
the law of nuisance.146 Since most potential conflicts in modern urban
environments involve these less tangible interferences, nuisance law pro-
vides the most important source of common law rules for shifting the
risk of loss for external harms.
A. Existing Nuisance Law as a Land Use Control System
Nuisance law is today suffering from neglect. Its doctrines receive
little attention in modem casebooks on torts and property. Scholarly
143 The National Commission on Urban Problems ignored this possibility when it
asserted that, in the 1920's:
[t]he buyers and sellers of lots needed some device to prevent a drop in property
values, keep out unwanted intrusions, encourage investment in land and construc-
tion-in sum, to assure character. The fee simple land tenure, which gives owners
a freedom of use that modern homeowners are frightened to have their neighbors
possess, did not provide the needed protection. Zoning did.
BUILDING THE AMERICAN CrrY, supra note 4, at 18-19.
144 J. CRIBBEr, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 292-95 (1962).
145 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
146 One category of nuisance law deals with "public nuisances," criminal interferences
with common public rights subject to abatement upon prosecution by the state. As a
system of mandatory prohibitions enforced by government officials, public nuisance law
was the ancestor of zoning and is a more centralized approach to external cost problems
than private nuisance doctrines.
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analysis of nuisance problems has been minimal, perhaps because
nuisance law is widely viewed as an archaic means of handling land use
problems. As a result, the confusions and inefficiencies in the law of
nuisance are considerably more serious than in most other areas of the
law.34
7
Many of the doctrinal difficulties in nuisance law have arisen when
courts have tried to avoid granting injunctive relief, the traditional
remedy in nuisance cases. An injunction often imposes prevention costs
that exceed the reduction in nuisance costs it achieves; the closing of a
factory may be more costly to the economy than the losses caused to
neighbors by its operation. As courts became sensitive to this danger
they responded by limiting the circumstances in which they were will-
ing to find a nuisance, rather than denying injunctive relief while still
allowing damages.148 Nuisance law thus came to provide no relief in
many cases where the risk of loss could appropriately have been shifted
to the landowner carrying out the damaging activity. 49
In many instances courts avoided finding actionable nuisances by
applying a type of balancing test; the social utility of the actor's conduct
was compared to the total amount of harm caused. This test is proper
for deciding whether to grant injunctive relief. Unfortunately most
courts applied the test to the initial question of whether a nuisance
existed at all,8 0 incorrectly limiting the availability of damage awards
147 "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance.'" W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON TORTS, § 86, at 571 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER, TORTS].
148 A good example is the case of Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div.
37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). The defendant's coke oven emitted air pollutants that gave
plaintiff headaches and caused her to keep some of her windows closed to reduce the soot
level in her home. Proof of substantial damage from a nuisance gave rise to an absolute
right to injunctive relief under New York law. See, e.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper
Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913). Although the nuisance was apparent, recognizing it
would have resulted in shutting down a major manufacturing facility during the depths
of the depression. The court was able to refuse injunctive relief only by an analysis that
also kept it from awarding damages. It avoided finding a nuisance on the grounds that
the plaintiff had "come to the nuisance" and the defendant was shielded by
permissive zoning; neither defense was justified by the facts of the case. Bove thus shows
the doctrinal confusion caused by the liberal availability of injunctive relief. A recent
New York case has eliminated the court's dilemma in Bove by holding that injunctive
relief would henceforth be discretionary in nuisance cases. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
149 For example, most courts denied all relief in cases of aesthetic blight. Injunctive
relief against aesthetic harm is generally mistaken because the damage is usually slight.
It is not dear, however, why damages should not be allowed. See text at notes 181-90 infra.
150 W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 147, § 89 at 596-602. See also RESTATEmENT OF TORTS
§§ 822(d) & (i), 826 (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822(a), 826 (Tent. Draft No.
16, 1970). The Restatement sections state that the defendant should not be liable under a
nuisance theory if the utility of the defendant's conduct outweighs the gravity of the harm,
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that would internalize the harmful externalities. That a grocery in
the Santa Monica Mountains is shown to have high utility is a good
reason to refuse to enjoin its construction, but it is not good grounds
for allowing it to avoid paying for its external costs. Illogical doctrines
of this type have greatly reduced the value of nuisance law as a land use
control system.
The use of nuisance law reached a height in the United States during
the 1920's and 1930's as landowners invoked it to relieve actual or
threatened noxious uses in their neighborhoods, 151 with gas stations152
and funeral parlors 53 generating the greatest volume of cases. In virtu-
ally all of these cases the plaintiff asked for only injunctive relief;
damages were sought only from a government, charity, public utility,
or other defendant against whom courts would not be likely to issue an
injunction. 54 The courts were thus forced to make difficult all-or-
nothing decisions about whether a particular use should be allowed to
continue.155
Because courts had so limited their remedy options, one party was
These sections apply to damage actions as well as to suits for injunctive relief. At the
suggestion of Professor Fleming James, however, new comments were added implying
that the balancing test should not deprive a plaintiff of compensation when he suffers
serious harm. See the newly added comments at id. §§ 826-27 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
151 See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 725 (1924) (amusement park); Annot., 50 A.L.R. 107 (1927)
(garage); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 518 (1927) (pesthouse); Annot., 86 A.L.R. 998 (1933) (bakery);
Annot., 90 A.L.R. 1207 (1934) (industrial plant); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 1461 (1937) (auto-
mobile wrecker); Annot., 153 A.L.R. 972 (1944) (medical clinic); Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d
774, 801-02 (1952) (trailer camp); Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1249 (1953) (private school); Annot.,
44 A.L.R.2d 1381 (1955) (dance hall); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1324 (1956) (cemetery); Annot.,
68 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1959) (golf course or driving range); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1962)
(oil refinery); Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 974 (1963) (dairy); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 572 (1963)
(drive-in-restaurant); Annot., 93 A.L.R.2d 1171 (1964) (drive-in theater); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d
989 (1966) (tavern); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1058 (1968) (rehabilitation institutions).
152 See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 749, 771-73 (1920); Annot., 26 A.L.R. 937, 944-49 (1923); Annot.,
35 A.L.R. 95 (1925); Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1224 (1927); Annot., 124 A.L.R. 383 (1940).
153 See Annot., 7 A.L.R. 749, 782 (1920); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 745 (1923); Annot., 26 A.L.R.
937, 953-54 (1923); Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1171 (1926); Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1061 (1933); Annot., 39
A.L.R.2d 1000 (1955).
154 For example, among the many appellate cases involving funeral parlors, I found
only one where the plaintiff sought damages: Haan v. Heath, 161 Wash. 128, 296 P. 816
(1931) (affirming judgment of $500 for plaintiff). This pattern was also pointed out in
Beuscher & Morrison, Judicial Zoning through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wise. L. Rxv.
440, 442. On the other hand, damage actions are probably less likely to be appealed, and
thus reported, than suits involving injunctive relief.
155 Particularly in the earlier cases, the plaintiffs generally sought total abatement
rather than a more narrowly limited equitable decree. In the gas station cases, for example,
the courts dealt with this problem by granting an injunction where the station would be
located in an exclusively residential area, and denying it if the area was mixed or largely
devoted to business. Compare Huddleston v. Burnett, 172 Ark. 216, 287 S.W. 1013 (1926)
with Julian v. Golden Rule Oil Co., 112 Kan. 671, 212 P. 884 (1923).
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likely to be highly aggrieved whatever the trial court's decision, and
appeals were common.15 Nuisance litigation thus became an expensive
process. In addition, courts were hardly an expert institution for making
difficult resource allocation decisions.
These administrative flaws of nuisance law combined with its doc-
trinal weaknesses to fuel the belief that public regulation systems such
as zoning would be superior. As zoning began to flourish, nuisance law
became less important.157 The decline of nuisance law is perhaps not
surprising in light of its doctrinal and administrative shortcomings. If
these underlying weaknesses were remedied, however, for example by
curtailing availability of injunctive relief and transferring nuisance
adjudications to specialized bodies, nuisance law might return to
prominence as a system for internalizing external costs.
The following sections of this article contain a proposed set of rules
for assigning rights among neighboring landowners. These rules try to
define the subset of externalities for which the risk of loss should be
shifted to the party whose activities create the externality; in some cases
the proposed rules sharply diverge from current nuisance law, especially
where the availability of injunctive relief has warped existing doctrine.
Finally, the article suggests an administrative structure for protecting
this rights distribution and analyzes the optimal employment of that
structure and other devices for dealing with harmful externalities. 58
B. Nuisance Law: The Prima Facie Case
In an important economic analysis of the problem of external cost,159
Professor R. H. Coase showed that if administrative costs are zero, the
156 The annotations cited in note 152 supra record that gas stations alone prompted
four reported appellate cases annually during the 1920's and 1930's.
157 The number of nuisance cases has apparently declined in recent years. For example,
the pages devoted to public and private nuisance cases in WrsT's DECENNrAL DIGmsr declined
from 102 in 1946-56 to 78 in 1956-66; the most recent case of a landowner trying to
enjoin construction of a gas station on a pure nuisance theory occurred in 1958. Phillips
v. Adams, 228 Ark. 592, 309 S.W.2d 205 (1958) (injunction granted against a gas station in
a residential neighborhood).
158 See text at notes 269-318 infra. The interrelationship of rights and remedies makes
separate discussion rather hazardous. For example, a specific rights assignment might
optimally resolve private nuisance suits for damages, but create inefficiency if applied as
a constraint on legislated regulations. Nevertheless, although couched in terms of nuisance
law, the ensuing discussion of the efficiency and equity issues at stake in the assignment
of rights will usually assist in the assessment of more centralized internalization systems.
159 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2. What this article calls "administrative costs" Coase
defined in more limited terms and called "transaction costs." The Coase theorem has been
challenged as ignoring the fact that "rational" action by those in conflict may lead to
suboptimal results. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. LAw & ECON. 427
(1972). The game theoretic tactics that might lead to those results, however, all depend on
uncertainty, a condition foreign to Coase's world of perfect information.
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same resource allocation will result regardless of the initial distribution
of rights. Assume, for example, that there is a grocery in the Santa
Monica Mountains, the only external harm to the neighbors is added
noise, and administrative costs are zero. The Coase theorem states that
if the cost to the grocer of going out of business is less than his
neighbors' gains from the reduction in noise resulting from the termi-
nation of his enterprise, the grocer will shut down regardless of the
initial distribution of rights. If homeowners have the right to recover
for injury caused by the noise, the grocer will choose to absorb the
smaller loss of going out of business rather than pay for the damage
he causes by staying open. If the law does not require the grocer to
compensate the homeowners for noise, the homeowners will combine
to pay the grocer to close. The grocer will agree if the bounty is
larger than his losses from closing, and the homeowners will be willing
to offer more than the amount of his loss if their total damage exceeds
that amount.
On the other hand, when the cost to the grocer of closing exceeds
the resulting benefit to the homeowners, the grocer will continue to
operate. If the homeowners have the right to recover, the grocer will
pay damages rather than absorb the larger costs of terminating his
business. If the grocer need not pay damages, the homeowners will not
pay him to adopt a more neighborly course of action, because the
minimum payment he would insist on to shut down exceeds the value
of the damage they are currently suffering. In brief, the Coase theorem
states that private bargaining will tend to reduce the sum of nuisance
and prevention costs over time, regardless of assignment of rights.1 0
The Coase theorem does not imply that the policy maker need not
be concerned about how rights are assigned. First, as Coase reminds
us, 1" administrative costs in bargaining situations are not zero, and
consequently the assignment of rights does affect resource allocation.
Second, the policy maker cannot ignore the equities of resource dis-
160 One might think that there would be fewer groceries if they were forced to
pay for their external harm, but this is not the case if administrative costs are
zero. A change in the law from nonliability for noise to liability would only put out
of business those groceries unable to absorb the cost of future damage judgments, but
there would be no marginally profitable groceries in business. Their potential operators
would prefer to accept payments from neighboring homeowners not to operate and
would thus be investing their capital and entrepreneurial skills elsewhere. For a more
theoretical explanation of this point, see Nutter, The Coase Theorem on Sodal Cost: A
Footnote, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 503 (1968). Compare Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, supra note 11, at 730 n.28, with Calabresi,
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment, supra note 11,
at 67-68.
161 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 15. See also Crocker, supra note 118.
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tribution, as Coase intentionally does,162 to focus solely on the efficiency
of resource allocation. Any unexpected alteration of the distribution of
rights among landowners is almost certain to affect their relative shares
of wealth.163 Decisions on the distribution of rights in cases of external
cost thus must accommodate the complex considerations of administra-
tive costs and fairness.
The following reformulation of nuisance law is an estimate of how
rights should be distributed among neighboring landowners when these
considerations are taken into account. The analysis follows a rather
traditional legal mold: the development of a prima facie case, to be
pleaded and proved by the injured neighbor, and the articulation of
various defenses. Whether a particular issue should be an element of
the prima facie case or a defense is not an easy question, but the
suggested allocation should result in a reasonably efficient and fair pro-
cedural system. A tolerably burdensome prima facie case is imposed on
the plaintiff to help weed out unmerited claims. The defenses are issues
on which the defendant is most likely to have the best information or to
be able to introduce the most credible evidence.
1. Assigning Rights To Promote Efficiency: A Preliminary General
Rule. Efficient resource allocation is accomplished through the minimi-
zation of the sum of the nuisance costs, prevention costs, and adminis-
trative costs arising from land use confficts.' 64 A party compelled to bear
a nuisance cost can be expected to adopt all preventive measures he
perceives as efficient. A measure will appear efficient to a party if its
prevention cost and the administrative cost of carrying it out are less
than the reduction in nuisance costs achieved. Prevention costs cannot
be diminished by shifting the assignment of rights; 16 5 those costs are
only affected by technological innovation. 16 6 Legal rules may, however,
affect the administrative costs involved in the execution of a specific
preventive measure. Rights should therefore be assigned to reduce ad-
ministrative costs in order to increase the number of preventive mea-
sures that parties perceive to be in their self-interest. Four guidelines
162 See note 27 supra. See also Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1
J. LEGAL STUDIES 13, 22-25 (1972).
163 See Demsetz, Wealth Distribution and the Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES
223, 228 (1972).
164 See text at notes 23-25 supra.
165 Since prevention costs have been defined to exclude administrative factors, this
statement is a tautology.
166 New combinations of resources can make available cheaper antinuisance devices.
Innovation can also reduce the opportunity costs of refraining from nuisance activity by
introducing new substitutes for that activity.
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can help reduce administrative costs; 167 none is controlling, but each
helps in assigning legal rights when other factors are neutral.
The first guideline is knowledge. It will help to assign the risk of
loss to the party facing the lowest information costs. Legal rules should
focus on the party who has, or can most cheaply acquire, relevant infor-
mation on the risks of future nuisance costs, and who can most cheaply
assess available preventive measures. The object of this guideline is
minimizing expenditures of resources on information.
The second guideline is organization. It will help to place the risk
of loss on the class of parties likely to have the lowest organization
costs, usually the one with the fewest members.168 This assignment will
reduce the costs of internal organization and policing against free-
loaders that arise when many parties must negotiate the division of
costs of damage payments or preventive measures.
The third guideline is control. When the risk of loss is assigned to
the parties in control of the properties where the most efficient pre-
ventive actions can be taken, the administrative costs of executing
the preventive measures will be reduced.
The final guideline is simplicity of rules. Other things being equal,
simple rules of liability are preferable to more complex ones since
they reduce the costs of determining the distribution of rights in spe-
cific cases.
These guidelines can now be used to generate rules of liability for
nuisance cases. The process can begin with the following general rule of
nuisance liability: if a physical change on B's property results in a
diminution of the value of A's property, B should have to compensate
167 Professor Calabresi's inquiries into systems for allocating the risk of losses from
accidents have heavily influenced my guidelines. Calabresi's guidelines, however, are not as
explicitly based on the need to reduce administrative costs. G. CALABRE I, CosT OF Acci-
DENTs, supra note 11, at 135-61. But see id. at 143-44. See also Demsetz, supra note 162, at
28. More recently, Calabresi and Hirschoff have proposed a rule of liability similar to the
guidelines suggested here. They propose that a loss should be borne by the party to an
accident "in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs
and accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made." Calabresi &
Hirschoff, supra note 11, at 1060.
168 For a detailed analysis of the problems of group organization, see generally M.
OrsoN, JR., THE LOGIC or CoLLECavE AcTION (1965). There are of course mechanisms for
reducing administrative costs in large groups. For example, a laissez faire distribution of
rights might create demand for "nuisance insurance" as part of the package of protections
offered homeowners by insurance companies. If one company insured most of the houses
in a given area, a situation not difficult to achieve in a new subdivision, it could bargain
on a one-to-one basis with the party causing damage to modify his course of action, thus
greatly reducing the administrative costs of homeowner organization. For a proposal on
homeowners' equity insurance, see Yarmolinsky, Reassuring the Small Homeowner, PUBLIC
INTERE.sT, Winter, 1971, at 106.
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A for that loss. This rule for liability of landowners is overbroad and
will be qualified. As a general rule, however, it is more in accord with
the guidelines for efficiency than the laissez faire distribution of prop-
erty rights discussed earlier.
When a physical change is intentional, as .in the construction of
a grocery, the party making the change will have better knowledge
about possible external costs than outsiders affected by the change.
The knowledge guideline thus suggests that the grocer should bear
the loss. He is in a position to know that damage is almost certain and,
by assuming the neighbors are of normal sensitivity, can estimate their
prospective losses reasonably well. His victims, however, may be sur-
prised when the loss occurs. In addition, a party intentionally making
changes on his land is likely to be more expert than his neighbors about
the particular type of harm involved and thus better able to evaluate
potential preventive devices.
The second guideline, organization, also points to liability of the
grocer. When one or more parties intentionally carry out an activity,
they exhibit some degree of organization. In many land use cases the
intentional actor acts alone and diminishes the property values of
multiple neighbors who have no preexisting organization. One grocer
can usually organize to deal with a risk of loss more cheaply than many
homeowners.
The control guideline indicates only that liability should not be
shifted to nonlandowners. It is impossible to determine, as a general
rule, whether the most efficient preventive measures for reducing
nuisance costs may be taken on the land where the damaging activity
is occurring or on the injured properties. Neighbors of smoky factories
can buy air conditioners, and Santa Monica Mountain homeowners
can shutter their windows against grocery stores; on the other hand, it
may be more efficient to install air-scrubbers or redesign the store. In-
formation on the optimal prevention device must be available before
the control guideline can be employed.
According to the fourth guideline, however, it is desirable to define
a rule of general applicability for the allocation of rights. Since the
first two guidelines point to assigning liability to the landowner
making the intentional change and the third guideline is neutral, a
general rule assigning liability to landowners who intentionally host
physical changes that injure neighbors provides a good base for a system
of nuisance law.
Changes in land use occasionally are accidental rather than inten-
tional; these cases are harder to resolve. A landowner may try to paint
his house white, but instead produce a repulsive shade of pink because
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an underlying coat of red paint unpredictably bleeds through. As
changes become more accidental it is less likely that the owner of the
property on which the change occurs is best assigned the risk. Since
accidental losses are less predictable, the landowner may be poorly
equipped to calculate the risk of loss accurately and thus be unable to
assess intelligently the array of preventive measures available. A non-
landowner, such as the white paint manufacturer, might in fact be the
cheapest cost avoider in the accidental pink house example. If the land-
owner intentionally painted the house pink, however, he should clearly
be assigned the loss.
The law has also had much trouble deciding where to place the risk
of loss for another class of damage-unintentional changes perceived as
arising solely through natural forces. The law of torts generally requires
some act as a prerequisite of liability. Nuisance cases absolve land-
owners from liability for damage caused solely by natural conditions
on their property, such as stagnant water, spreading weeds, or ugly
foliage. 1609 This reluctance to impose liability for inaction is often at-
tributed to a concern for maintaining individual liberty by limiting the
number of affirmative obligations. The act-omission distinction also
makes considerable sense on efficiency grounds.
For intentional acts, the first guideline pointed to host landowner
liability because he usually was best able to judge the magnitude of
possible harm and assess available preventive measures. When a land-
owner does nothing to contribute to a damaging event, he may be as
surprised as anyone when the damage occurs. The generalization
about superior landowner information, however, is likely to be valid in
two types of situations where he has been passive: where a landowner
starts an activity and, by neglecting maintenance, fails to protect
against its predictable natural deterioration; and where damage occurs
in areas where land is so intensively used that landowners are normally
aware of natural conditions on their property. In both these circum-
stances the risk of loss and the preventive measures available will
generally be as apparent to the host landowner as to his neighbors or
anyone else; modem nuisance doctrines impose liability in both situ-
ations. If a landowner starts an activity and then fails to finish it or
fails to maintain the improvement in the normal way, he is liable for
109 See, e.g., Boarts v. Imperial Irr. District, 80 Cal. App. 2d 574, 182 P.2d 246 (1947)
(refusing all relief where weeds had blown over from defendant's property); Merriam v.
McConnell, 31 Ill. App. 2d 241, 175 N.E.2d 293 (1901) (refusing injunctive relief to plaintiff
whose land was invaded by bugs from defendant's trees); RESTATMENT OF TORTS § 840
(1939); RPsTATEMErNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
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failure to abate the harmful conditions created." ° Similarly, urban
landowners are liable for failure to correct purely natural hazardous
conditions. 17' Use of urban parcels is usually sufficiently intensive for
owners to be aware of such dangers.
Since this article focuses primarily on land use problems in urban
areas, the general liability of a host landowner is proposed both for
intentional changes and for damaging events on his property that arise
through the workings of nature. In both situations the urban landowner
is likely to be the most efficient bearer of liability.
2. Toward a Tripartite System of Internalization: The Unneighbor-
liness Requirement. The general rule of host landowner liability for
harmful externalities must be qualified in order to operate yet more
efficiently. A landowner can reduce the welfare of his neighbors either
by undertaking harmful activities or by terminating beneficial con-
ditions that had previously existed on his property; the analysis thus
far has dealt only with the former situation. A layman would regard
a smokestack or a billboard as "theft" of neighborhood enjoyment that
should be tagged with liability or proscribed. He would perceive quite
differently, however, the demolition of an architectural landmark or
the construction of a housing development on a beautiful vacant
meadow. These latter acts would no doubt diminish neighboring
property values, yet a layman would not characterize the acting land-
owner as a thief of neighborhood enjoyment, but perhaps as a former
"Good Samaritan" who has understandably become tired of bestowing
"windfalls" on his neighbors. Thieves, the layman would probably say,
should be liable for the damage they cause, but lapsed Good Samaritans
should not.
The wisdom of attaching any operational significance to this linguis-
tic distinction has been a matter of considerable controversy. Some
commentators have criticized the distinction on the ground that it
cannot be determined which party is causing harm to the other. 72 In
170 RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 839 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). Although the Re-
statement illustrates the duty to maintain artificial land improvements in a nonharmful
state with a case involving cesspools, the same reasoning could be used to impose liability
for failure to paint a house or clip an ornamental hedge. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 839,
Illustration 3 (1939).
171 The RESATEMENT (SECOND) imposes an affirmative obligation on landowners in urban
areas to correct harmful natural conditions, such as unstable native trees that threaten to
topple over and injure people on the sidewalk or street. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 840(2) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 147, § 57, at 355.
172 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 34-35. Compare Michelman, Property, supra note
21, at 1196-1201, with id. at 1235-45. But see Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for
City Planning, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 650, 663-69 (1958).
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the Santa Monica Mountains case they would argue that one cannot
determine whether the grocer is harming the homeowners with his
commercial operations or, if the grocer must pay damages, the home-
owners are harming the grocer through their sensitivities. In ordinary
speech, however, people consistently distinguish "harms" from "bene-
fits" and would agree that the grocery is doing the harming there.
Evaluative terms like good, bad, beneficial, and harmful are easily
used because people have remarkably consistent perceptions of normal
conditions and thus can agree in characterizing deviations from nor-
malcy. In any community, observers empirically establish standards of
normal conduct for repetitive activities; people largely agree on normal
clothes styles or normal behavior in public places. Similarly there is
considerable agreement on the identification of normal land uses, a
category virtually certain to include characteristics of modestly priced
residential developments. 173 A specific land use is characterized in or-
dinary speech as beneficial when it would have a more positive than
usual impact, and harmful when it would have a more negative than
usual impact, on the values of normal surrounding properties assuming
a laissez faire distribution of property rights.174
Systems of compensating plaintiffs are also labeled according to the
normalcy of the plaintiff's welfare after compensation has been pro-
vided. Generally, a plaintiff in a nuisance case is not "benefited" by
being awarded judgment, he is simply "made whole." The defendant
is not "harmed" by an adverse judgment, he is merely required to
"make good the damage he has done." If liability rules required de-
fendants to compensate plaintiffs for loss from the termination of the
defendants' above-normal conduct, the rules would probably be
viewed as unjust to defendants and bestowing windfalls on plaintiffs.
Normalcy has become a central concept in law175 as well as language,
but the reasons for this importance have not yet been adequately ex-
plored. This article contends that normalcy is often used as a legal
standard because the concept promises substantial efficiencies. In
order to promote economically productive behavior that cannot be easily
achieved by bargaining and to satisfy community desires to reward
virtuous activities, legal rules should seek to transfer wealth from those
whose actions have unusually harmful external impacts and to those
173 If streets are included, residential uses occupy the majority of the area of most cities.
174 The laissez faire model is probably incorporated in ordinary language because
people recognize that administrative costs may impede legal correction of an immediate
wealth transfer effect.
175 For a demonstration that perceptions of normalcy influence the legal language of
causation, see H.L.A. HART & A. HoNoRE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 31-38 (1959).
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whose actions are unusually beneficial to others. That pattern of trans-
fers is now accomplished through a tripartite set of rules incorporating
the normalcy standard: meritorious behavior is sometimes rewarded
through quasi-contract doctrines and other devices, normal behavior
is treated neutrally, and substandard behavior is penalized through lia-
bility rules and other sanctions. 176
Distribution from the substandard and to the meritorious could also
be achieved through a unitary approach that would not use the con-
cept of normalcy. For example, a token liability to neighbors could be
placed on the most meritorious conduct, with increasing penalties for
less meritorious conduct; the standard of conduct toward others would
thus be perfection rather than normal behavior. In this system a sub-
standard landowner would suffer net losses since he would pay high
penalties and recover lower ones from his normal neighbors. 'he
most meritorious actors would pay small penalties and recover larger
ones. The distributional result sought under the tripartite approach
can thus also be achieved under a unitary approach. The legal system's
adoption of the former must be attributed to a desire to save adminis-
trative expenditures. Normal actors in a tripartite system neither pay
penalties nor receive rewards; if the range of normal conduct on the
land use spectrum is broad, the administrative economies of that sys-
tem are considerable. 77
The notion of normalcy is implicit in much of the language of
economics as well as law. It it probably no accident that economists use
the term "goods" to describe output of producers for which consumers
pay positive prices; the benefits that outsiders derive from that produc-
tion are usually optimally internalized through prices paid in mar-
ket exchanges. Economists have given less attention to the production
of "bads," output that would attract bribes to stop, or negative prices,
176 This analysis demarcates rough boundaries of tort and contract law. The former is
designed to deter below-normal behavior and the latter to provide incentives for above-
normal behavior. Tort texts often explore the use of liability rules to encourage unusually
meritorious actions like the rescue of accident victims by bystanders. This article's analysis
indicates that proper internalization in rescue situations will be most efficiently provided
not through liability rules, but through quasi-contract doctrines, public prizes to Good
Samaritans, or similar reward systems. For a discussion of the Carnegie Hero Fund, adopt-
ing this approach, see Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1972, at 1, col. 4. Cf. Epstein, A
Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEAL STiuDis, 151, 189-204 (1972); Franklin, Vermont
Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1972).
177 The concept of normalcy provides administrative savings in areas other than law.
For example, a language is a more efficient means of communication if no evaluative terms
are needed to describe a broad band of normal conduct. The absence of both positive
and negative adjectives implicitly communicates that the unmodified object is normal.
Thus, the most common evaluation to be made is communicated by the cheapest means,
silence.
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from consumers. Since economists are most comfortable with con-
sensual market mechanisms, they may neglect the problem of bads
because market mechanisms are usually less efficient than other means
of internalizing bads.
The distinction in economic theory between harmful and beneficial
spillovers reflects an underlying notion of normalcy. Modem scholars
may be surprised that Pigou thought the proper way to handle air
pollution was to give bounties to factories that cleaned up emissions,
rather than to tax polluters. In an era when it was normal to pollute
with coal-burning fireplaces, Pigou was probably right in recognizing
that rewards were the most efficient internalization system and in per-
ceiving the rare nonpolluter as a producer of beneficial externalities.
Further, this example shows that the proper tagging of an externality
should change as normal conditions change. Automobiles when they
first appeared were nuisances to horse travel; as cars began to swamp
horse-drawn vehicles in number, horses were properly perceived as
the nuisance.
This article assumes that a tripartite legal approach to land use
spillovers is more efficient than a unitary one. Proper internalization for
the owner of a beautiful meadow or a beautiful building is then best
accomplished through some reward system; his termination of those
beneficial activities is deterred by concern about losing those rewards.178
Since the rules being formulated here are limited to the liability side
of a tripartite system, imposition of host landowner liability must be
limited to instances in which he undertakes subnormal activity. Ac-
cording to the simplicity of rules guideline, the addition of the ele-
ment of subnormalcy to the prima facie case for nuisance will raise
administrative costs in cases where the element is contested. Indeed,
many students of tort law feel the added costs of the analogous fault re-
quirement in negligence cases' 79 has undermined the viability of that
system of liability, particularly in automobile accident cases. Fact find-
ing in nuisance cases, however, is generally cheaper than in accident
cases because the damaging condition is usually continuing; the ad-
ministrative costs of a counterpart to the fault requirement should
therefore be less.
The following modification in the general rule of host landowner
liability is proposed to establish the tripartite system: a change in land
178 Evaluation of various reward schemes is beyond the scope of this article. See note 12
supra.
179 The fault system, relying as it does on the reasonable man standard, generally bars
liability for normal conduct. Liability without fault has historically only been imposed on
a small class of rare activities, such as those identified as ultrahazardous.
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use should result in liability of the host landowner only if the change
is perceived as unneighborly according to contemporary community
standards. In cases where only part of a complex land use is unneighborly,
only the damage done by its unneighborly aspects should be compensa-
ble. For example, if a gas station blocks a scenic view, but a typical
residence would also have blocked the view, damages from view block-
age should not be included in the gas station's liability.
An unneighborliness test is a democratic and dynamic method of
assuring that neighbors of an enterprising landowner do not receive
excessive endowments of property rights. The unneighborliness concept
is analogous to the emphasis on unreasonableness in current nuisance
law, but the latter test is avoided here since it has been used in far too
many situations to protect host landowners from liability, often by
courts trying to avoid the harshness of injunctive relief.
Since the unneighborliness test is based on community standards, it
requires some delineation of community boundaries. Using metro-
politan areas as the relevant communities will involve lower adminis-
trative costs than a more decentralized definition. In addition,
metropolitan areas are large enough to include all significant categories
of a regional population; this characteristic tends to prevent nuisance
law from being used to exclude groups or activities unpopular only in
unusually sensitive neighborhoods of the metropolis. The metropolitan
definition is also decentralized enough to take into account diversity
from region to region. Mobile homes might be perceived as unneigh-
borly land uses in Minneapolis but not in Duluth.
There is one major difference between the proposed unneighborli-
ness requirement for nuisance liability and its "reasonable man" coun-
terpart in negligence cases. The reasonableness of allegedly negligent
conduct is tested under the circumstances in which it occurs. By analogy
the neighborliness of gas stations throughout a metropolitan area should
then be judged within less than metropolitan boundaries. Existing
nuisance law rarely characterizes a land use as a "nuisance per se," as-
signing liability regardless of location; in most cases the challenged
use must be a "nuisance in fact," unreasonable in its actual location.
Although judicial acceptance of this approach is sensible when injunc-
tive relief against nuisances is allowed, block-by-block assessment of
neighborliness should be rejected if damages is the sole relief in
nuisance cases. The purpose of the unneighborliness requirement is to
eliminate normal and meritorious activities from the nuisance system
to produce a savings in administrative costs; simplifying identification
of the cases falling within the nuisance system makes its operation
cheaper. Where damages is the remedy, imposition of a metropolitan
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standard will not result in inaccurate internalization of costs. For
example, if a gas station is considered unneighborly in most locations,
the proposed rule would impose liability even when it is surrounded
by industrial properties, but the amount of damages assessed there
would be less than usual because the industrial neighbors suffer less
than normal losses.
Under the system described above an aggrieved landowner establishes
a prima facie case for nuisance when he shows that his neighbor has
damaged him by carrying on activities, or harboring natural conditions,
perceived as unneighborly under contemporary community standards.
To determine whether a prima facie case against a proposed grocery
can be made out by homeowners in the Santa Monica Mountains, one
would have to investigate perceptions of groceries as neighbors in Los
Angeles County. °80 Groceries are relatively rare land uses, and they
must be perceived as unneighborly since they are barred, along with
other commercial uses, by most restrictive covenants in modest resi-
dential areas in Los Angeles. A grocery should thus be treated as a
nuisance in that region. This treatment can be accorded because gro-
ceries are not so common that imposing liability on them will result
in inefficiently numerous claims, the danger inherent in imposing lia-
bility for normal land uses.
3. Compensable Damage: The Problem of Aesthetics. The formula-
tion of the prima facie case discussed above allows recovery without a
physical invasion of the damaged property, for example where the
sole injury is to a landowner's psychological comfort or sense of aes-
thetics. This possibility represents a departure from prevailing legal
doctrines reflected in decisions like Mathewson v. Primeau.18s The
plaintiff in that case sought equitable relief from two conditions on
defendant's property, hogs and an accumulation of junk. The court
granted restrictions against the hogs since their odor occasionally
travelled to the plaintiff's land. Relief was denied, however, against
the pile of junk on the theory that it merely offended the plaintiff's
aesthetic senses and thus could not be remedied through a nuisance
action. This distinction is perhaps another of the distortions in nuisance
law that has resulted from the limitation of remedies to injunctive re-
lief. Since the severity of the aesthetic damage was probably slight, the
court's refusal to enjoin the junk pile may well have avoided an in-
180 The sprawl of Southern California makes identifying the relevant metropolitan
area more difficult than usual. Los Angeles County has been chosen because the Census
Bureau recognizes it as a separate Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
181 64 Wash. 2d 929, 395 P.2d 183 (1964).
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efficient remedy. There is no reason, however, why damages were not
appropriate.
Although most courts accept the distinction made in Mathewson,
some commentators have favored relief from aesthetic nuisances. 8 2
In addition, a number of exceptions to the requirement of physical
invasion have been recognized. Casting light on another's premises, ar-
guably not an invasion, has routinely been held a nuisance. 83 Relief
has also been granted against spite fences, and other construction
motivated by malice to neighbors and totally lacking in other utility.8 4
Another curious exception is the relief often provided against the
operation of funeral parlors in residential areas, even where no invasion
by fumes can be detected; many courts conclude that funeral homes
inevitably remind people of death, cause consequent feelings of de-
pression, and thus are sufficiently damaging to constitute a nuisance.8 5
Extensive exceptions to limit a legal rule often betray the conceptual
frailty of the rule itself. Although physical invasions are almost always
perceived as unneighborly and thus provide a good case for relief, the
physical invasion test does not exhaustively identify the occasions for
imposing nuisance liability.186 When an unneighborly land use de-
creases surrounding property values, the traditional objections to re-
covery in the absence of physical invasion are not persuasive. Damage
from aesthetic blight may be difficult to measure, but so may damage
182 See, e.g., Noel, Unaesthetic Sights as Nuisances, 25 CoRNEm L.Q. 1 (1939); Note,
Aesthetic Nuisances: An Emerging Cause of Action, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1075 (1970).
183 See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 705 (1949). Blocking natural light sources, however, generally
does not give rise to liability in this country. See, e.g., Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas
Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 127, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 357 (1971). The distinction may be
based on the difficulties raised by the English doctrine of "ancient lights" that provided in-
junctive relief to protect natural light sources. For a glimpse of the problems with this
doctrine, see Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores, [1904] 78 Ch. 484 (reversing the granting
of an injunction against further construction of an addition to a building that would have
slightly darkened the plaintiff's ground level offices).
184 See, e.g., Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888); Welsh v. Todd, 260
N.C. 527, 133 S.E.2d 171 (1963); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 691 (1941).
185 See, e.g., Brown v. Arbuckle, 88 Cal. App. 2d 258, 198 P.2d 550 (1948); Jack
v. Torrant, 136 Conn. 414, 71 A.2d 705 (1950); Rockenbach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47
N.W.2d 636 (1951); Rutledge v. National Funeral Home, 203 So. 2d 318 (Miss. 1967). But
see, e.g., Dean v. Powell Undertaking Co., 55 Cal. App. 545, 203 P. 1015 (1921);
Pearson & Son v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 307, 272 S.W. 375 (1925); Westcott v. Middleton, 43
N.J. Eq. 478, 11 A. 490 (1887), aff'd, 44 N.J. Eq. 297, 18 A. 80 (1888). See also sources cited
note 153 supra; Comment, Funeral Homes: Their Locations in the Community as Con-
trolled by Zoning Ordinances, Restrictive Covenants, and the Law of Nuisance, 20 SYAcusE
L. Rav. 45 (1968).
186 Michelman makes a similar observation about the use of a physical invasion
standard to identify compensable "takings" by government. Michelman, Property, supra
note 21, at 1227-29.
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from noise, smoke, vibration, or other spillovers readily accepted as
nuisances. Nor does there seem to be any physiological or psychological
reason to distinguish visual harm from other types of sensory discom-
fort.187 Idiosyncratic tastes of the complaining landowner are not more
likely to arise in aesthetic cases than in olfactory cases and can be
eliminated by measuring damages according to market values'8 and
recognizing a defense of hypersensitivity.'8 9 Finally, concern for preser-
vation of individual freedom and self-expression of landowners does
not justify refusal to recognize aesthetic nuisances. Playing a musical
instrument may be as important to one individual as building in an
odd architectural style is to another, yet noise is widely recognized as
a nuisance. The category of aesthetics does not precisely delimit the
instances for paramount concern for the protection of individual
liberty. 90 The bar against recovery for aesthetic nuisance should be
eliminated from the law, and the suggested prima facie case succeeds in
eliminating it.
4. Measuring Damage: Bonuses for Consumer Surplus. Where com-
pensation is to be allowed, a system must be designed to measure its
proper amount. The golden mean of normalcy would seem to be
achieved by requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff an amount
equal to the drop in the market value of the plaintiff's property
that would be caused by the defendant's unneighborly use if there
were no right to recovery. If periodic rather than permanent dam-
ages were awarded, they would equal the lost rents over the relevant
period discounted to present value. The market value of a plaintiff's
land would then not vary with changes in expectations about nearby
nuisances; the land value would drop only if the plaintiff cashed in on
his future rights to damages. This compensation measurement would
thus seem to protect the normalcy of the plaintiff's welfare.
Use of market values for measuring damages in nuisance cases, how-
ever, may be inappropriate. There is a minimum price at which any
person would voluntarily exchange any item of his property. The
excess of this subjective value over market value is termed "consumer
surplus."'' Consumer surplus creates no problems in the law of
187 Although there is less physical effort involved in averting one's eyes than in hold-
ing one's nose or muffling one's ears, the opportunity costs of restrictions on sight are apt
to be greater than the opportunity costs of restrictions on smelling or hearing.
188 See text at notes 191-96 infra.
189 See text at notes 241-55 infra.
190 See text at notes 231-37 infra.
191 This term is being used to include differences between subjective valuations and
market prices that arise after the purchase of an item; economists seem to use the term
more narrowly.
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damages when property is fungible; the owner can recover lost surplus
by repurchasing the lost item at market prices. If the lost property is
not fungible, however, a potential replacement item cannot provide as
large a surplus as its predecessor. For example, a longtime owner of a
single-family home in a stable residential area might not willingly part
with his dwelling except at a substantial premium over the market
price. His surplus would be based in part on experience in using this
particular house and sentimental memories connected to it. Using
market values to measure damages to this homeowner from a nuisance
seems unfair because the homeowner is apparently not made whole, and
inefficient since the external costs involved seem to be incorrectly
calculated. 1 92
Market values represent a community consensus on the severity of the
harm inflicted,193 however, and may in fact not be an unfair or in-
efficient standard. If a person feels that the market undervalues his
damage, he may be unusually sensitive and the best cost avoider of
the losses resulting from that hypersensitivity. 94 The imprecision of
market values may also be tolerable because of the resulting savings
in administrative costs. Reliable calculation of consumer surplus is
inherently expensive because of difficulty in screening out fraudulent
claims.
Nevertheless, there are types of nonfungible property to which
most owners attach considerable consumer surplus. Possessions such as
long-occupied single-family homes in stable residential areas tend to
attract increasing subjective valuations as the tenure of ownership in-
creases. The property owner with a common nonfungible surplus is
normally sensitive, not hypersensitive, and consequently not likely to
be the best avoider of losses of that surplus. A desirable system for deal-
ing with this problem is to award damages for the drop in market value
plus a bonus award to compensate for loss of the commonly held ir-
replaceable consumer surplus. To limit administrative costs such bo-
nuses could be defined through legislated schedules, perhaps as specific
percentages of the market value award. Different percentages based on
factors such as the longevity of occupancy of the injured neighbor, or
192 The shortcomings of using market values to measure losses also highlight one of
the advantages of consensual solutions to problems of external cost. Bargaining permits
subjective, idiosyncratic assessments of value; collective valuation systems, explicitly needed
in nuisance law, and implicitly required by regulatory systems like zoning, must proceed
on more impersonal, objective lines.
193 See Michelman, Toward a Practical Standard of Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAc.
LAW., No. 2, 1969, at 36, 37, 42.
194 Cf. G. CALABREsI, CosT oF AcCIDENTS, supra note 11, at 222-24. See also text at notes
241-55 infra.
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whether the neighbor is an owner-occupant or a renter, would be justi-
fied if uneven patterns of subjective value could be verified empiri-
cally.195 Resort to schedules assumes that individualized valuation is not
cost-justified. 190
5. The Requirement of Substantial Harm. Prevailing nuisance law
requires that the plaintiff suffer "substantial harm" to be entitled to
relief.197 This condition is essential to an efficient prima facie case.
If plaintiffs are allowed to bring suits for trivial damages, the adminis-
trative costs involved are likely to exceed the efficiency gains of permit-
ting such suits.198 A rational plaintiff will pursue all claims where his
expected costs of pursuing the claim are less than his expected benefits
from success discounted by his perceived probability of success. 99 The
plaintiff, however, will not consider the administrative costs his actions
impose upon either the defendant or the dispute-resolution system.200
The total administrative cost of a rational but trivial claim may thus
exceed the reduction in the sum of nuisance and prevention costs
achieved by granting the claim. A requirement of substantial harm as
an element of the prima facie case thus promotes efficiency by eliminat-
ing inefficient cases that survive the unneighborliness requirement.
That an individual case is inefficient under the substantial harm
requirement, however, should not create an absolute requirement of
its dismissal. The substantial harm requirement should not bar a claim
where it can be ascertained that short-term efficiency losses involved in
granting relief are less than the efficiency gains of establishing prece-
195 Bonus payments disguised as relocation payments are now granted to condemnees
displaced as a result of federal or federally assisted programs. The Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655
(Supp. 1973), provides for awards of up to $15,000 over fair market value to homeowners,
id. § 4623, and up to $4,000 to tenants, id. § 4624. A HUD survey found actual awards
averaging nearly $10,000 per homeowner and $2,870 per tenant. Abramowitz, Uniform
Relocation Act Defended, 29 J. oF HoUsING, 279, 280 (1972). The average payment to
homeowners displaced by Federal Highway Administration programs in 1971, however, was
a less generous $2,800. Note, In the Path of Progress: Federal Highway Relocation As-
surances, 82 YALE L.J. 373, 379 n.38 (1972).
10 See note 275 infra.
197 W. PROssER, ToRrs, supra note 147, § 87, at 577-78; RsTATE ENT (SEcOND) OF ToRTS
§ 821F (rent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
198 Cf. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, supra
note 11, at 537.
199 See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 399 (1973). In calculating expected benefits and costs the plaintiff will
take into account the possibility of settlement or judgment and also the effect of his
action on his credibility to others in similar future suits.
200 Such costs might include the defendant's costs, plaintiff's costs assignable to the
defendant, or costs of the adjudication machinery not covered by user fees.
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dents that will cause similar harm-inflicters to undertake efficient pre-
ventive measures or settle quickly with those they injure. For example,
singly inefficient damage suits against slightly offensive gas stations may
enhance overall efficiency if their success prompts oil companies to
design their future outlets more carefully.
Application of the substantial harm requirement is particularly
difficult when a large plaintiff class alleges harm and seeks damages.
Total costs of organizing, making strategy, and sharing costs and awards
rise with the number of plaintiffs, but economies of scale may be
present. Further, as the nuisance becomes more pervasive, the total
damage increases and large efficiency gains are more likely to result
from the adoption of preventive measures. In these suits the substantial
harm test should first be applied to each member of the plaintiff class to
eliminate members whose damages are less than the marginal adminis-
trative costs their claim imposes on the class. The threshold level of
damages required of each of the eligible plaintiffs may be less than that
required of a lone plaintiff because of possible efficiencies involved in
multiple-plaintiff claims. The requirement of substantial harm, how-
ever, will narrow the eligibility for damages from a pervasive nuisance
to the few, if any, parties suffering relatively acute injury.
6. Remedies: The Plaintiff's Choice between Damages and Purchas-
ing an Injunction. In a recent and stimulating article Calabresi and
Melamed observed that there are four possible rules on remedies in
nuisance cases.20 Under the first rule the plaintiff is entitled to enjoin
the defendant's nuisance. Second, the plaintiff is entitled to damages
from the defendant but not to injunctive relief. The third rule is that
the plaintiff may neither enjoin the defendant's conduct nor collect
damages. The fourth rule, generally ignored by legal commentators,
permits the plaintiff to enjoin the defendant's conduct, but only if
he compensates the defendant for the defendant's losses caused by the
injunction.20 2 When a nuisance exists, present principles always allow
the plaintiff to invoke rule two (damages) and in a great many situations
to invoke rule one (injunction).
Nuisance law would function better if, in general, a plaintiff in a
nuisance case were limited to choosing between the remedies of rule
two (damages) and rule four (compensated injunction). Adoption of
this recommendation would obviously constitute a major reformation
201 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1115-23.
202 The fourth remedy will be referred to as a "compensated injunction" to distinguish
it from the first remedy, termed simply an injunction or injunctive relief.
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of prevailing nuisance doctrine.20 3 The following discussion examines
the usual justification for injunctions in nuisance cases and demon-
strates the advantages of the second and fourth rules. Rules one and
three are recognized as appropriate, however, in certain unusual nui-
sance situations where they are essential to protect the fundamental
rights of one of the parties.
The major danger of injunctive relief is that the cost to the defen-
dant of an injunction might exceed its benefits to the plaintiff, and
that, because of high administrative costs, the parties will be unable
to bargain for a modification of the overly strict decree. Courts generally
recognize this danger and try to balance the utility of the defendant's
activity against the amount of damage it does, before granting injunctive
relief. These balancing exercises are expensive and introduce con-
siderable uncertainty into the conflict resolution process. The courts
are often forced into this balancing chore in nuisance litigation because
there is nothing to deter a plaintiff from seeking an inefficient injunc-
tion.
Rule two and rule four, however, are less likely to be inefficient
remedies. Rule two internalizes the nuisance and permits the defendant
to make his own cost-benefit analysis of preventive measures. By shifting
the costs of an injunction back to the plaintiff, rule four discourages
plaintiffs from seeking inefficient injunctive restraints, and thus saves
some of the administrative costs of rule one. Although rule one injunc-
tions may be warranted in certain situations, the usual justifications
for injunctions are unpersuasive; this article proposes that the courts
adopt a rebuttable presumption against the availability of that relief
in nuisance cases.
a. Commentators have traditionally offered four primary rationales
for injunctions. 2 4 First, since market values do not reflect the subjective
losses a plaintiff suffers and since those losses are hard to monetize by
any other means, the remedy of damages is said to be inadequate.20 5
As has been pointed out, however, this shortcoming of the damage
remedy can be overcome for common subjective values through bonus
203 This change actually increases the remedies avaliable to plaintiffs. If the external
costs of an activity exceed its internal benefits to the defendant, the balancing test cur-
rently entitles the plaintiff to an injunction. Rule four would continue to entitle him to a
"free" injunction in this situation. See note 222 infra. Where the balancing test operates
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff is currently denied an injunction and often damages
as well. Rule four and rule two, however, provide him remedies when balancing works
against him.
204 See Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1002-04 (1965).
205 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, CosT oF AccwENrs, supra note 11, at 97-100, 203-04.
1973]
The University of Chicago Law Review
payments calculated from legislated schedules.2 06 If he holds unusual
subjective values, the landowner is hypersensitive 20 7 and, except in
cases involving personal safety or fundamental freedoms, has no per-
suasive claim to injunctive relief.
b. A second justification for rule one is the moral assertion that a
landowner should not be able in effect to exercise a private power of
eminent domain and force others to exchange basic property rights for
damages.2 08 By adopting rule two, however, our legal system has long
tolerated such forced exchanges where they would promote efficient
land use. For example, a landowner's remedy against a trespasser is
limited to damages if the trespass was justified by some incomplete
privilege like private necessity. If the invader can meet the requirements
for an easement by necessity, rule three is applied, and the servient
landowner is not even compensated for the exchange.
Forced exchanges, or nonconsensual interferences with an individual's
living arrangements, are most disturbing when they threaten funda-
mental liberties. Murderers and slave-traders obviously should be en-
joined even if they could somehow compensate their victims. Similarly,
if one function of property is to provide a shield behind which an
individual can nurture his eccentricities, in some situations he should
be entitled to stop disturbances of his domain without making a rule
four payment. If courts rarely grant injunctions against nuisances,
however, society may benefit from increased landowner choice among
affirmative activities within their own boundaries. The problem is to
identify the disturbances so threatening to individual liberty that they
justify use of injunctive relief. A trade-off must be made between the
value of individual autonomy and the possible efficiency and liberty
gains from fewer restrictions on interactions.
To accommodate these conflicting goals, the proposed presumption
against injunctive relief in a nuisance case should be open to being re-
butted by a showing that the plaintiff's personal safety or fundamental
freedom of action within his boundaries has been or will be critically
curtailed by the defendant's activity. The plaintiff will then generally
be entitled to enjoin encroachments that oust him from part of his prop-
erty.20 9 Rule one injunctions should in addition be available against
206 See text at notes 191-96 supra.
207 See text at notes 241-55 infra.
208 See, e.g., G. CALABR.si, CoSr OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 11, at 100-02; Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, supra note 11, at 536; cf. Ross, Book
Review, 84 HARv. L. Rnv. 1322, 1323-24 (1971).
209 This principle is not without exception. For example, if a downstream landowner
dams a watercourse and floods the lands of his upstream neighbor, Mill Acts in many
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invading fumes or other substances likely to kill or critically injure
normally sensitive people. Unprivileged continuing trespasses by people
should also be subject to injunctive relief; those invasions of privacy are
likely to restrict the landowner's choice of lifestyles.2 10 The proposed
rule for identifying situations appropriate for injunctions is admittedly
vague, and ambiguous cases are certain to arise. The majority of nui-
sance activities, however, involve only what might be termed incon-
veniences; injunctions are rarely essential for libertarian reasons and
should usually be withheld because of the disadvantages of injunctive
relief.211 For example, the external costs of spite fences, as outrageous
an activity as one is likely to find in a nuisance case, can be best inter-
nalized by allowing the plaintiff to choose between rule two and rule
four relief.212
c. The third rationale used for injunctions is that damages are in-
adequate when the defendant is judgment-proof. This argument is
self-limiting; it holds only if the plaintiff can show that he could not
collect a monetary award. -In addition, this justification is not convinc-
ing in a nuisance case even when the defendant is destitute. A lien based
on a judgment or a settlement arising from misuse of a property could
be given priority over all mortgages on that property; this treatment
would induce mortgagees to discourage a mortgagor's inefficient
nuisance activities. 213 Even if this priority rule were not adopted,
a plaintiff in a nuisance case need not worry about judgment-proof
defendants as much as plaintiffs in other cases. By definition landowners
have assets on which a plaintiff could levy to receive cash, or at least
the termination of the defendant's ownership. Short-term tenants re-
sponsible for nuisances, however, may not possess a lienable interest.
This threat to the adequacy of the damage remedy could be eliminated
states adopt rule two and limit the upstream owner to damages. Constitutional attacks
on these acts have been unavailing. Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885). See
generally Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem,
58 YALE L.J. 599, 604-05 (1949).
210 Occasional trespass by nonvicious animals, however, would neither threaten personal
injury nor chill any of the landowner's activities. Thus, it should not be enjoined.
211 John Rawls has proposed a set of "basic liberties" that would prevail in a just society;
he would forbid even consensual exchanges of these liberties for social and economic
benefits. J. RAWLS, supra note 30, at 60-61, 243-48, 541-48. He would not count freedom
from unpleasant neighboring conditions as a basic liberty.
212 The price for purchasing a rule four injunction against a spite fence will usually
be zero because these structures by definition have no positive market value. The price will
be greater than zero only if the cost of removing the fence exceeds the damages it does. See
note 222 infra.
213 This priority rule assumes that the allocative gains from such private policing exceed
the added administrative costs of the rule.
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by holding a landlord liable for the nuisances of his short-term tenants
and granting him the right of indemnification against the tenants.
d. A fourth justification for rule one injunctions is that administra-
tive factors can make granting an injunction more efficient than
awarding damages. The merits of each of the four rules on remedies
vary according to the number of parties involved in a land use contro-
versy. Where many plaintiffs are harmed by a single defendant's ac-
tivity, rule one injunctions are likely to have major allocative costs. If
a court imposes preventive measures that are too harsh under a cost-
benefit analysis, the defendant will have great difficulty negotiating re-
moval of the injunction. He must obtain a release from every member
of the plaintiff class since each can enforce the injunction, and each
plaintiff would wait to be the last to release his rights since his bargain-
ing power increases as others sell their releases. Aware of this holdout
problem, the defendant may not care to begin to negotiate the release of
the strict decree. Thus, the judiciary should be cautious when consider-
ing equitable relief in pervasive nuisance cases since the market cannot
be relied upon to correct the inefficient aspects of the injunction.21 4
The second and fourth rules involving payments may be even less
desirable in these cases. Although damage actions and compensated in-
junctions are less likely than imprecise injunctions to cause major un-
corrected misallocations, they may be less efficient if their allocative
advantage is outweighed by added administrative costs; increased costs
could result from the need to calculate and distribute damage awards to
or collect purchase contributions from a large plaintiff class. Rule three
also seems unattractive since it leaves the harmful externalities un-
internalized. Among the four rules, rule one may be the most efficient
for pervasive nuisance cases. Nevertheless, Calabresi and Melamed are
right to be chary of injunctions against widespread environmental
nuisances. All four rules are apt to be inferior in these cases to options
outside the arena of private civil litigation, notably publicly assessed
fines and mandatory legislative regulations.215 Most commentators
214 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1106-07, 1119.
215 See text at notes 269-318 infra. The preferability of legislative regulations to
judicial injunctions is not obvious. If mandatory regulations are appropriate for handling
certain pervasive nuisances, it is not clear why a court cannot frame such regulations via
injunctions as well as or better than a legislative body. In some situations ad hoc judidal
injunctions might involve lower administrative costs than legislative enactment and
enforcement of mandatory standards and prohibitions. In addition, legislatures are prone
to enact particularly inefficient regulations when some of the costs of those regulations are
borne by those outside that legislative process. The legislative process is also likely to be
inefficient in resolving conflicts between two interest groups when those groups face vastly
different costs of organizing for political action.
Nevertheless, except when these legislative shortcomings are overwhelming, the legisla-
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thus agree that rule one is rarely the optimal remedy for pervasive
nuisances.
The relative efficiency of injunctions and damages in more localized
nuisance cases raises different considerations because of the lower ad-
ministrative costs involved in dispute resolution. Calabresi and Mela-
med assert that injunctive relief may be more efficient when
administrative costs are sufficiently small; they analyze a hypothetical
conflict between two individuals, Marshall and Taney, to support their
proposition.216 They suggest that if Marshall is entitled to a rule one
injunction that directs Taney to take inefficient preventive actions,
Taney will not be deterred by the possibility of high transaction costs
from bargaining for at least a partial release of the strict decree. Cala-
bresi and Melamed imply that the allocative crudeness of injunctions is
thus readily corrected by the market in one-on-one cases and that
rule one is preferable to rule two in such cases because it avoids two
costs of damage actions: the administrative costs of judicially or legis-
latively valuing damages and the costs of coercing plaintiffs who are
forced to exchange their rights at prices to which they might not volun-
tarily consent.217 The concern about coercion is curious since the
problem is reciprocal; plaintiffs are coerced by forced exchanges, but
defendants are coerced by injunctions. There is no apparent reason why
either form of coercion should be more costly than the other. The
observation about administrative costs has considerable surface appeal
since collective rules on damages are expensive to administer. On
further analysis, however, it appears that Calabresi and Melamed failed
to note that a combination of rule two and rule four may involve lower
ture is likely to be a less dangerous branch of government than the judiciary from an
efficiency standpoint. Legislatures are institutionally urged toward favorable cost-benefit
decisions, while courts are more insulated from such pressure. If some legislative action, or
inaction, is dearly inefficient, there are crude pressures working within the political process
to eliminate the inefficiency. For example, overly strict preventive measures will be strongly
opposed by the regulated group, but weakly defended by the intended beneficiaries of the
regulation since they gain only a small reduction in nuisance costs from the measures.
There are basic similarities between the legislative and bargaining processes. In the leg-
islative process, participants try to purchase collective bargains, or laws, with the currency
of politics--votes, campaign contributions, volunteer work, and bribes. Although it
is less reliable than private bargaining, the legislative process does have an institutional
tendency to move in the same direction as bargaining, toward minimizing the sum of
nuisance and prevention costs. Assuming it is not corrupt, the judicial system contains less
effective checks against inefficiency. Land developers aggrieved by overly strict zoning may
be able to vote out, or buy out, the offending zoning officials, but they are comparatively
helpless in the face of an overly strict injunctive decree. Thus, in the few instances where
the establishment of mandatory standards and prohibitions is appropriate, those standards
should be established by the most politically sensitive government institution.
216 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1118.
217 Id. at 1118-19.
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administrative costs than rule one in the settlement process of even
one-on-one controversies. This team of remedies can accomplish at least
three types of administrative savings.
First, the "valuation costs" incurred by the parties before they agree
on a price for settlement are likely to be higher in a case where the
plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief than where the plaintiff must
choose between damages and a compensated injunction.- 8 A party in-
volved in negotiations over the release of an injunction would become
involved in the search for clues to the subjective values held by his
adversary. For instance, a plaintiff entitled to an injunction would seek
to determine the defendant's subjective valuation of his nuisance
project since that value represents the plaintiff's ideal settlement
figure. Conversely, the defendant would try to discover his own ideal
settlement figure by seeking the plaintiff's subjective valuation of the
plaintiff's losses from the project. This search process would involve
strategems such as exploratory offers, false signals, and threats; these
same tactics are also used in settlement negotiations over damage
claims. The critical difference between rules one and three and rules
two and four is that under rules one and three the parties have no col-
lective valuation rules to refer to when estimating an appropriate
settlement figure. If a plaintiff were restricted, however, to a choice
between collecting damages and purchasing an injunction, collective
rules on damages would establish targets for appropriate settlements
and would considerably narrow the range of disagreements to be negoti-
ated. If the collective rules were comprehensible, the parties could cal-
culate the damages the plaintiff would collect in litigation from the
defendant and the price the plaintiff would have to pay for an injunction.
A hypothesis of this article is that valuation costs, and thus administra-
tive costs, tend to be higher when there are no such external guidelines
to constrain the settlement figure under negotiation. Calabresi and
Melamed have noted the difficulty of ascertaining subjective values219
and show evidence at times that they would agree with this hypothesis. 220
Rule four remedies, although historically not available in nuisance
cases, may thus be an efficient addition to the array of remedies avail-
able to the plaintiff. Granting the plaintiff the option of purchasing
an injunction should expedite the private settlement of cases where the
plaintiff perceives rule two damages as inadequate. A recent case, Spur
218 If the collective rules for measuring damages are vague, this advantage may of course
be lost.
219 Id. at 1095 n.13, 1109 n.38.
220 "[W]here negotiations after an accident do occur-for instance pretrial settlements
-it is largely because the alternative is the collective valuation of damages." Id. at 1109.
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Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co.,221 involved such a
situation, and the court in fact imposed a rule four remedy. Spur In-
dustries operated a cattle feedlot outside Phoenix, Arizona, that held
30,000 cattle in peak seasons. A herd that size produces over a million
pounds of wet manure a day, attracting flies and emitting annoying
odors. After the feedlot had been established, the plaintiff began
development nearby of a major retirement community called Sun City
and sought to enjoin the operation of the feedlot. The Supreme Court
of Arizona granted the injunction, but conditioned this remedy on the
plaintiff paying the defendant its costs "of moving or shutting down"
because Sun City had come to the nuisance. 222
Availability of a compensated injunction probably reduces the
valuation costs involved in voluntary settlement of a controversy like
Spur Industries. If the developer invoked the rule two remedy, he
should not be entitled to his full damages, because, as suggested be-
low, 223 he indeed came to the nuisance. Thus, even if the feedlot is in-
efficiently located, a damage award would not necessarily result in its
dosing since that award would be less than the full burden of the feed-
lot on Sun City. If the development company were limited to a rule two
recovery, it might therefore try to negotiate with Spur for termination
of the feedlot. The cost of these negotiations would likely be lower if the
developer were entitled to purchase an injunction; collective rules
would set a target for settlement, and the defendant would realize that
the plaintiff could ultimately force an injunction on him at that price.224
The main role of rule four is to facilitate the termination of a nui-
sance whose harm a plaintiff subjectively values at an amount greater
than the damages he can recover under rule two.225 This situation is
221 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972).
222 The measure of damages under rule four should be the diminution, if any, in the
market value of defendant's land, structures, and equipment resulting from his future
inability to devote his property to the enjoined nuisance activity. This formula automatic-
ally takes into account the lesser of the defendant's relocation and shutdown costs. The
defendant's compensation for a rule four injunction is zero unless the internal benefits to
him of the nuisance exceed its total external costs, as those costs are valued collectively.
If his neighbors' losses exceed his benefits, the curtailment of his nuisance activity would
raise his property values by reducing his liabilities.
223 See text at notes 256-68 infra.
224 Rule four remedies are less likely to be useful where there are multiple plaintiffs
and thus freeloader problems.
225 Where the plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunction, and the defendant's use is at
least temporarily discontinued, both parties have an incentive to obtain a private settle-
ment that would provide a rapid final solution and avoid the expense of litigation. Even
where the plaintiff does not obtain a preliminary injunction, the rule four injunction
remedy provides a target for settlement, indicating the maximum the defendant can demand
from the plaintiff for termination, and thus will facilitate private settlement.
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most common when the plaintiff has unusual subjective values, his ac-
tivities are hypersensitive to injury, or he has come to the nuisance.
Availability of compensated injunctions is also useful in assuring the
immediate termination of nuisances where collective valuation systems
indicate that the activity generates greater external costs than internal
benefits, but the defendant's subjective values lead him to conclude
otherwise and thus a judgment for damages would not shut him down.
In that situation the defendant is not entitled to compensation under
rule four; an appropriate restriction on his activities would, if any-
thing, increase the value of his land by reducing his nuisance liabilities.
Rule four thus gives priority to the subjective values of normal land-
owners over the perverse subjective benefit a defendant receives from
his nuisance activity, the preferred result from a distributional stand-
point.226
A second advantage of the combination of the rule two and rule four
remedies that Calabresi and Melamed may have overlooked is that under
those rules nuisance activities that are prospectively worthwhile will be
subject to less delay in starting than if they are vulnerable to rule one
injunctions. If rule one is available in a one-on-one situation, a land-
owner planning some nuisance activity will usually delay its start
until he settles with the sole plaintiff who could enjoin it. Starting
earlier would greatly weaken his bargaining strength by enabling
the plaintiff to hold him up at critical junctures. The defendant
might of course try to force a quick settlement by threatening to
abandon his plans or move the activity to another location. Even if
the defendant made those threats, however, the plaintiff would still be
226 Allowing successful plaintiffs to choose between damages and a compensated injunc-
tion raises some procedural questions. Upon making the proper showing, a plaintiff invok-
ing rule four should be entitled to secure a preliminary injunction against further
expansion of the defendant's activity to minimize the required payment to the defendant.
A preliminary injunction, however, is obviously harsh on the defendant. Consequently, if
a plaintiff obtains an injunction under rule four, he should not be permitted to abandon
that route; otherwise he could use the preliminary injunction as a tactical maneuver in
bargaining. The tribunal issuing the preliminary injunction must also assure the defendant
adequate security for the payment the plaintiff will owe him. The plaintiff should thus
be required to post an adequate bond.
Plaintiffs lacking security for rule four payments are a more serious concern than
defendants lacking security for rule two payments. Nuisance cases commonly involve
multiple plaintiffs, but rarely multiple defendants. Multiple plaintiffs might conspire to
have one member of the class bring an action that would bankrupt him individually,
after which the entire plaintiff class would secretly chip in for his support. These same
plaintiffs might have spurned the rule four remedy if required to compensate the defen-
dant fully. In contrast, when the defendant's security for rule two payments is inadequate,
the plaintiffs will be able to foreclose their judgment lien and terminate his ownership of
the offending property.
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likely to take time before settling to gather clues about the defendant's
relocation costs and the defendant's subjective valuation of his proposed
activity. In any case, the defendant will be strongly inclined to delay
his project until a settlement has been drafted, signed, and possibly re-
corded in public records to bind the plaintiff's successors in ownership.
If the plaintiff's choice is between damages and a compensated injunc-
tion, however, the defendant will have little reason to delay his activity
once he has estimated the collective assessments of the appropriate
awards under each rule. To the extent that the collective rules are clear,
delay will be slight; the defendant's strategic reason for delaying activ-
ity, fear of loss of bargaining power, evaporates when uncompensated
injunctive relief is no longer available.227
Finally, the availability of injunctive relief in localized nuisance
cases would complicate legal rules on remedies. If injunctions are
denied in pervasive nuisance cases because they threaten uncorrectable
misallocations of resources, yet are available in localized cases due to
reduced administrative costs of bargained corrections, the legal system
will be required to develop rules for estimating the level of adminis-
trative costs in each dispute.228 Those rules themselves would create,
however, considerable administrative costs since uncertainty about en-
titlements to rule one remedies would seriously complicate settlement
negotiations. 229
Administrative cost questions are ultimately empirical, and it may be
that the remedy used in one-on-one situations does not significantly
affect efficiency. The conclusion apparently reached by Calabresi and
Melamed, that rule one remedies are preferable in one-on-one nuisance
cases, is not clearly wrong; this article suggests, however, that injunc-
tions may create at least three administrative problems in that simplest
of settings: the cost of difficult searches for subjective values, delays in
initiation of cost-justified nuisance activities, and added administrative
costs in determining what remedies are available in a specific case.
In sum, the justifications generally offered for rule one injunctions are
227 There may be an advantage to the entire system in encouraging the defendant to
start early. Disputes over an executed settlement agreement are less likely when the agree-
ment is made after the defendant begins his nuisance activity. A plaintiff can attack a
preactivity settlement on the ground that the defendant misrepresented the nature of his
prospective activity.
228 A rule that uncompensated injunctions are available only in one-on-one situations
would not eliminate any ambiguities, but merely shift the defendant's attention to the
legal rules governing the standing of plaintiffs.
229 To estimate the magnitude of this problem, one might investigate the extent to which
the doctrines now limiting rule one relief, such as laches, unclean hands, estoppel, and
balancing of hardships, create uncertainties that impede private settlement negotiations.
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certainly not compelling in most instances; the plaintiff normally should
be forced to choose between collecting damages and purchasing an in-
junction.2 0 A rebuttable presumption against rule one injunctions
should exist in nuisance cases, and be overcome only when the plaintiff
can show that his personal safety or fundamental freedoms are vitally
threatened by the defendant's activity. Rule one relief is justified to
protect essential liberties, but few modem urban nuisances threaten in-
vasions of that type.
The prima facie nuisance case can now be summarized as follows:
A landowner who intentionally carries out activities, or permits
natural conditions to develop, that are perceived as unneigh-
borly under contemporary community standards shall be liable
for all damages (measured by the diminution in the market value
of plaintiff's land plus bonuses for diminutions in widely held
subjective values) to all parties who are thereby substantially
injured, and continuation of the activity may be enjoined by any
party willing to compensate the landowner for any losses he suffers
from that injunction.
C. Nuisance Law: Defenses
Plaintiffs who succeed in making out a prima facie case in nuisance
should not be entitled to remedies that would violate the defendant's
fundamental liberties or conflict with the four guidelines for the effi-
cient assignment of rights. Affirmative defenses involve additional ad-
ministrative costs. Nonetheless, four defenses to the prima facie case
are now proposed: the first two to protect the defendant's liberty and
the last two to promote efficiency. These defenses will often be incom-
plete, and in such cases the parties in conflict will ultimately be required
to split the contested cost between them.
1. The Defense of Freedom of Expression. This article has already
suggested that a landowner should be entitled to enjoin nuisance inva-
sions that curtail his fundamental liberties.231 Libertarian concerns
also indicate that every landowner should possess rule three entitle-
230 In some situations the plaintiff may be restricted to the damage remedy alone. See
text at notes 231-40 infra.
231 See text at notes 208-12 supra. There is widespread agreement that it is useful to
single out liberties other than the right to be protected from unfair wealth redistributions.
See J. RAWLS, supra note 20, at 60-61, 244-48, 541-48; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11,
at 1102-05. There is little agreement, however, concerning which liberties are to be
protected, though many scholars include basic bodily integrity, basic political rights, and
basic rights of self-expression and self-determination. On the difficulty of identifying basic
liberties and providing for the resolution of conflicts when liberties are incompatible, see
Grey, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REV. 286, 308-16 (1973).
[40:681
Alternatives to Zoning
ments that protect him from liability for exercising certain freedoms 232
and immunize him from the risk that a neighbor will stop these
activities by purchasing the right to their termination through rule
four. A landowner's basic rule three entitlement should be that his
activities may not be disturbed unless a neighbor can make out a
prima facie case in nuisance against him.233 In addition, rule three
protection is warranted even when activities are unneighborly, to
the extent that those activities constitute exercises of fundamental
rights of free expression. Bizarre architecture or landscaping may
be as significant a mode of self-expression as unusual clothing or
hairstyles, activities lately protected by rule three.234 In the famous
case of People v. Stover,235 for example, a landowner argued that
he strung offensive clotheslines of rags to express disapproval of local
tax policy. Activities such as noise from political meetings, playing
musical instruments, or burning incense in religious rituals might
conceivably warrant rule three protection.
When the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in nuisance, how-
232 Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (imposition of liability for
alleged defamatory statements may abridge constitutional rights to free expression).
233 For example, a doctor whose examining room is unusually sensitive to noise should
not be allowed to invoke rule four to purchase involuntary promises of silence from his
normal neighbors. This allocation of rights favors people who create nuisances over those
who are hypersensitive. Except where the plaintiff is entitled to a rule one injunction or
wants to purchase a rule four injunction, an unneighborly landowner can force a nuisance
on his normal neighbors, but a hypersensitive landowner cannot compel neighbors to
terminate normal activities that are incompatible with his hypersensitivities. The only
apparent justification for this asymmetry is that easements protecting hypersensitivities
are perceived as interfering more with the servient landowner's rights than easements
legitimizing unpleasant neighboring conditions. This perception is reflected in First
Amendment cases that treat loss of the right to speak, the impact of an easement of silence,
as a more disturbing deprivation of freedom than interferences with a person's preference
not to hear, the effect of an easement of noise. But see the argument for the primacy of
"the right to be left alone" in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
234 Government bodies have had considerable difficulty winning rule one entitlements
against eccentric appearances. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearing
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in corridor of courthouse constitutionally
protected from collective sanctions); Tinker v. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(wearing of black armbands in public school constitutionally protected from collective
sanctions). On the issue of the regulation of hairstyles in public school systems, compare
Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wisc. 1969) with Ferrell v. School District, 392 F.2d
697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968). The Supreme Court has denied rule two
remedies in externality cases on constitutional grounds. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). I know of no First Amendment case in which the government agreed to
compensate a constrained individual for his losses and the individual challenged its right
to do so; in most cases such government condemnation of First Amendment and privacy
rights would probably not survive constitutional scrutiny.
235 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963).
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ever, most courts readily deny defenses based on constitutional rights
of freedom of expression.236 This disdain for freedom of expression
defenses in nuisance cases is doubtlessly attributable to the easy avail-
ability of other means of expression to landowners. Restrictions on
land use activities do not curtail individual liberties as sharply as
restrictions on hairstyles, for example, because the unneighborly ac-
tivity can be carried out in a more isolated location. For similar
reasons the Supreme Court has tolerated imposition of reasonable re-
strictions on the time and place of even political expression.237 Al-
though it will rarely be recognized in land use cases, the defense of free-
dom of expression serves as a useful reminder that maximization of
wealth and the assurance of its fair distribution are not the sole
social goals.
2. The Defense of Equality of Opportunity. Unavoidable physical
characteristics of a landowner may be perceived as unneighborly and
thus cause an unusual decline in his neighbors' property values. In a
society valuing equality of opportunity, however, rule three should
be used to protect people with unpopular racial, ethnic, or morpho-
logical characteristics from liability and coerced disruptions. Rawls,
who would permit social and economic inequalities only if they are
attached to positions open to all,238 would clearly regard the assessment
of liability against unalterable personal attributes as unjust.
The issue of external costs resulting from low social status is con-
siderably more complex. In a society in which high status positions
may be achieved by anyone within a short time, nuisance liability for
low social status might be accepted as fair. In reality, however, in even
the most mobile societies major shifts in social class are exceptional
even over a span of several generations; in most cases a person in a low
social class can do little to escape that position. In light of this fact, the
Rawls test indicates that low social status should not be treated as a
nuisance, and the case law concurs.239 Plaintiffs seeking damages in a
236 Courts have even upheld the dictation of architectural styles in historic districts.
Michelman, supra note 193, at 59-40.
237 "The rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic
society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a
group at any place and at any time." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). See also
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (affirming convictions arising from demonstration at
jailhouse).
238 J. RAWLs, supra note 30, at 60.
239 See Falloon v. Schilling, 29 Kan. 292 (1883) (asserting as dictum that injunctive
relief should not be available against a person who brings a different social class of people
into a neighborhood, even if he is motivated by spite); cf. Cawley v. Housing Authority, 146
Conn. 543, 152 A.2d 923 (1959) (holding on different grounds that a state public housing
project did not constitute a nuisance).
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nuisance suit should be denied compensation for losses caused by un-
avoidable characteristics of an unneighborly landowner or his invitees.
Similarly, a plaintiff seeking a compensated injunction should not be
entitled to coerce the removal of people whose status or physical char-
acteristics he finds objectionable.
The impact of the defense of equality of opportunity can be seen by
imagining the installation by hillbillies of a mobile home in an exclusive
residential area of Beverly Hills not protected by covenants. Although
mobile homes are certainly unneighborly uses in Los Angeles County,
the offended neighbors could only either recover compensation for
the damage caused by the physical appearance of the mobile home240 or
purchase an injunction compelling the amelioration of its noxious
aesthetic features. Forced removal of the hillbillies through rule four
would be barred by the equality of opportunity defense.
The distinction between damage inflicted by unavoidable personal
characteristics and damage inflicted by land use activities is not always
clear. A mobile home or tarpaper shack may not be inherently unaes-
thetic. Uses of this type are probably considered ugly, thereby reducing
surrounding property values, because they are associated with people of
low social status. If this hypothesis were built into the law, owners of
all types of residential structures would be entitled to rule three protec-
tion to prevent aesthetic damages from fostering class exclusion. The
distinction between people and structures, however, has its advantages.
Although no one exercises significant control over his social class, poor
people have considerable flexibility in the appearance of their dwelling.
The exemption of all residential structures from nuisance liability
could create serious allocational inefficiencies since most landowners
are generally the best avoiders of costs caused by changes in physical
conditions within their boundaries. Even though the wealth redis-
tribution to poor people effected by a residence exemption is desirable,
such a redistribution would be best accomplished through direct
transfer payments under a general welfare system. A given wealth
distribution almost certainly can be achieved much more efficiently
through direct transfers than through contortions in liability rules.
3. The Defense of Hypersensitivity. As now stated the prima facie
case for nuisance generally imposes liability on a host landowner for
external losses caused by intentional or natural changes on his prop-
erty. This rule was prompted by consideration of the four guidelines
240 These damages would be valued as if the mobile home were occupied by people of
normal social status.
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for the efficient assignment of rights. The first three of these guidelines
suggested that the risk of loss was better borne by the party with greater
knowledge of the risk, better organization for dealing with the risk, and
better control over implementing the most efficient preventive measures.
The general rule placing liability on the landowner must now be modi-
fied to deal with those types of cases where the affected neighbor, not the
landowner, typically has better knowledge, organization, and/or con-
trol over at least part of the potential loss. This relationship occurs
primarily where the neighbor is hypersensitive to harm or where he
fails to mitigate damages after a change on the landowner's property.
In hypersensitivity cases the neighbor generally has better knowledge
of the risk; in mitigation cases he is at least equally aware of the risk of
further damage and controls the property on which the most efficient
preventive steps can be taken. Efficiency defenses based on these two
situations, unlike the liberty defenses discussed above, should not
entitle the defendant to rule three protection, but should rather
benefit him by shifting more in his favor the assessment of payments
due under rules two and four.
Instances of damage from market competition can illustrate that a
party injured by another's action is often best able to avoid that loss.
Redistributions of wealth caused by market competition are generally
not treated as occasions for compensation.241 If a large supermarket
opens next to a mom-and-pop grocery, destroying the value of the
latter's goodwill and diminishing the market value of its building,
mom and pop usually bear those losses. One reason they receive little
sympathy is that they were probably the best avoiders of the losses they
suffered. They probably had the best knowledge of their precarious
competitive position and were in the best position to adopt preventive
measures, in this case technological advances in their industry.
This laissez faire attitude results from the impact of efficiency con-
siderations on collective assessments of the fairness of private wealth
redistributions. Successful competitors are usually not viewed as wrong-
doers since free competition is perceived as promoting optimal -alloca-
tion of resources through the market mechanism; further, losses from
competition are so common that the administrative costs of arranging
settlements would be excessive. Economists advise that losses from
competition will add to efficiency in the long run, since the resources of
the injured party will eventually be more optimally employed than
241 When compensation is paid to those injured by market competition, it usually
comes exclusively from the public treasury, as in cases of unemployment insurance or
subsidies to impacted industries.
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before.242 Michelman would consider the general rule denying com-
pensation to be equitable243 since mom and pop should be able to
judge that they, or people like them, will be better off in the long run if
liability is not imposed for damages from market competition. For
this class of losses a laissez faire distribution of rights appears to be
efficient and fair.
Similarly, for some land use conflicts it will be both efficient and
fair to assign at least part of the risk of loss to the neighbor to en-
courage him to take precautions that limit his potential damages. In
accident law the doctrine of contributory negligence is used to induce
the victim to take precautions; the counterpart to contributory negli-
gence in nuisance cases is the denial of relief where the plaintiff's
land use activity is damaged due to its hypersensitivity to injury.244 The
hypersensitivity doctrine was decisive in Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland
Meadows. 245 A racetrack and a drive-in movie theater were built vir-
tually simultaneously on adjacent plots of land. The track's lights
shone directly on the drive-in's screen, causing a serious deterioration in
the quality of the picture and thereby prompting the owner of the
drive-in to seek damages. The Oregon Supreme Court held that light is
not inherently harmful and denied the claim for damages on the ground
that the injury was caused by the unusual sensitivity of the plaintiff's
land use.246
242 Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. LAw & EcoN. 11,
25-26 (1964).
243 For a summary of Michelman's fairness test, see note 30 supra; cf. text and note at
note 69 supra. See also J.S. Miii., On Liberty, in UnLrrxANusm, LiBraRv, AND REPRnsENTA-
nvx GovuNamEr 202 (Everyman's ed. 1951): "Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded
profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest
for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted
exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general
interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of
consequences." But see 3 W. BLAcymroNE, CommENTAr us *218-19 (establishment of a com-
peting fair, market, or ferry is an actionable nuisance). The English approach, as reflected
in Blackstone, did not sit well across the Atlantic. See Proprietors of the Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 551-53, 562-63 (1837).
244 The PrsrATEmENT (SEcoND) or ToRrs will apparently allow both contributory
negligence and the hypersensitivity of the plaintiff's land use as defenses. Compare § 840B
with § 821F, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970). See also W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra
note 147, § 87, at 579. The hypersensitivity issue was involved in most of the old cases
discussed in Coase's landmark article. Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2; see, e.g., Sturges v.
Bridgman, 11 Ch. D. 852 (1879) (sensitivity of doctor's consulting room to noise); Cooke v.
Forbes, L.R. 5 Eq. 166 (1867) (sensitivity of bleach involved in manufacturing process to
fumes); Bryant v. Lefever, 4 C.P.D. 172 (1879) (sensitivity of chimney location to blockage
of drafts); Webb v. Bird, 10 C.B. (N.S.) 268, 142 Eng. Rep. 455 (1861), aff'd, Exch. 13
C.B. (N.S.) 841, 143 Eng. Rep. 332 (1863) (sensitivity of windmill to blockage of wind).
245 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (1948).
246 The court's total denial of damages in Amphitheaters may have been justified since
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The four guidelines for efficient assignment of rights also call for de-
nial of relief in cases like Amphitheaters. A particularly delicate neigh-
bor is more likely than the surrounding landowners to be aware of the
risks inherent in his hypersensitivity. The neighbor should also have
greater knowledge about the nature of his special condition and be
better equipped to assess available preventive measures. The guideline
on superior knowledge thus suggests that the neighbor bear the risk
of loss for that part of the damage attributable to his hypersensitive
condition. That assignment of rights will conserve the resources that
would otherwise be spent on conveying information about hypersensi-
tivities. The rarity of the neighbor's vulnerability also reduces fear
about difficulties in organizing the injured class for bargaining pur-
poses.2 47 Thus the second guideline does not support the liability of a
host landowner to a hypersensitive neighbor. The third guideline,
favoring liability on the party having superior control, is neutral in
this context. The simplicity guideline indicates that recognition of
the hypersensitivity defense will result in added administrative costs;
nevertheless, the efficiency gained from denying damages attributable to
unusually sensitive aspects of a plaintiff's activities will probably exceed
these added administrative costs, thus justifying the departure from
guideline four. The defense of hypersensitivity should also be per-
ceived as fair by people able to see the long-term advantages to them of
an efficient set of liability rules.
The defense of hypersensitivity requires a method for identifying
hypersensitive land conditions or uses. 24 8 This method necessarily in-
many landowners consider additional light at night beneficial. If the racetrack's light is
perceived as unneighborly under Portland standards, however, the defendant should have
been required to compensate the plaintiff for the losses he would have suffered if his land
use had been normally sensitive to light, provided that damages met the substantial harm
requirement. When the hypersensitivity defense has been recognized, however, it has
usually operated as a complete defense.
247 The drive-in involved in Amphitheaters actually succeeded in persuading the track
to place hoods over its light stanchions.
248 If the plaintiff, and not his activity, is hypersensitive, he should not be able to
recover for any perceived subjective damage to his property. Damages should be measured
by the drop in market values, reflecting the tastes of people of general sensitivity. If the
plaintiff suffers personal injury because of his special sensitivities, he should also not be
able to recover special damages in a nuisance action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821F, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
The hypersensitivity of a plaintiff's activities should also be distinguished from the
hypersensitivity of topographic features of his parcel. When a landowner is unable
practicably to alter natural topographic conditions, he is rarely the most efficient avoider
of losses in the value of his land. For example, if a normally constructed hillside residence
has its view blocked in an unneighborly way, that residence should recover for the lost
view. If the house had been unusually designed to take advantage of the view, however,
some of its loss could be attributed to its hypersensitivity.
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volves empirical examination of the relative vulnerability to harm of
prevailing land uses in the relevant community. To hold down the ad-
ministrative costs of determining hypersensitivity, a wide band of activi-
ties should not be susceptible to the classification. For example, normal
residences and predominant construction and dimension patterns
should not be characterized as hypersensitive. The defense might be
employed, however, by a grocery located among the luxury homes of
the Santa Monica Mountains. If the damage caused by a grocery to its
neighbors would be only minor in most residential areas, but there is
additional damage to the luxury homes in the Mountains, the grocer
should be able to raise the defense of hypersensitivity against this
incremental component of the damage. In this example the very rich
are hypersensitive and must bear some of the risk of not finding a haven
for their homes.
The geographic flexibility of this defense can be illustrated by the
fact situation in Miller v. Schoene.249 The defendant's ornamental cedar
trees were host plants for a disease that was highly infectious to his
neighbor's apple trees. If the case had arisen in Nevada, where apple
trees are rare, the apple grower would bear the risk of loss since his
land use would be regarded as unusually sensitive under the standards
of that state. Miller arose in Virginia, however, where apple growing is
a major industry and clearly not hypersensitive. If cultivation of apple
trees is so widespread in Virginia that most landowners know about the
danger of cedar trees, growing cedar trees would be perceived as un-
neighborly and their owners should bear the risk of infecting apple
trees.2 0
The common law doctrine of lateral support is another example of
legal recognition of hypersensitivity. An excavator was held strictly
liable at common law for the external damage that his excavation would
have caused had the neighboring land been in its natural state; he was
liable only in negligence if part of the damage was caused by the
weight of structures on the neighboring land.251 This distinction was
249 276 U.S. 272 (1928). This case has been the focus of a spirited exchange. Samuels,
Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 435 (1971);
Buchanan, Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al.
v. Schoene, 15 J. LAW & EcoN. 459 (1972); Samuels, In Defense of a Positive Approach to
Government as an Economic Variable, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 453 (1972).
250 Miller is a troublesome case in part because the damage may have been accidental;
landowners who planted cedar trees may not have known of the potential injury their
trees could inflict on apple orchards. This problem is not present in the usual nuisance
cases where the harm can be characterized as intentional. In addition, cedar trees may be
wild, not artificial, and the law has been hesitant to impose liability for unneighborly
natural conditions in rural areas. See text at notes 169-71 supra.
251 J. CRinaEr, PRINCILES OF THE LAw oF PRoPERTY 293-94 (1962).
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developed in rural English society where lot sizes were rather large.
Where land parcels are ample, neighbors who unnecessarily build near
their lot lines and expose themselves to loss of lateral support are
hypersensitive and deserve less favored legal treatment.2 52
The most difficult cases are those in which the plaintiff has made his
land use hypersensitive to injury and the defendant is aware of the
plaintiff's unusual state but nevertheless proceeds to damage him. A
basic reason for the hypersensitivity defense, superiority of the plaintiff's
knowledge of the risk, is negated when the defendant is aware of the
plaintiff's condition. In negligence law the doctrine of last clear chance
places the risk of loss on the defendant even though the plaintiff is
contributorily negligent, where the defendant is better informed about
the possibility of injury (the inattentive plaintiff) or is in a better po-
sition to prevent harm (the helpless plaintiff). Although analogous
fact situations are common in land use conflicts, nuisance law has no
analogous doctrine.
The possible utility of such a doctrine is illustrated by Fontainebleau
Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.,253 a conflict between neigh-
boring Miami Beach hotels. The Eden Roc Hotel had located its swim-
ming pool area at the southern edge of its parcel, where the sunlight
could be easily blocked by buildings constructed at the northern end of
the adjacent Fontainebleau parcel. When Fontainebleau began building
a fourteen-story addition only twenty feet from its northern lot line, the
Eden Roc sought to enjoin further construction because its swimming
pool area would be in the shade after two o'clock in the afternoon dur-
ing the prime winter season. The appellate court denied relief because
the right to protect preexisting natural light sources is not recognized in
the United States.
The judicial approach to Fontainebleau suggested by this article
would be considerably different. The Eden Roc could make out a prima
facie case in nuisance if the height of the Fontainebleau addition would
be considered unneighborly in the Miami area. The Eden Roc had
made itself hypersensitive to injury, however, by placing its swimming
pool at the southern end of its parcel; this location had been freely
chosen, probably to avoid the shadow cast by its own hotel. The defense
of hypersensitivity would limit the damages recoverable by the Eden
Roc to the loss in land value caused by the Fontainebleau's un-
neighborly shadow plus the loss in value that a normal use would have
252 The common law would have been more precise if, rather than shifting the basis of
liability from strict liability to negligence, it had kept strict liability but honored the
defense of hypersensitivity.
253 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959).
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suffered had it been located on the Eden Roc parcel. The Eden Roc thus
would not be compensated for that part of the loss that resulted from
the unusual sensitivity of its land use.
A last clear chance doctrine might seem appropriate in this case
since the Fontainebleau was certainly aware of the vulnerability of
the Eden Roc's swimming pool. The analogy to accidents, however,
is not clearly compelling. Unlike accidents, nuisances are intentional
and usually evolve gradually enough to permit the parties to negotiate
changes in conduct. Helpless plaintiffs thus are not a problem in nui-
sance cases, but inattentive plaintiffs are a problem, and the Eden Roc
may have been inattentive. Assume the total property value of Miami
Beach would be increased if the Fontainebleau redesigned its addition
to be less disruptive. An optimal set of liability rules would then assure
that the Fontainebleau would sell an easement of light and air to the
Eden Roc at a price targeted by rule four. Since the Fontainebleau
should be aware that the Eden Roc might compel the termination of
its project later, the Fontainebleau has nothing to gain by not informing
the Eden Roc of the prospective project at an early stage. Informing
the Eden Roc, however, does not benefit the Fontainebleau since it can
be compensated for the expenditures on the nuisance project up to the
time that the Eden Roc gets a rule four injunction. The problem then
is to induce the Fontainebleau to broadcast its plans before the project
is far along. An incentive to inform could be created by imposing an
enforceable legal duty254 on a defendant planning a prospective nui-
sance to give early warning to neighbors who he should know will be
hypersensitive to it. This rule would tend to assure early bargaining
in conflicts between hypersensitive plaintiffs and nuisance defendants.
The magnitude of the rule's administrative costs, for example deter-
mining the defendant's knowledge of the plaintiff's condition, will de-
termine whether such a rule is efficient. The courts that have faced
these fact situations, however, have not yet considered imposing a duty
to warn. 255
254 For example, a breach of the duty to inform could subject the defendant to liability
for the full drop in the market value of the plaintiff's land caused by his nuisance.
255 In Levy v. Brothers, 4 Misc. 48, 23 N.Y.S. 825 (1893), the defendant to protect his
privacy, blocked off plaintiff's windows situated at their common lot line. The court
denied relief, stating- "It will not do for a man to build at the extreme end of his lot,
and then complain because his rear neighbor, in exercising the same privilege, has cut off
the light, air, or prospects he formerly enjoyed. He should not rely upon the generosity of
his neighbor, and must depend upon himself, by reserving space enough on his own land
for all his requirements-light, air, and vision included." Id. at 50, 23 N.Y.S. at 826; cf.
Scharlack v. Gulf Oil Corp., 368 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), denying relief
although defendant's billboard virtually covered plaintiff's. In another case the defendant
erected a service plaza with lights that damaged the picture quality at the plaintiff's
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4. The Defense of Failure to Mitigate Damages. A major flaw in
existing nuisance law is its disregard for the sequence of actions of
the parties to a conflict and its consequent failure to induce a plaintiff
to minimize damages by adopting measures uniquely within his con-
trol.25 6 Although the duty to mitigate damages is imposed in many
areas of the law to provide such incentives, it is rarely recognized in
nuisance cases. The efficiency considerations that lead courts to impose
a duty to mitigate in tort and contract cases, however, also hold in nui-
sance cases. The lack of such a doctrine for land use conflicts is par-
ticularly unfortunate since the cases generally involve continuing harms
to plaintiffs and thus present many opportunities for mitigation. A
neighbor who is aware of a nuisance often has special knowledge about
possible preventive actions he can take on his property and is always
in the best position to execute such measures. If sulphur is blowing
from a landowner's pile and corroding steel beams stored in his neigh-
bor's yard, the neighbor should have some incentive to apply tarpaulins
or oil coatings to protect the steel from further damage; 257 arranging
for such action is more expensive for the owner of the sulphur pile.
The need to deter landowners from aggravating injuries by initiating
incompatible uses in the face of known dangers is even clearer. In
negligence cases a plaintiff who voluntarily confronts a known risk may
be vulnerable to the defense of assumption of risk.258 In the classic
land use analogy the defendant builds a brick factory, and the plaintiffs
subsequently construct their houses around it.25 9 In a majority of juris-
dictions the plaintiffs may recover full damages or obtain injunctive
relief on these facts, even though they came to the nuisance.26 0 This
preexisting drive-in theater. The court held for the defendant even though it should have
known about the plaintiff's vulnerable condition. Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois
State Toll Highway Comm'n., 34 Ill. 2d 544, 2116 N.E.2d 788 (1966).
256 The RESrATEMENT OF TORTS (1939) completely ignored the sequence of the plaintiff's
and defendant's activities in nuisance cases; recent drafts of the RSTATmjENT (SEcoND) oF
ToRrs indicate that it will be at best a small improvement. See note 260 infra. Prosser
observes that "once the nuisance is established and the interference with [plaintiff's] rights
has begun, he may be required to take reasonable steps to guard against further harm."
W. PRossER, ToRTs, supra note 147, § 91, at 610.
257 Cf. Associated Metals & Min. Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, 82 N.J. Super. 281,
197 A.2d 569 (1963).
258 See W. PRossER, TORTS, supra note 147, § 68, at 440, 445-52.
259 Cf. Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), discussed at length in Michelman,
Property, supra note 21, at 1237-45.
260 See, e.g., North American Cement Corp. v. Price, 164 Md. 234, 164 A. 545 (1933); En-
sign v. Walls, 323 Mich. 49, 34 N.W.2d 549 (1948); Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co.,
143 Minn. 374, 172 N.W. 805 (1919); Mahone v. Autry, 55 N.M. 111, 227 P.2d 623 (1951);
Riblet v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 41 Wash. 2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952), 45 Wash.
2d 346, 274 P.2d 574 (1954); W. PROSSER, TORTS, supra note 147, § 91, at 611. But see, e.g.,
Oetjen v. Goff Kirby Co., 49 N.E.2d 95 (Ohio App. 1942); Powell v. Superior Portland
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article suggests that such a result is inefficient and inequitable. 61 The
landowners surrounding the factory, if they invoke rule two, should be
limited to damages262 measured by the diminution in the value of their
property as it existed when the factory was first built.20 3 The neighbors
who persisted in building residences on vacant lots in the face of the fac-
tory have failed to mitigate damages. To allow them recovery for any
diminution in the value of subsequent improvements caused by the fac-
Cement Co., Inc., 15 Wash. 2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942); Rex v. Cross, Car. 8c P. 483, 172
Eng. Rep. 219 (1826). See also Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 344 (1972).
The most recent draft of the RSTATmaENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970)
illustrates the current confusion surrounding this issue. Section 840C asserts that assump-
tion of risk is to be a defense in nuisance cases to the same extent as in other tort actions,
but section 840D, entitled "Coming to the Nuisance," then hopelessly clouds the issue: "The
fact that the plaintiff has acquired or improved his land after a nuisance interfering with it
has come into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar his action, but is a factor to be con-
sidered in determining whether the nuisance is actionable." This section invites unprin-
cipled decisions based on an undefined balancing process and fails to distinguish cases where
the plaintiff has improved his property subsequent to initiation of the nuisance from
those where he has simply subsequently acquired it. This error probably arose because
judicial opinions employ the phrase "coming to the nuisance" to cover both situations;
the distinction, however, is important. Denying recovery to a plaintiff because he purchased
an improvement that preexisted the nuisance is clearly erroneous, unless his predecessor
in title had recovered permanent damages. If subsequent purchasers are denied recovery,
landowners near existing nuisances will suffer diminutions in the value of their assets;
prospective buyers will be willing to pay less for the land due to inability to recover future
damages. Externalization of part of the cost of the nuisance must result. The "coming
to the nuisance" defense has merit, however, as a device to keep the plaintiff from aggravat-
ing his damage by installing incompatible improvements in the face of a preexisting
nuisance.
261 Accord, Baxter & Altree, supra note 2, at 3-5.
262 Permanent damages are appropriate if the activity level of the brick factory is seen
as relatively fixed for the indefinite future. If the factory is likely to expand its activities
over the years, the plaintiff might prefer to sue periodically for time-to-time damages. If
the plaintiff also expands his own incompatible land use incrementally, the sequence of
the parties' acts may becone quite complex and make the measuring of the appropriate
damage award an heroic task. When these problems exist, a simpler rule on sequencing
could be preferable.
263 The best starting point for the duty to mitigate is not necessarily the time the
harmful spillovers first appear. The homeowners would have failed to mitigate damages if
they built their houses after the prospective construction of the brick factory was publi-
cized, even if that publicity occurred before construction was completed. Imposing the
duty at the time of first publicity, however, would encourage publicity of many projects
that are unlikely to be completed. To solve the dilemma for airports, which often take a
decade to build, Baxter and Altree would require the airport authority to file a declara-
tion of intent to build and make the authority liable on abandoning the project for pre-
vention expenditures incurred in reliance by homeowners. Baxter & Altree, supra
note 2, at 5-11. This system seems a bit cumbersome for more common nuisance activity.
An alternative system, with obvious ambiguities in some situations, would be to impose a
duty to mitigate on the plaintiff when defendant's harmful project had progressed far
enough to be virtually certain of completion, provided the plaintiff knew or should have
known the unpleasant characteristics it would have.
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tory would increase the incidence of factory-homeowner conflicts since
the factory cannot cheaply purchase from them the promise not to
build.
Imposition of the duty to mitigate damages may be opposed because
it may enable the first land developer of a neighborhood to set the land
use pattern for the community at the price of paying for the diminution
in the value of the land surrounding his use. If the injured neighbors
attach some subjective value to their land, however, and organization
costs are low, they will exercise their rule four entitlement and termi-
nate the preexisting nuisance at the price of compensating its sponsor.264
If organization costs are high they could still attempt to persuade an
appropriate government to purchase the termination of the factory.
Requiring mitigation of damages should help resolve the most
frequently discussed hypothetical in the literature of external cost-
Pigou's example of a locomotive producing sparks that threaten to
ignite farmers' crops along its tracks. 265 Coase criticized Pigou for as-
signing the risk of loss to the railroad; he feared that farmers would
disregard the high risks and continue to plant inflammable crops since
they could recover damages for their losses indefinitely.266 Coase is
correct in believing that Pigou had oversimplified the solution. As a
general proposition it is efficient to make the railroad bear the risk of
loss since it has the best information about the risk of sparks and about
anti-spark devices. In some cases, however, the railroad should be able
to raise the farmer's failure to mitigate damages as a defense. A farmer
who is aware of the risk of sparks and nevertheless plants a flammable
crop adjacent to the tracks and loses it to fire should not recover the
crop's value; compensation should be limited to the diminution in
the value of his land resulting from inability to devote it to uses en-
dangered by sparks.267
Nuisance law has generally failed to recognize the wisdom of divid-
ing the damage in these situations. An example of this refusal to split
losses is found in Le Roy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul
Ry. Co.,268 a case remarkably similar in its facts to Pigou's hypothetical.
264 See Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972);
text and notes at notes 221-25 supra. In those cases where rule two damages would ex-
ceed the collective valuation of the benefits of the nuisance to the defendant, the price
of a rule four injunction is zero. See text at note 226 supra.
265 A. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 134 (4th ed. 1932).
266 Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 28-34.
267 Accord, Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 J. LAw &
ECON. 201, 211-12 (1971); Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL Srounms 205-07
(1973). As to whether the damages should be permanent, see note 262 supra.
268 232 U.S. 340 (1914).
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The plaintiff in that case established a factory along a preexisting rail-
road track and stored highly inflammable flax in an open yard seventy-
five feet from the track. Sparks from the defendant railroad's locomotive
started a fire that consumed the flax. Plaintiff was awarded full com-
pensation for his loss, the Court rejecting a plea of contributory negli-
gence. The factory, however, had apparently failed to minimize the
damages likely to be caused by the sparks since it probably could have
readily prevented such losses. Cases like Le Roy Fibre give substance
to Coase's concerns. The duty to mitigate damages would reduce the
administrative costs involved in assuring that the flax would be placed
in a less dangerous position in the future.
VI. A TENTATIVE SKETCH OF A MORE PRIVATIZED
SYSTEM OF LAND UsE REGULATION
The analysis thus far has suggested rules for identifying harmful
externalities and measuring their severity. There remains the prob-
lem of selecting appropriate devices for correcting these imperfections
in market operations. This article proposes that private nuisance reme-
dies become the exclusive remedy for "localized" spillovers-that is,
those that concern no more than several dozen parties. 69 Private nui-
sance remedies, however, are not the optimal internalization system for
all types of harmful spillovers from land use activity; in particular
private remedies are likely to be an inefficient means of handling in-
substantial injuries from "pervasive" nuisances that affect many out-
siders.270 More centralized systems for internalizing pervasive harms
may be capable of achieving savings in administrative costs that out-
weigh the inevitable allocative inefficiencies of collective regulation.
This article will suggest that fines be assessed by a public authority to
internalize insubstantial injuries from those pervasive nuisances that
present a reasonably objective index of noxiousness. These fines would
complement the nuisance remedies that would remain available to per-
sons able to show substantial injury from the pervasive problem. Lack
269 Three factors determine the number of persons injured by a harmful activity: the
area of the affected land, the density of landowners and occupants in that area, and the
frequency with which outsiders enter that area. The last two factors rise sharply with
population density. Highly urbanized areas thus require, and generally have, more
sweeping collective regulatory schemes than less densely populated areas.
270 See text and notes at notes 214-15 supra. Courts are generally aware of the limita-
tions of nuisance law. In a class action on behalf of the seven million residents of Los
Angeles County, the plaintiff sought billions of dollars in damages and injunctive relief
against 800 alleged polluters. The trial court's conclusion that any grant of relief would
be beyond its effective capability was affirmed on appeal. Diamond v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 874, 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971).
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of an objective index of noxiousness may justify imposition of manda-
tory standards on pervasive nuisance activity, but such an approach is
usually justified only when the public authority is willing to impose
standards retroactively. To develop and administer these systems, this
article proposes creation of a specialized metropolitan body.
A. The Superiority of Nuisance Law for Localized Harms
Many land use activities now constrained by zoning ordinances raise
only localized threats that would be better handled through private
nuisance remedies supplemented by covenants and good manners. The
system of private nuisance law outlined above avoids the allocative
inefficiencies threatened by mandatory regulations or injunctions. It
relies upon a decentralized policing system that is triggered more effi-
ciently than a centralized system, and it can easily be used to internalize
existing nuisances, not merely future ones. It also assures the availabil-
ity of compensation to parties substantially injured by nuisances.
The major drawback of the nuisance approach is potentially exces-
sive administrative costs. Even in localized conflicts, the costs of assess-
ing and distributing payments under rule two or rule four might be
so high as to make the nuisance approach inferior to one of its alter-
natives .2 71 Some economies should be possible, however, through proper
structuring of the public administrative apparatus used for handling
nuisance disputes. Land use conflicts arise frequently in urban areas
and present specialized and repetitive issues. A single adjudicative au-
thority with exclusive jurisdiction over these cases could resolve them
with greater facility and consistency than courts of general jurisdiction.
I. Nuisance Boards. The following administrative structure would
be a good start. First, the state would enact the nuisance rules sug-
gested above. The state would then establish metropolitan Nuisance
Boards and grant them primary jurisdiction over nuisance cases and
exclusive rule making power over land use problems in their metro-
271 These costs are largely dependent on the clarity of the nuisance rules and the ease
of gathering the determinative facts. The fault system for handling accident losses, not
appreciably more complex than the proposed reformulation of nuisance law, has been
heavily criticized for its high administrative costs. Calabresi states that the operating
costs of the fault system exceed the net awards received by accident victims. G. CALAaREMs,
Cosr oF ACCIMENTS, supra note 11, at 286 n.l. Fact finding in land use conflicts, however,
is simpler than in accident cases and often requires little more than taking a few photo-
graphs and obtaining subdivision maps from public records. Prior judgments and settle-
ments in nuisance cases must also be easily available to purchasers of affected land to
prevent information costs from becoming excessive. Where recordation of judgments or
settlements is the predominant method of binding subsequent purchasers, information
costs depend heavily on the efficiency of the indexing methods used in the recording sys-
tem.
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politan area.2 2 Each Nuisance Board would then use this power prin-
cipally (a) to publish regulations stating with considerable specificity
which land use activities are considered unneighborly by that metro-
politan population at that time, (b) to identify hypersensitive uses with
similar specificity, (c) to establish threshold levels of "substantial harm,"
and (d) to promulgate schedules of bonus payments for losses of common
nonfungible consumer surplus. By thus clarifying entitlements, the
Board would assist the private settlement of disputes and thus lower
administrative costs.273
In adjudicating cases the Board would be authorized to award com-
pensated injunctions and either periodic or permanent damages.274 To
reduce administrative costs, the Board could assign hearing officers to
find facts and determine appropriate awards. These decisions would be
reviewable first by the Board and then by courts of general jurisdiction,
a pattern of appeals characteristic of many administrative agencies.
Where they would simplify Board decisions and encourage private settle-
ments, the Board could promulgate schedules of damages for typical
harms.2 75 User fees imposed on litigating parties could also be structured
to encourage private settlements.
Whatever the Board's inducements for settlement, several indepen-
dent factors will tend to reduce administrative costs by limiting the
number of cases actually litigated. First, empirical evidence indicates
that a mingling of diverse land uses has surprisingly little effect on land
values.276 If that is the case, the substantial harm requirement will
quickly dispose of many conflicts ifi favor of the defendant. In addition,
when the injury is not trivial, the initiator of a harmful use has a
strong incentive to undertake it on a parcel large enough to buffer its
harms from surrounding neighbors. By internalizing the external costs
272 Since land use control has traditionally been considered a local issue, these boards
might be challenged as invading the home rule powers of chartered cities in home rule
states. This challenge could be answered by a demonstration of the statewide interests
affected by land use regulation.
273 The Board could also administer more collective regulatory systems. See text at
notes 297-318 infra.
274 For examples of the use of permanent damages, see Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey
Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal. 2d 265, 239 P.2d 625
(1952); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
275 Cf. G. CLA uRsi, CosT oF AccaDmErs, supra note 11, at 202-03.
276 One study found that the presence of mixed uses on interior blocks in several Pitts-
burgh neighborhoods seemed to have little effect on the value of single-family homes.
Crecine, Davis & Jackson, supra note 2. See also Nourse, The Effect of Public Housing on
Property Values in St. Louis, 39 LAND ECON. 433 (1963), finding that the replacement of
slum properties with public housing had no demonstrable effect on surrounding property
values. These studies did not consider the effect that mixtures may have on an owner's
subjective valuation of his land.
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through merger, the landowner saves the administrative costs he would
otherwise incur in settling with those he injures. Existing harmful land
uses not currently held to be nuisances but considered nuisances under
the proposed reformulation-for example, service stations-might also
be spontaneously redesigned once their owners recognized their poten-
tial liability. Finally, good manners will continue to limit the incidence
of nuisances and thus the amount of litigation.
One unavoidable administrative cost of the proposed reforms would
be the burden on land use practitioners of learning a new'system. In
the long run, however, the rules in the nuisance system would probably
be more stable than zoning provisions, and thereby reduce the burden
of keeping up with the latest legal requirements. In addition, nuisance
rules demand less detailed understanding than do zoning rules. In most
situations a misconstruction of a mandatory zoning regulation has far
more serious consequences than a misestimate of the damages recover-
able in nuisance litigation.
Nuisance remedies, whatever their structure, will undoubtedly in-
volve substantial administrative costs, but so do the alternative land
use control systems. The nuisance approach will be desirable in situ-
ations where its allocative and administrative inefficiencies are less seri-
ous than those of alternative systems.
The proposed Nuisance Boards would not be wholly immune from
the evils of ineptness, corruption, and discrimination often character-
istic of zoning administration. The nuisance approach, however, does
correct the three major flaws of zoning identified earlier.277 In Professor
Calabresi's terminology, private nuisance actions for damages are a
system of general deterrence and avoid the high prevention costs of
specific deterrence systems like zoning. Second, largely because the stan-
dards of conduct are not mandatory, nuisance law can be more effi-
ciently applied to preexisting land uses than any system of mandatory
regulation. In addition, the suggested nuisance approach is a system
of uniform regulation that avoids variation of standards from zone to
zone, thus eliminating a primary source of the discrimination and cor-
ruption typically found in zoning systems. Although Nuisance Boards
will probably not be models of honest government, nuisance cases,
unlike zoning changes, present readily reviewable legal issues and thus
are more amenable to effective judicial scrutiny.
2. Nuisance Boards in Action. Some examples will illustrate how the
nuisance system might apply to localized problems now regulated by
zoning.
277 See text and notes at notes 101-17 supra.
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a. Side and rear yards. Construction of a building by a landowner
close to his side or rear lot line will generally affect the property values
of only one of his neighbors, and never more than three or four, assum-
ing the usual configuration of urban lots. Nearly all localities regulate
such construction through mandatory minimum side and rear yard re-
quirements. When enforced,278 these restrictions impose massive preven-
tion costs by making a large fraction of urban land unimprovable.
Private civil remedies would permit the bargaining out of more indi-
vidualized solutions, an eminently feasible process in such localized dis-
putes.270 Moreover, in a new subdivision the nuisance approach would
allow the developer, initially the landowner on both sides of the lot line,
great flexibility in determining the side and rear setbacks best suited to
consumer demands.
A Nuisance Board would handle conflicts over side yard uses in the
following manner.280 First, to assist parties in understanding their en-
titlements, the Nuisance Board would promulgate general rules estab-
lishing threshold distances for unneighborly side yard construction in
its metropolitan area. If a landowner were violating the threshold, the
adjacent neighbor would be entitled to choose between collecting dam-
ages under the reformulated nuisance rules and purchasing injunctive
relief against the side yard incursion. In negotiating a resolution of the
conflict the parties would find targets for settlement in prior decisions
278 Enforcement of these provisions often seems ridiculously strict. A homeowner in
San Diego was recently sentenced to a jail term of six months for building a carport four
feet too close to his neighbor's property. The sentence was suspended on condition that
the defendant remove the carport within thirty days and submit to imprisonment for one
weekend. L.A. Times, Aug. 8, 1971, § 1, at B, col. 4. See also Kuchta v. Allied Builders
Corp., 21 Cal. App. 3d 541, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1971), where the plaintiff recovered $5,585
from a home improvement company that had built a patio roof in violation of side yard
restrictions. The Orange County Building and Safety Department had ordered removal
of the roof; the regulatory scheme apparently did not permit transfer payments from the
homeowner to his neighbors to compensate them for their injuries. An incredible ex-
ample of the high prevention costs caused by such provisions arose in Washington, D.C.,
where the rear yard requirements applicable to subway stations were found to be "caus-
ing costly, time-consuming delays" in the construction of a multibillion dollar transporta-
tion system. Washington Post, Mar. 17, 1972, at C2, col. 2.
279 Conflicts over front yard setbacks and heights are, however, less localized. See text
at notes 311-12, infra.
280 There are a number of decentralized approaches to side yard conflicts. A simple
change within the zoning framework would be to entitle landowners to a waiver of side
yard restrictions whenever the adjacent neighbor agreed to the waiver. Developers of
subdivisions could thus always eliminate side yard restrictions within their development.
The same change could be accomplished by eliminating side yard restrictions in zoning,
and granting all landowners a transferable easement of light and air over the strips of
land surrounding their parcels. The nuisance solution is preferable, however, because
the proposed nuisance entitlements establish collective targets for appropriate settlement
amounts and should thus expedite bargaining. See text and notes at notes 214-30 supra.
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of the Board and in any schedule of damages the Board might issue.
Settlements or judgments would be recorded in order to bind trans-
ferees of the current owners. Similarly, a developer of a subdivision
would record the side yard rules he wished to apply to the internal lot
lines in his subdivision.
b. Intermixtures of different land uses. The paramount purpose of
zoning is the segregation of land uses into different districts; as discussed
earlier, this segregation causes allocative inefficiencies, requires frequent
and expensive amendments, and makes equitable administration impos-
sible.281 Since more privatized alternatives than use zoning are available,
use zoning should be discontinued. The nuisance system, however,
despite its general advantages, is unlikely to be the best method of han-
dling pervasive land use conflicts. Harmful spillovers from heavy uses
like steel mills may be so widespread that the administrative costs of
private nuisance remedies renders inefficient and impracticable use
of that system as an internalization device.28 2
Use zoning, however, is not the only available response to the prob-
lem of pervasive nuisances. Rather than rely on use zoning, municipali-
ties should deal with uninternalized pervasive harms through fines,
varying in magnitude from zone to zone,2 3 and selected uniform man-
datory standards.& 2 4 The effect of this change would not be radical.
The threat of suboptimal location of heavy uses was greatly exaggerated
in the early zoning literature; market transactions naturally segregate
land use to a remarkable extent. Heavy uses in Houston, where there is
neither zoning nor a fine system, appear to be as spatially segregated as
in most zoned cities.285
In addition, use zoning is not primarily concerned with pervasive
conflicts. For example, most zoning ordinances try to segregate multi-
acre estates from modest subdivisions, single-family residences from
multifamily developments, and all residential units from light commer-
cial and industrial uses. The nuisance system, buttressed by private
covenants, is likely to be superior to zoning for handling conflicts in-
281 See text at notes 31-117 supra.
282 The location of heavy uses that cause pervasive harm-like steel mills, airports, and
power plants-is not likely to be efficiently determined by private nuisance suits. Al-
though nearby neighbors who were substantially harmed would collect damages from
the sponsors of heavy uses, many insubstantial injuries to landowners farther away would
be uninternalized.
28& Cf. Baxter & Altree, supra note 2; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 11, at 1123;
Michelman, Book Review, supra note 11, at 685-86.
284 See text and notes at notes 297-318 infra.
285 Siegan concluded that industrial zoning was not needed in Houston. Siegan, Non-
Zoning, supra note 2, at 111-15.
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volving these kinds of uses. First, use zoning is an overreaction to the
need to control micro-neighborhood conditions. Although homeowners
may believe that construction of a nearby apartment building will de-
press property values, there is little evidence to support such fears.286
Even where intermixture of uses does result in substantial external
losses, those losses are usually localized.287 In addition, proximity to
certain uses may entail benefits that offset external costs; for example,
commercial and industrial uses provide opportunities for shopping and
employment.
The familiar example of a grocery in the Santa Monica Mountains
can be used to demonstrate how a Nuisance Board could handle con-
fficts between residential and commercial uses. After examining metro-
politan sentiment, the Board would probably classify groceries as an
unneighborly land use. Nevertheless, because of the benefits of prox-
imity to groceries, it is unlikely that more than a score or so of the gro-
cery's neighbors could prove substantial harm from its operation. If the
parties could not reach a private settlement, the uncompensated neigh-
bors could take their case to the Nuisance Board either to collect
damages or to purchase the closing of the grocery.288 This approach
286 See note 276 supra. Siegan reports that the F.H.A. office in Houston does not lower
the valuations of modest single-family homes whose mortgages it insures because of nearby
garden apartments, although it often lowers valuations if gas stations or supermarkets are
immediately adjacent. Siegan, Non-Zoning, supra note 2, at 103, 106.
287 The probability of the participation of neighboring landowners in Skokie, Illinois,
zoning hearings declined by 50 percent for every additional seventy-nine feet that sep-
arated the landowner from the site in controversy. T. Tideman, Three Approaches to
Improving Urban Land Use, 1969 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago,
Dep't of Economics). The probability of a landowner participating in such a hearing is no
doubt highly correlated with his perception of potential damage to his property values.
288 Measurement of damage in this case would be affected by a number of nuisance
doctrines. Los Angeles Board rules would likely specify the value levels (e.g., $50,000) at
which residences (exclusive of their site value) become hypersensitive to damage. Damage
attributable to house value over that threshold would not be compensable. Since the
Santa Monica Mountains contain many luxurious homes, the grocer could probably suc-
cessfully raise as a partial defense the hypersensitivity of some of his neighbors. The
homeowners, on the other hand, should be awarded bonuses for the losses in subjective
value they are likely to have suffered, especially if they are long-time residents. Board
rules would, again, provide guidelines for these bonuses.
If the offending use in the Santa Monica Mountains were a federally subsidized garden
apartment project for lower income families, the defendant developer would raise as a
partial defense not only the hypersensitivity of Mountain homeowners but also the
equality of opportunity of his tenants. Any damage attributable to the race or class
of the persons who occupy the project would then be excluded from the award. The home-
owners could recover their remaining damages from the developer only if the bulk, ap-
pearance, noise, or other characteristics of that kind of project were generally viewed
as unneighborly in Los Angeles. Again, if those characteristics would have only a slight
adverse effect on the value of neighboring property devoted to normally sensitive uses, the
residual damage might not be sufficient to meet the substantial harm requirement.
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would be much more likely than the present system to assure the
optimal number of groceries, as well as uses like multifamily dwell-
ings, in the Mountains. Undoubtedly the nuisance system will permit
groceries to externalize some insubstantial pervasive costs, but allocative
perfection-the adoption of all efficient preventive measures-is too
administratively burdensome to be desirable.
c. Unneighborly population densities. Zoning regulations may con-
trol population densities in many ways. Maximum dwelling unit densi-
ties per acre can be explicitly stated for each residential zone; popula-
tion density per unit can be controlled through limitations on the
number of bedrooms per unit and housing codes that limit the number
of people who can inhabit a room. Minimum lot sizes, or minimum
unit sizes coupled with severe bulk restrictions, may also be used to
limit population. These types of mandatory controls are presently con-
sidered essential ingredients of community planning efforts.m 2 9 They
are designed to serve two distinct functions: (i) to limit overall future
population growth in a wide area and (ii) to prevent unwanted local-
ized concentrations of population. Again, there are better alternatives.
"Growth controls" should generally not be exercised except where the
restricted landowners are compensated, and concentration problems
should be handled primarily through the proposed nuisance system.
"Growth controls" may be defined as governmental measures that
restrict the prospective development of land parcels to a population
density less than that generally prevailing in developed areas of the
relevant metropolitan area. Mandatory growth controls unfairly pro-
hibit owners of undeveloped property from duplicating the develop-
ments of earlier landowners; although a new development with a
population density identical to the prevailing densities may add to ex-
isting pollution problems and increase the congestion of public
facilities, it cannot be said that it differs in kind from the developments
that preceded it. Growth controls also usually increase the price of entry
for people moving into an area.2 90 Residents of a metropolitan area are
289 See, e.g., Lamm & Davison, The Legal Control of Population Growth and Distri-
bution in a Quality Environment: The Land Use Alternatives, 49 DENWR L.J. 1 (1972);
cf. Comment, Toward a National Policy on Population Distribution, 47 VASH. L. REv.
287 (1972).
290 Where density controls operate as pure taxes on land rents they have no effect on
entry costs. Under those circumstances the entire cost of the restriction is shifted to land-
owners, and prices of residential units are unaffected; such controls, however, are unlikely
to have that effect. Consumers apparently prefer large lots to small ones, and this pref-
erence will be reflected in lot prices. In addition, growth controls can raise the price of
building sites by limiting their supply. Finally, a house is a complementary good to a lot.
As localities mandate increased lot sizes, builders respond by upgrading house designs,
effectively increasing entry prices.
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overtly discriminating against outsiders when they apply prospective
population density controls that prohibit new development that would
be less dense than their existing neighborhoods.
In addition to the possible inequities of growth controls, such con-
trols are usually undesirable on efficiency grounds.2 1 It is doubtful
whether a planning agency can make intelligent decisions about the
optimum gross spatial distribution of a population. An optimal distribu-
tion is more likely to be achieved through private migration decisions
than through public regulation.292 Employers and individuals faced
with location decisions naturally weigh the overall advantages of their
alternative environments. If a particular area becomes too dense, its
residents will perceive the disadvantages of this high density and tend to
leave; growth controls are thus not needed to protect people from "un-
291 Although many urban experts consider regulation of population densities essen-
tial for rational planning of sewers, highways, schools, and other public works, this
justification for density regulation is rather weak. First, as stated in the text, urban
growth tends naturally toward equilibrium. If public facilities are not provided, growth
will slow because of their absence. When the new town of Reston, Virginia, first opened,
the roads between it and Washington, D.C., were grossly inadequate. The result was
not continued growth and hopelessly clogged roads, but rather, largely because of poor
access, a very modest initial growth rate in Reston. Second, planners of public facilities
should not need density controls to obtain useful population projections. The private
entrepreneurs who are responsible for most urban growth empirically examine trends in
supply and demand to determine when and where they should make incremental ex-
pansions in their brand of land improvement. Since converting raw land into a de-
veloped area takes many years, it is not hard to detect where growth is occurring and
provide new facilities accordingly.
In practice, even where density controls exist, public works planners can rarely rely
on them. Installation of huge sewers or wide roads in an area publicly planned for high
density development risks being highly wasteful unless there is strong evidence that the area
will actually be developed in that way. Thus, public works planners must themselves
resort to empirical studies of trends in determining future projects and cannot rely
on governmental controls that may be amended at any time. The future densities in any
given area may be sharply affected by local economic factors, changes in housing pref-
erences, breakthroughs in housing or land development technologies, national migration
trends, national fertility rates, and other developments that cannot be anticipated by any
public works planner. His best strategy may be to muddle through by building facilities
adequate for the foreseeable future, preserving the possibility of installing larger pipes,
additional lanes, or new classrooms at a later date. A final practical problem in using
density controls to forecast public works is that the zoning ordinances of most large cities
would permit their populations to double or triple. Since most large central cities have
also been losing population, these zoning provisions obviously cannot be relied upon for
public planning.
Operating a local government without mandatory density controls is not inconceivable.
Houston has developed rapidly without them, yet Siegan reports that traffic flows well in
Houston. Siegan, Non-Zoning, supra note 2, at 73. Siegan does observe that Houston has
had a difficult time predicting demand for sewers, but this problem is also common in
localities that try to control density.
292 Cf. Mills, Welfare Aspects of National Policy toward City Sizes, 9 URBAN STUDIES, Feb.,
1972, at 117.
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livable" conditions.2 3 When conditions are unlivable for many resi-
dents, emigration will reduce population densities and tend to establish
equilibrium. If California's attractiveness as a place to live were to
diminish because of rapid population growth and the resulting addi-
tions to traffic congestion and air pollution, private forces would end
net migration to California; population planning is not necessary to
accomplish this result 29 4
When the residents of an area perceive a rapid population influx as
"overcrowding," from a national perspective they are hypersensitive
in their reaction. Even with the population influx the area must have
298 Commentators do not unanimously agree with this assertion:
Finally, development rights transfer is a pernicious device in today's congested cities.
Whether from landmarks, midblock brownstones, or municipal buildings, unused
rights will always flow to those areas where the commercial advantages of concen-
tration make transfer economically attractive. If this existing concentration is at-
tended by its usual effects-if the subways and buses are overloaded; the streets,
clogged; the air, polluted; and the few remaining open spaces, in the perpetual
shadow of surrounding office or apartment towers-then development rights transfer
can only make life more miserable.
Note, supra note 52, at 371 (emphasis in original). It is highly doubtful, however, that
developers actually tend to build in locations where life is generally perceived as miser-
able. For an excellent review of the literature concerning the effects of crowding on the
incidence of social pathologies, see Stokols, A Social-Psychological Model of Human
Crowding Phenomena, 38 J. Am. INST. OF PLANNERS 72 (1972). If social status factors
are controlled for, there is little evidence that pathologies increase with crowding.
294 Pigou thought the need for density controls self-evident:
It should be added that sometimes, when the interrelationships of the various private
persons affected are highly complex, the Government may find it necessary to exer-
cise some means of authoritative control in addition to providing a bounty. Thus
it is coming to be recognized as an axiom of government that, in every town, power
must be held by some authority to limit the quantity of building permitted to a
given area, to restrict the height to which homes may be carried,--for the erection of
barrack dwellings may cause great overcrowding of an area even though there is no
overcrowding of rooms,--and generally to control the building activities of individuals.
It is as idle to expect a well-planned town to result from the independent activities
of isolated speculators as it would be to expect a satisfactory picture to result if each
separate square inch were painted by an independent artist.
A. PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 194-95 (4th ed. 1962). The analogy to the painting of a
picture suggests that Pigou's main criticism of decentralized density controls is the difficulty
in producing communities with desirable aesthetic features on a large scale. Centralized
regulation of urban growth is undoubtedly the best method for obtaining highly ordered
landscapes, but large scale aesthetics is not the sole consideration in city planning.
Centralized direction has serious drawbacks in other regards: it will probably introduce
major inefficiencies in the location of land uses, raise serious problems of equity, and
threaten the liberties of existing residents. Pigou's analogy is inappropriate. First, its
scale is wrong; a person can fully comprehend the problems of painting a picture, but
not of planning a city. It is doubtful that Pigou would prefer that all of French
painting be made the exclusive business of a National Art Agency, rather than allowing
that great tradition to continue to grow through incremental contributions of unorgan-
ized private painters. Second, figures on a painting are inanimate objects, but real people
and their activities are the media of city planning and not as lightly played with as a set
of oil paints.
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above-average national appeal, because immigrants outnumber de-
parting residents. In this situation growth controls are likely to be
efficient only when the residents benefiting from the growth controls
internalize the prevention costs by compensating the restricted land-
owners for lost development rights. If, as at present, compensation is not
generally provided, the cost of growth controls falls on owners of vacant
land and future entrants, two groups with little voting strength. In light
of the political weakness of this opposition, the dynamics of local
governmental processes systematically generate inefficiently strict regula-
tions on population growth.29 5
The reluctance of most state and local governments to spend large
sums for parks and scenic easements is a clue that growth controls are
usually inefficient and will remain politically appealing only so long as
the cost is generally borne by others than typical taxpayers. A reliable
method of preventing the present system's inefficiencies and assuring
equal treatment of landowners and outsiders is to avoid growth controls
that fail to provide for compensation.296
The problem of harmful spillovers from localized objectionable
population concentrations, however, raises different issues. One ap-
proach would be to limit landowners concerned about such concentra-
tions in their immediate surroundings to self-help protections like
buffer parcels and restrictive covenants. Unusually dense real estate
developments, however, may create situations not properly dealt with
through strictly laissez faire entitlements. Dense residential develop-
ments are likely to be considerably noisier and more offensive in ap-
pearance than normal neighboring land uses. These unneighborly
aspects of a development are proper targets for an internalization
system. Localized costs such as noise can be best internalized through
private nuisance actions. The unneighborly effects of an unusual popu-
lation concentration, however, may also involve pervasive, but indi-
vidually insubstantial, losses such as overburdened street parking. These
problems are likely to be best handled through systems of fines and
uniform mandatory public standards.
295 Residents receiving benefits from exclusionary ordinances can vote in local elections
and are able to identify each other to organize cooperative lobbying efforts. In con-
trast, outsiders threatened by an exclusionary measure have neither the franchise nor the
ability to identify each other. Opposition to exclusionary ordinances is thus left mainly
to homebuilders and land speculators.
296 This article does not reach the questions of whether state legislatures, state judi-
ciaries, or other institutions should be more active in policing growth controls and the
legal doctrines on which intervention could be based. Its scope is limited to the sub-
stantive weaknesses of growth control measures.
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B. The Necessity of More Collective Internalization Systems for Per-
vasive Harm
A pervasive nuisance may inflict substantial harm on nearby neigh-
bors and also cause legally insubstantial injuries to a large number of
more distant parties. Entitlement to nuisance remedies assures those
suffering large injuries compensation for their losses.297 Use of nui-
sance remedies to internalize the insubstantial pervasive harms, how-
ever, would pose an intolerable administrative burden. One of the more
collective internalization systems-fines, regulatory taxes, mandatory
standards, mandatory prohibitions29 -may prove to be a more efficient
intervention by eliminating the task of assessing and distributing many
small awards. It might be suggested that insubstantial, pervasive harms
should be left uninternalized. Although these injuries are individually
insubstantial, however, the total harm may be significant; thus, major
allocative efficiencies should be possible if an appropriate internali-
zation device can be found. In addition, when a nuisance is pervasive,
the administrative costs of forcing internalization are likely to be
justified because of efficiencies of scale of policing; centrally enforced
internalization of localized insubstantial injuries, however, is less likely
to be efficient.
An informed choice among the more collective systems for internali-
zation would be primarily based on empirical examination of each sys-
tem's relative administrative costs, and potential for allocative damage.
Since many of the options have not been tried, policy prescriptions at
this point are necessarily tentative. This analysis suggests, however, that
in many instances fines should be tried in the place of mandatory
standards and prohibitions as a means of regulating pervasive nuisances.
1. Uniform Standards Enforced Solely through Fines. Welfare econo-
mists have historically favored fines as solutions to problems of external
cost. Unlike mandatory standards and prohibitions, fines can be applied
retrospectively to existing nuisances without imposing the drastic pre-
vention costs that deter many zoning administrators from eliminating
nonconforming uses. Fines are also more flexible than mandatory
regulations since a landowner is free to buy, in effect, the right to violate
an inefficient standard. A system of fines requires establishment of
standards for imposition of the fines, rules for calculating their amounts,
and an administrative structure for assessment and collection.
Standards can take either of two forms: performance standards, setting
297 Under the Michelman fairness test those insubstantially injured should be able to
understand why it is in their long-term self-interest not to be compensated. See note 30
supra.
298 See text at notes 19-20 supra.
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performance levels to be achieved, or specification standards, detailing
exact technologies that are, and are not, acceptable. For example, per-
formance standards on light stanchions in gas stations might consist of
limits on the lumens detectable at a specified distance; specification
standards would list approved or disapproved types of poles, hoods, and
bulbs. These approaches can also be used in combination. Performance
standards are often praised in the literature,2 99 but are useful only when
the allocative flexibility they permit justifies the additional admin-
istrative costs, to both the regulator and the regulated, of measuring
compliance with the standards. A desirable combination is thus the
establishment of a general performance standard and, in addition, the
articulation of examples of complying and noncomplying technologies.
The unneighborliness requirement is a general performance standard
and may function well as a general standard for identifying conduct to
be fined. Fines on activities meeting an unneighborliness test will dis-
courage below normal conduct; as discussed earlier, the fining of normal
conduct is rarely efficient because of the frequency of these offenses, and
the efficient way to induce above-normal behavior is usually through
rewards. Just as administrative costs in nuisance cases can be reduced by
regulations identifying unneighborly activities in a jurisdiction, the
Nuisance Board should be authorized to write standards for .fines and
should recognize the advantages of a high degree of specificity in its
regulations.
Administrative simplicity is a paramount consideration in structuring
the calculation of fines.300 For distributional reasons, substantially
injured landowners should be permitted to pursue their nuisance
remedies. To avoid "overinternalization" the fines must then be cal-
culated to cover only the insubstantial, and thus incompensable, losses
inflicted by the pervasive unneighborly activity.301 Those losses can be
estimated by using the nuisance system, minus the substantial harm re-
quirement, to identify and measure harmful externalities. Certainly
the defenses protecting civil liberties and equality of opportunity
should be recognized to prevent fining constitutionally privileged un-
209 See, e.g., Hirsch, Measuring the Good Neighbor: A New Look at Performance
Standards in Zoning, LAND USE CONTROLS, No. 2, 1968 at 5; Note, Industrial Zoning and
Beyond: Compatibility through Performance Standards, 46 J. URBAN LAw 723 (1969).
S00 Localized nuisances could be ruled exempt from fines on the grounds that the
pervasive injuries they inflict are de minimis.
301 Cf. Michelman, Book Review, supra note 11, at 675-76. An alternative is for the
Nuisance Board to levy fines that internalize all losses, to compensate those substantially
injured in the amounts that would otherwise be due them under the nuisance system,
and to bar private damage actions against pervasive nuisances. This alternative, however,
creates needless complications about the availability of private nuisance remedies and
hinders private bargaining over levels of compensation.
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neighborly activities. To simplify administration, however, the Board
might decide to disregard the duty to mitigate damages in calculating
fines, thus avoiding expensive investigations into the sequence of activ-
ities.30 2 A brick factory later surrounded by homes would thus be fined
for pervasive harm just like the average brick factory.3 3
Monetary penalties could be individually calculated to internalize the
precise damage inflicted on the actual neighbors of the offensive activity,
the "regulatory taxes" approach, or they could be "fines" based solely
on the nature of the offending landowner's conduct, with the mix of
surrounding uses assumed to be normal. Fines are simpler, and thus
often will be the preferable approach; for example, pollution charges
cannot feasibly be calculated to equal the actual external damage of
each polluter.804 A middle ground solution may be the best. A regula-
tory agency might obtain greater allocative efficiency, at additional ad-
ministrative cost, by combining the two approaches and varying assess-
ments for violations of standards according to the geographic zone in
which the offending activity occurs. The amount of the fine would be
an estimate of the pervasive damage a violation would normally cause
in that mapped zone.805 Fines against unusually tall buildings, for ex-
ample, would be greater in hilly areas or along coast lines than else-
where, but would be uniformly assessed within each zone. Varying fines
among zones would reintroduce some of the arbitrariness and discrimi-
nation typical of current zoning systems. The distributional effects of
determining the boundaries of zones for fines, however, would not be
nearly as dramatic as under current zoning decisions. Present restric-
tions on heights determine whether or not a skyscraper can be built;
302 Cf. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 Am. ECON. REv. 307,
312-13 (1972).
303 This approach assumes that the reduction in administrative costs achieved would
exceed allocative losses resulting from the absence of any incentive to mitigate. The ration-
ale for imposing a duty to mitigate on homeowners pursuing nuisance remedies is that
the costs of investigating sequencing there are lower because fewer parcels are involved.
304 Effluent charges are now used by several cities and the state of Vermont to combat
water pollution. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1265e (1973); Wall Street Journal, July 12, 1971,
at 24. They are also often proposed as a method of attack on air pollution. See, e.g., Ruff,
The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, PUB. INTERESr, Spring, 1970, at 69, 78-85.
For a theoretical discussion of problems with this approach, see Dolbear, On the Theory
of Optimum Externality, 57 AM. EcoN. REv. 90, 97-103 (1967). Although he continues to
view them as the preferred internalization device, Professor Baumol foresees great diffi-
culty in the calculation of fines. See Baumol, supra note 302, at 316-20. Some recent em-
pirical studies of the effects of air pollution on property values, however, provide hope
that fines could be rationally estimated. J. HIrE, H. MACAULAY, J. Sr EPP & B. YANDALL, THE
ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 46-47 (1972).
305 A balancing of administrative costs and allocative consequences would determine
the optimal number of zones.
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zones for fines would affect only the developer's cost of construction, not
his right to build.3 0 6
The metropolitan Nuisance Boards would be the logical authority to
administer the fine system since those boards would already be involved
with the nuisance rules. For flexibility, the Boards could be authorized
to levy either periodic fines or permanent fines.30 7 The fines should be
lienable and given priority over most other creditors. Actual collection
of fines might be handled through the property tax assessor's office.
Although fines are an attractive land use control, they are not neces-
sarily the best system for all types of pervasive nuisances. Fines work
best as an internalization device when the harmful activity presents a
simple and objective index of noxiousness; the amount of the fine is
then easily keyed to that index. If no such index exists, the administra-
tive costs of calculation will be higher, and the amount of individual
fines are likely to be so arbitrary that courts will have a difficult time
preventing graft and discrimination.308 Even where a simple, objective
index can be applied, rapid changes in index variables may make fines
unworkable by requiring maintenance of expensive monitoring de-
vices.30 9
There are, however, several pervasively harmful land use activities
now regulated by mandatory governmental controls that are well suited
to being controlled with fines. These activities all present a reasonably
objective index of noxiousness that is negligibly volatile over time.
a. Inadequate provision of internal parking. Street parking in
crowded urban areas, because it is generally offered at a low price level,
is not sufficient to meet the demand for storage space for automobiles.
The failure of a landowner to provide a normal amount of internal
parking can consequently be perceived as unneighborly. The nuisance
remedy, however, may be inefficient where hundreds of landowners who
compete for street parking are affected by another's disproportionate
claim on that commodity. Local governments now deal with this
S00 A sufficiently high fine could have the same allocative consequences as a prohibition.
The thirst of government officials for revenues, however, would dampen the inclination
to levy fines intended as prohibitions. In addition, the calculation of fines can be made
subject to judicial review.
307 Fines on prospective buildings could be estimated at the time of application for a
building permit. This early assessment would assist builders in getting commitments for
construction and permanent loans. Where permanent fines are assessed, the Board might
devise a system of partial rebates for landowners who pay fines and later correct
the offensive condition.
808 Fear of these abuses is probably largely responsible for the notable lack of reliance
on fines as land use controls in the United States.
SO0 Fining erratic patterns of air pollution, noise, or other evanescent harm obviously
might involve great administrative costs.
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problem by drafting minimum standards for internal parking keyed to
housing units, bedrooms, employees, or square feet of floor space.310
These mandatory standards are usually prospective only and thus pri-
marily enforced through preconstruction design reviews. If a Nuisance
Board were to handle parking problems with fines, it would issue
uniform specification standards, based on the same variables as present
standards, that specifically identify unneighborly shortages of parking
space. Fines for violating these standards would apply to both future
and existing uses and would vary among mapped parking zones. Fines
might thus run several thousand dollars a space in areas where street
parking is scarce, yet be waived completely elsewhere. Administrative
costs could be reduced through use of permanent fines, with rebates
available to landowners who later corrected, or partly corrected, viola-
tions.
b. Overhead utility lines. Utility wires and poles visible to many
residents cause pervasive aesthetic damage. Whether the proper inter-
nalization device is a system of rewards for underground wires or a sys-
tem of fines for overhead wires depends on prevailing perceptions of
normalcy. High-tension lines are rare enough today to be treated as
nuisances; as undergrounding becomes more common, ordinary tele-
phone and electric poles may also come to be viewed as unneighborly. A
simple index for calculating fines on utility lines would be the number
of poles located in areas above some threshold population density. More
sophisticated indexes based on the height of the poles or their proximity
to major arteries could be developed at somewhat greater cost. Ad-
ministration of periodic fines would be relatively inexpensive since
there are few utilities and changes in utility networks are incremental
and easily monitored by the utility itself.
c. Front yard setbacks. Front yards affect more people than side
or rear yards because they determine the light, air, and views available to
passing pedestrians and motorists and the ability of those travellers to
avoid cross-traffic at intersections. Mandatory front yard setbacks are
now imposed prospectively and enforced through preconstruction de-
sign reviews.311 This problem might be more flexibly handled through a
system of fines triggered by violations of specification standards issued
by Nuisance Boards. The index for calculating fines might include such
310 See generally D. WrrHEFORD, ZONING, PARKING AND TRAF"IC (1972).
311 Cf. Goreib v. Fox, 274 US. 603 (1927), upholding the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance requiring structures to be set back at least as far as 60 percent of the existing
buildings fronting the street on the same block. See also Comment, Zoning: Setback Lines:
A Reappraisal, 10 WAi. & MARY L. REV. 739 (1969); Comment, Building Size, Shape, and
Placement Regulations: Bulk Control Zoning Reexamined, 60 YALE L.J. 506 (1951).
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variables as distance from the street, street width, and proximity to
intersections.
d. Building heights. Mandatory height restrictions are becoming
popular in many coastal cities where skyscrapers are perceived as
threatening pervasive harm. 12 Fines are again a possible alternative;
they are easily indexed to height and area of silhouettes. Where a low
skyline is strongly valued by the local populace, these fines might be
quite large. Since the damage caused by tall buildings on hillsides and
coastlines may be greater than on flat lands, it would be efficient to vary
the fines among geographic zones. Since the fines would be retrospective,
they would provide incentives for the destruction of existing skyscrapers
perceived as offensive by a metropolitan population.
2. Mandatory Enforcement of Uniform Standards and Prohibitions.
When an activity that causes pervasive harm presents no reasonably
objective indexes of noxiousness a system of fines is likely to be both
administratively costly and arbitrary. In these instances mandatory en-
forcement of minimum standards may be the best method for limiting
damage caused by pervasive nuisances. Mandatory standards involve
great risks, however, and such a system should be compared to the lais-
sez faire approach that is preferable when there is no cost-justified
mechanism for internalizing pervasive nuisance injuries. In addition,
mandatory standards raise difficult equity issues when they are nonuni-
form, either among zones or over time due to prospective application.
To be fair, standards should generally apply across a given metropolitan
area3 13 and, except where obviously inefficient, 314 should be retro-
312 Shortly after San Francisco voters had defeated two initiative measures that would
have imposed strict height limits, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors unanimously
approved an ordinance limiting heights in most residential areas to forty feet. HousE &
HOME, Sept., 1972, at 28. Laguna Beach, California, approved a thirty-six foot height
limit by initiative, but the procedures were later held to violate landowners' rights to due
process. Taschner v. City Council, - Cal. App. 3d -, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973). La Jolla,
California, has enacted a temporary height limit of fifty feet. L.A. Times, Aug. 4, 1971,
at 1, 10. An anti-highrise initiative applicable to coastal areas was approved with 63 percent
of the votes in a November, 1972, election in the City of San Diego; the procedures used in
the initiative are now under constitutional attack. L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1973, Pt. II, p. 4.
313 Several zoning critics have advocated the abolition of zones and suggested that
uniform standards on site planning and building design apply to uses in all locations.
See Pratter & Ward, A New Concept in Residential Zoning, 1971 URBAN LAw ANNUAL 133;
cf. Davis & Winston, The Economics of Complex Systems: The Case of Municipal Zoning,
supra note 2, at 444.
314 Since, for example, the cost of widening streets in existing neighborhoods is much
greater than the cost of building wide streets in new subdivisions, street width standards
that are prospective only may be more efficient than standards that also apply retroac-
tively.
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spective as well as prospective. Since mandatory restraints on normal
behavior are politically unpopular, retrospective mandatory standards
are rarely aimed at activities that are not perceived as unneighborly.
Where the standards are prospective only, the regulatory agency should
usually refrain from forcing above-normal behavior. The Nuisance
Board, metropolitan in scope and expert at identifying unneighborli-
ness, could properly be delegated the basic authority to enact and en-
force mandatory standards for land use. If an activity complies with the
Board's mandatory standards governing it, but is also a nuisance under
the nuisance rules, its neighbors should still be permitted to seek
damages in a private nuisance action. This entitlement provides inter-
nalization where the Board's specification standards are easier to meet
than the general performance standard against unneighborly land use
activities.3 15
Mandatory standards may be the best land use control system for
regulating activities like subdivision design. Subdivision activity may
pervasively disrupt the community road, utility, and drainage net-
works. There is no apparent simple index for assessing fines against
violations of normal standards on subdivision design, and regulatory
taxes that equal the actual damage inflicted would be both expensive
to calculate and difficult for courts to scrutinize. The current system of
mandatory subdivision standards is often discriminatory in that new
315 Most cases hold that permissive zoning is not a defense in a private nuisance action.
See, e.g., Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 281 F.2d 465 (1st Cir. 1960); Sweet v.
Campbell, 282 N.Y. 146, 25 N.E.2d 963 (1940); Reid v. Brodsky, 397 Pa. 463, 156 A.2d 334
(1959). But cf. Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932).
See generally Linden, Strict Liability, Nuisance, and Legislative Authorization, 4
OsCOODE HALL. L.J. 196 (1966); Note, Zoning Ordinances and Common Law Nuisance, 16
SYRAcusE L. REV. 860 (1965); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 659 (1947); Michelman, Book Review,
supra note 11 at 676-79. The cases often fail to consider the kind of relief being sought.
Permissive legislation, if silent about preemption of preexisting nuisance law, should be a
defense against a private suit for injunctive relief, but not against an action for damages.
See Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 781 (1952).
Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes that expressly restrict liability for damages
when a noxious activity is carried out in compliance with statutory standards. For some
British examples, see Coase, Social Cost, supra note 2, at 24. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 731(a)
(West 1954), originally enacted in 1935, provides that if a zoning ordinance expressly per-
mits a manufacturing, commercial, or airport use, that use cannot be privately enjoined
"from the reasonable and necessary operation ... nor shall such use be deemed a nuisance
without evidence of the employment of unnecessary and injurious methods of operation."
This statute properly bars injunctive relief, but might also be construed to bar recovery of
damages by neighbors of uses that do not employ "unnecessary and injurious methods
of operation." The California courts have fortunately not considered this statute much of
a constraint. See Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d 507 (1955)
(damages granted despite permissive zoning, statute not mentioned); Christopher v. Jones,
231 Cal. App. 2d 408, 41 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1964) (limited injunctive relief granted despite
permissive zoning).
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subdivisions are commonly required to be above-normal in quality.
This discrimination could be avoided by making uniform subdivision
standards, where efficient, applicable to both new and existing subdivi-
sions, 310 and by refraining from prospective controls mandating above-
normal conduct.
Pervasive aesthetic blight might also be an appropriate target for
mandatory regulation. Damage from unneighborly signs, for example,
is typically pervasive since signs are intentionally placed where many
people see them. Assessment of fines might be administratively pos-
sible,317 but it seems crude since good barometers for ugliness are
lacking. Assuming mandatory controls are better than a laissez faire ap-
proach, specification standards for signs are needed to simplify adminis-
tration.318 These standards should apply uniformly and usually also
retrospectively in light of the low cost of removing or modifying exist-
ing signs.
VIl. CONCLUSION
The most prevalent systems of land use control in the United States
are neither as efficient nor as equitable as available alternatives. De-
tailed mandatory zoning standards inevitably impair efficient urban
growth and discriminate against migrants, lower classes, and landowners
with little political influence. The elimination of all mandatory zoning
controls on population densities, land use locations, and building bulks
is therefore probably desirable. The alternative proposed in this article
relies primarily on a variety of less centralized devices to internalize
the external costs of unneighborly land use activities; a brief summary
of the proposal will highlight its content.
Consensual systems of internalization-the merger of adjoining land
parcels and covenants between their owners-are good mechanisms
for handling external costs, particularly in areas where much of the land
is still undeveloped. In all locations the wish of landowners to show
good manners to their neighbors, essentially a consensual system,
operates to limit the incidence of nuisances. Although these voluntary
316 In established subdivisions special assessments can raise the revenues needed for
compliance with the standards.
317 The index for fines on signs could be based on variables like brightness, area, height,
or movement. California State Senator Beilenson has proposed an annual tax of fifty cents
per square foot of display area on outdoor signs more than 100 feet away from the premises
to which they relate. This tax would be uniform throughout California and independent
of the height, brightness, or movement of the sign. See Calif. S.B. 708 (1972).
318 Keying standards to street width and speed limits seems appropriate. For model
standards of this sort, see W. EwA.D, JR., & D. MAmEEmRga, SmEr GRAitcs 70-79, 85-105
(1971).
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mechanisms should be strengthened, more coercive devices to dis-
courage unneighborly behavior are also needed.319 Since current nui-
sance law is in disarray, a large part of the analysis was devoted to
developing an efficient and fair set of nuisance rules. It was suggested
that substantial injuries from nuisances be internalized through private
lawsuits by the injured neighbors; a plaintiff entitled to a remedy
would be able to choose between collecting damages and purchasing
the termination of the nuisance at the objective cost of that termination
to the nuisance maker.
Pervasive but individually trivial harms caused by noxious land uses
cannot be efficiently internalized through nuisance suits. These external
costs can best be deterred through: (1) fines, often graduated by geo-
graphic area, levied against the pervasive damage of nuisances that
offer a reasonably stable objective index of noxiousness and (2) selected
uniform mandatory standards applicable to the pervasive nuisances
that do not present such an index. These fines and mandatory standards
should generally apply to both existing and prospective land uses to
assure equal treatment of landowners and to create political pressures
against excessively strict fines or standards. These internalization devices
could be administered by metropolitan Nuisance Boards that would
perform rule making, administrative, and adjudicatory functions within
the guidelines of state law.
The proposed approach is superior to zoning in achieving the funda-
mental goals of a land use control system-efficiency and equity.
Greater reliance on decentralized internalization devices reduces the
potential for high prevention costs inherent in centralized approaches.
Although the administrative costs of the proposed combination of
remedies might be greater than in a system relying heavily on zoning
controls, that difference is likely to be more than compensated for by
allocative efficiencies. To assure equity, arbitrary geographic zones for
standards that are too elusive for effective judicial review should be
avoided; extensive use of zones has resulted in the serious amounts of
graft and discrimination that'now plague zoning. Finally, elimination
of mandatory population density controls can correct the regressive
distributional effects of existing zoning controls.
The recommendations in this article may seem drastic. Houston,
however, has prospered even though it provides considerably fewer
internalization devices than suggested here.320 In that city restrictive
319 Siegan would perhaps disagree. See generally B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrrHour ZONING
(1972).
320 Neither nuisance law nor fines are important in Houston.
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covenants have adequately protected many fine residential areas. 321
Certain aspects of Houston's landscape, however, suggest that a com-
pletely laissez faire distribution of property rights is not the best ap-
proach; people in some metropolitan areas would strongly disapprove of
the number of billboards in Houston.
Finally, a word of caution. Most of the proposals in this article have
been based on intuitive estimates of the allocative and distributional
impacts of alternative internalization systems. Empirical knowledge
about these phenomena is limited, in large part because few major
variants of land use control systems have been attempted in the United
States. The Department of Housing and Urban Development has re-
cently had available for the first time substantial funds for urban re-
search; 322 some of these funds could be used to finance state and local
experimentation with new varieties of land use controls. Without more
experimentation future governmental interventions in land use markets
will continue to be potentially destructive. Unfortunately, the current
trend seems to be toward stricter mandatory controls. Zoning is today
out of control and must be severely curtailed, if not entirely replaced.
321 Houston has no use controls and no significant density restrictions. The subdivision
ordinance requires that new buildings have twenty-five foot front yard setbacks. A
parking ordinance requires that new residential projects provide one or more parking
spaces per dwelling unit, depending on the number of bedrooms. The Houston building
code also contains some provisions regulating the distance between buildings. Siegan, Non-
Zoning, supra note 2, at 75-76. For a mixture of views on the appearance of Houston, see
136 ARcmTCrauAL FoRUm, April, 1972, at 24-39.
322 In the early seventies HUD has been awarded annual appropriations of about $50
million for research and technology, three or four times the level of appropriations in
the late sixties.
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